Alphabetical misfortune dictated that the president of Zimbabwe should be the last African leader to shake the hand of the Chinese President, Hu Jintao.
I almost felt sorry for Robert Mugabe as he loped across the reception room in the Great Hall of the People and the cameras whirred for the 42nd time. At last November’s Africa Summit in Beijing, he was just one among dozens craving Chinese investment, loans, aid and political support.
In his dotage, Mugabe sees the events of 30 years ago more vividly than the present. He characterises Chinese interest in Zimbabwe as the actions of a friend in solidarity, dating back to the days of the liberation struggle.
“You gave us all the means with which we prosecuted our struggle and I say a good friend is one who stands by you when you are in trouble,” he told Liu Zhufeng, the Assistant Minister for Construction, who visited Harare with a 13-strong delegation of Chinese businesspeople in March, a few days after the United States and Britain had condemned police attacks on the opposition. In Mugabe’s view, Zimbabwe was “being faced by a struggle against great powers”, and China was its ally.
The view from Beijing is quite different.
“It’s quite easy for Chinese to become rich in Zimbabwe,” said Wu Jiangtao, dubbed “the most successful Chinese businessman in Zimbabwe” in a story carried by the official news agency, Xinhua, in January. In February, China Business News ran articles about the relative merits of starting furniture, glass and steel parts factories in Zimbabwe. Wang Wenming, described as “a former business diplomat to Africa”, told of a Chinese garment factory that recouped its initial investment in the first year.
The Chinese are in Africa for business, raw materials and to shore up African support over Taiwan and other matters of Chinese concern in the United Nations. They do not care if a state abuses human rights, but nor do they like instability and conflict that may interfere with the viability of their investments. Zimbabwe is important only inasmuch as it helps the Chinese project.
Nor are the Chinese blind to Zimbabwe’s problems, despite the rhetoric of support for the government carried in the official media.
“The Zimbabwean people seem to be closer and closer to the edge of tolerance,” said a Shanghai newspaper in mid-2006, in a report quoted widely throughout the Chinese media. “Although the national security police are everywhere, the people can’t help complaining in public. No one has a good word for the current government.”
All of which is good news for a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe. Resentment against China is widespread, as Chinese traders selling cheap goods widely derided as “zhing zhongs” have replaced indigenous businesses wiped out by Operation Murambatsvina. Then there are the stories of the buses from the Chinese company First Automobile Works that never moved from the garage, and the Air Zimbabwe planes that never flew. The opposition is angry because the Chinese provided the technology that jams SW Radio Africa, and the weapons the government bartered for tobacco and gold.
But resentment and anger will not help the economy recover. While Zimbabwe descended into its nightmare, the world outside changed. The West continued its long-term retreat, and China started to penetrate Africa. Managing Chinese investment and interests is one of the biggest challenges facing African governments in the first part of the 21st century, and a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe will be no exception.
China has a well worked out policy towards Africa, but fragmented, often ill-governed Africa with its different, sometimes competing states, has no coherent policy towards China. As a new government in Harare figures out its priorities, it will need to develop a pragmatic stance, preferably in concert with South Africa, which has a more mature approach to China than most African countries.
Take the March visit of the construction delegation. Mugabe wanted Chinese companies to build rural homes because he sees rural Zimbabweans having “more loyalty than the urban people”. A new government in Harare would probably want a rapid programme of urban regeneration to help those still destitute after Operation Murambatsvina. Chinese companies might be the best placed to provide low-cost housing. Keen to get contracts, Chinese companies often undercut their Western competitors. State-backed, their services may be bundled with loans or barter deals. This could be exactly what Zimbabwe needs.
Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC leader, told me: “Another two years of this, and Zimbabwe’s economy could still recover. Beyond that, I just don’t know.” That was five years ago. Zimbabwe’s economy will never look as it did before. Commercial farming can contribute to a new economy but it is unlikely to return to its previous dominant position, so new sectors must rise.
Zimbabwe has the world’s second-largest reserves of platinum; China is now the world’s largest buyer. Mugabe may delude himself into thinking that Chinese investment is some sort of charitable project but a new government must strike a good bargain. Chinese businesspeople and diplomats negotiate down to the wire, so a new Zimbabwean government must be prepared to take a tough stance. This is not a colonial relationship, but a modern exchange — willing buyer, willing seller.
On joint ventures and long-term supply contracts for platinum and other minerals, the Zimbabwean government needs to hold out for good working conditions, a ban on the import of unskilled labour and reasonable tax revenue. Of course, the Chinese will threaten to go elsewhere, but there are a limited number of places they can go. Zimbabwe is in a strong position.
The biggest factor working against Zimbabwean national interests will be corruption. The Chinese have no compunction about bribing to get a deal that works for them. Any new government in Harare will be unable to negotiate effectively with the Chinese if individuals taking decisions can be persuaded to back down by inducements.
When Mugabe goes — whether a political compromise or death carries him off — Western governments and international financial organisations will rush to Zimbabwe’s rescue. Huge amounts will be promised, vast numbers of foreign experts will offer their services. But maybe one of the most helpful things Western donors can do is to help Zimbabweans deal with the Chinese.
And maybe the best thing Zimbabwe’s new rulers can do is to discard any anti-Chinese sentiment they may harbour and concentrate on getting a good deal. That, after all, is what will benefit the Zimbabwean people, as they emerge from the long years of poverty and repression.
Lindsey Hilsum is Channel 4 News Beijing correspondent. Additional research by Kuang Ling