Had the army not pulled the rug from under Hosni Mubarak’s feet, siding with protesters in Tahrir Square, the story of Egypt’s revolution might have resembled more closely those of Syria, Yemen and even Libya.
A bitter confrontation would have cost hundreds, if not thousands, of lives, significantly delaying the former president’s fall. The chant that reverberated around Egypt’s squares in the early post-Mubarak days, as euphoric Egyptians embraced soldiers, was “The people and the army are one hand”. This was not only the people’s revolution but the army’s, too. However, it is now clear that the army does not perceive itself as a partner in the revolution, but as its representative and guardian: the sole bearer of its legitimacy.
The honeymoon between the military and protesters did not last long. Tahrir Square, once the scene of wild celebrations, turned into a battlefield as the army moved to disperse activists, beating them with clubs and electric rods and even firing live ammunition, leading to many casualties. Hundreds have been thrown in jail.
Between January and end-August, almost 12 000 civilians were tried in military tribunals — far more than Mubarak managed in 30 years of dictatorship. Torture by police and military personnel remains widespread, with hundreds of reports of beatings, electrocution and even sexual assault.
Days after assuming power the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces began to talk tough, declaring that it would not tolerate strikes, pickets “or any action that disrupts the country’s security” and imposing prison sentences on those who defied the ban. The army has since introduced a ban on public protest and curfews — although this seems to have strengthened activists’ resolve, as frequent demonstrations in Tahrir Square testify.
Exploiting the climate of tension heightened by the recent storming of the Israeli embassy, the army reactivated the state of emergency, announcing that it would remain in force until June next year. This dashed popular demands for a swift end to the draconian code that formed the constitutional underpinning for Mubarak’s dictatorship and served as his chief means of stifling dissent for three decades.
In an indication of the widening rift between the judiciary and the army, Tareq al-Bishri, a respected judge who chaired the committee for the revision of the Constitution, responded by declaring martial law invalid from September 20, as stipulated by article 59 of the constitutional referendum that was held in March.
If the state of emergency is one focus of mounting political discontent, elections pledged for this month are another. The supreme council recently announced that elections would be held in November instead, with no guarantee that the new date would be honoured.
Party proportional list system
A complex set of electoral rules has not improved matters, with political parties demanding a vote exclusively based on the party proportional list system, and the army allowing individual candidacy as well — a move critics say is designed to enable remnants of the old regime to sneak back to power.
Such fears have been intensified by the enlarging of electoral districts, making it difficult for citizens to vote and candidates to organise election campaigns over vast areas such as “north Cairo”, which includes five million citizens.
The backdrop of all the army’s decisions over the past eight months is concern over its position in the emerging political system. The generals realise that there can be no return to 1952, when the “Free Officers” seized power and subsequently controlled the political arena for more than two decades. But they seem unwilling to retreat to their barracks without first gaining the upper hand in internal and foreign policy matters.
It is not the day-to-day running of the country that interests the army. It wants to have a tight grip on strategic decisions and budgetary distribution. Above all, it wants to insulate the military itself from public scrutiny. That is the reason why the army has moved to lay down a “declaration of basic principles” that would grant it sweeping authority to intervene in civilian politics.
In a telling statement, Major General Mamdouh Shaheen, a council member, declared: “We want a model similar to that found in Turkey … Egypt, as a country, needs to protect democracy from the Islamists, because we know that these people do not think democratically.”
This was the justification used by Arab dictators to legitimise Âdespotism over decades.
Shaheen’s statement may be greeted warmly in London, Washington and Tel Aviv by those anxious to Âprevent meaningful change. Whether in suits or uniforms, the interests of the region’s autocrats seem destined to converge with those of the great Western powers. In this unholy marriage of internal and external obstructors of genuine reform lies the tragic plight of democracy and democrats in Arab lands. —