There was nothing unlawful about the way former national cricketer Garth le Roux and his accountant dealt with commissions for property sales, their lawyers have told the Wynberg Regional Court.
The court was on Wednesday hearing a second day of closing arguments in the trial of Le Roux and accountant Deon van Heerden on a string of income and value-added tax fraud charges.
The charges centre on Le Roux’s activities as an agent selling properties at the upmarket Fancourt golf estate in George.
The state claims he and three of his companies illegally evaded tax through an arrangement that saw his companies buy Fancourt properties at a reduced price while foreswearing commission owed by Fancourt’s controlling company, Plattner, on other sales.
In heads of argument submitted to the court, advocate Wim Trengove, for Le Roux, said the commission sacrifice transactions were ”perfectly lawful and innocent”.
”There was nothing sinister about them. They were openly and honestly done by everybody involved in them,” he said.
All the sacrifices were made because Le Roux wanted to buy property before he had enough cash to pay for it.
Trengove rejected the state’s claim that there was no true discount or reduction in the purchase price.
”It was as a matter of law a sale at a discount,” he said.
The Le Roux company entitled to the commissions, Marketime CC, had sacrificed them before it became unconditionally entitled to them.
For this reason, the commissions never accrued to Marketime in terms of tax legislation.
Nor did the discounts constitute ”amounts” within the meaning of tax law.
In his heads of argument for Van Heerden, advocate Andre la Grange said it was clear that the transaction was not, as the court had earlier suggested, ”probably more of a barter”.
Though Marketime had sacrificed the commissions, the benefits of the discounts had gone to the other two Le Roux companies.
He echoed Trengove’s argument that the commissions had been sacrificed before Marketime became entitled to them.
La Grange said key elements of the state case were based only on hearsay, and that a number of documents on which it sought to rely were ruled inadmissible.
He said if at the end of the day there was doubt over an accused’s guilt, the court was obliged to acquit.
In this matter, it was significant that the state, in its closing arguments, had raised a list of questions which it said remained unclear.
Every one of these related to factual issues where the burden of proof rested on the state. — Sapa