Deadlines for signing peace agreements have come and gone, in Burundi and Darfur — two of Africa’s most vexed trouble spots — illustrating that pressure tactics are not always the answer.
Arm-twisting might force warring parties to the negotiating table — and even get them to sign agreements. But these often fall apart when they cannot be implemented.
The National Liberation Forces (FNL) of Agathon Rwasa in Burundi were due to sign their deal with the government of President Pierre Nkurunziza last month, according to South African Minister of Safety and Security Charles Nqakula, who has taken over mediation of that issue.
He has been back to Dar es Salaam twice since and has not succeeded in getting the rebel movement to put pen to paper.
His last deadline for all parties to finalise preparations and to begin immediate negotiations on the comprehensive ceasefire was Thursday. South African Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aziz Pahad could not say what would happen if the deadline were ignored.
Sources close to the talks say the FNL has eased back on its demand for the Burundi security forces to be dismantled to allow for its rebel fighters to be folded into their ranks.
This is certainly an advance on the deadlocked position a fortnight ago.
But the FNL is still seeking assurances about representation in the year-old government, led by former Hutu rebel comrades-in-arms.
Last weekend there were clashes between the FNL and government forces within earshot of the capital Bujumbura.
Hanging over Rwasa’s head is the threat of being branded a terrorist with all the accompanying international sanctions, including a travel ban.
But this same menace was used against Nkurunziza when he was a recalcitrant rebel leader — without much effect.
Eventually it was patience and compromise that got Nkrunziza’s Forces for the Defence of Democracy out of the bush and into the corridors of power.
In Sudan’s lacerated western region of Darfur, some sections of the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) have signed a deal with the government of Omar al Bashir.
That group is now fighting pitched battles with SLA elements that have refused to sign. More than 80 people died this week and the signatory group led by Minni Minnawi is reportedly using tactics identical to those of the pro-government militia known as the Janjawid — including rape and attacking innocent civilians.
Nevertheless, Al Bashir has managed to persuade his African peers and the United Nations that the only way to achieve peace in Darfur is to turn the screws on the SLA factions that have yet to sign the peace deal.
”The Western powers don’t understand the dynamics of peace-brokering in Africa,” said Dr Timothy Othieno of the Institute for Global Dialogue in Midrand.
”They use high-pressure tactics to get the parties to sign and then head home claiming credit for getting those signatures. A couple of months down the line we end up with nothing as the parties are unable to implement what they were forced to agree.”
Othieno says the parties in Darfur have learned from the experience of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), which signed a peace deal nearly two years ago between north and south Sudan after the continent’s longest-running civil war.
”Minnawi struck his own deal with Khartoum. The other factions in Darfur don’t want to make the same mistake as the SPLA, who believed they were signing a peace deal that would see them sharing in the oil wealth of Sudan.
”Now the SPLA is told that only the oil in southern Sudan is to be shared. Not surprisingly the SLA elements in Darfur say they cannot sign something just to appease the mediators. They are looking for cast-iron guarantees before agreeing to anything.
”Too often the mediation believes that once they have the signatures on paper peace will prevail. This is not necessarily the case.”