As a panellist at a climate-change seminar at COP17 in Durban, I remarked that although there was the potential for 460 000 jobs to be created in the green economy over the next 15 years, this was not the same thing as the probability of these jobs actually materialising.
Creating green jobs will require the state to integrate planning, co-ordinate institutions and manage projects. The Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) co-produced the report quantifying potential green jobs, a report that has been commended as contributing to rigorous evidence-based policy-making. Yet, as anyone familiar with the issues would agree, for these potential green jobs to be created, the facilitative role of the state is crucial.
Indeed, South Africa’s lack of institutional ability to implement its policies is the biggest single weakness facing the country’s development. That may sound like the argument of a technocrat, overlooking the political questions, but it is not.
Institutional capabilities are indeed enmeshed in politics, but the politics of a failing state are a lot more shrill and negative than those of a state able to deliver on its electoral promises. Therefore, regardless of the ideological bent of the party or “broad church” in government, there needs to be an administrative machine in place that can go beyond political rhetoric. South Africa’s post-1994 history has been rich in policy ideas but generally poor in programmatic and project implementation.
The need for institutional capability is even more crucial for South Africa given the development requirements facing the country. Truth be told, the economy can grow moderately for years without creating a single new job for the 37% of the working-age population that is unemployed or discouraged . In short, the market economy is stuck in a low-employment equilibrium.
To break out of this structural trap, an activist state is necessary. The fashionable description of such a state is the developmental state. It is important to remember, however, that historically no such state (such as Japan or South Korea) ever conferred such a title on itself. Rather, they were described as such by others, based on what they had achieved. South Africa is the first country to declare its intention of becoming a developmental state.
At the heart of all these successfully developmental states was an ability to achieve a sufficient degree of what they set out to achieve.
The recent work of the National Planning Commission (NPC) begins to grapple with the challenge. The NPC highlighted the fact that the performance of the public service has been uneven. Moreover, the weaknesses in capacity are often most serious in disadvantaged areas where state intervention is most needed.
In response to these challenges, the NPC proposed a focus on managing the political-administrative interface by building a professional public service. The NPC also proposed that recruitment and management be based on expertise and experience and that public service and local government be made into careers of choice.
To be sure, South Africa has made determined efforts since 1994 to build a state that is appropriate to the new dispensation.
The first phase of state reform, from 1994 to 1999, focused on new policies, laws and institutional restructuring. Some argue that because of this focus the government put less emphasis on service delivery. A strong focus on representativity has been a characteristic of post-apartheid public-sector reforms; it often superseded other reforms. To an extent, this could attune the public service to the needs of the people they are meant to serve. By December 2001, 85% of public servants were previously disadvantaged individuals, including 66% of management.
In the second phase, between late 1999 and 2004, government focused on microeconomic reforms to correct market failures. Growth sectors were identified. Job summits and advisory councils were convened. Yet, even where the will to implement existed, the administrative capacity of the state to pursue such sector-based industrial policy was severely questioned.
In the third phase, from 2004 to 2009, proposals on better planning and co-ordination began to emerge. Plans to integrate the national, provincial and local spheres of government into a single public service were developed during this period. A draft Single Public Service Bill is currently on the table.
The fourth phase of reform started in 2009 with the new administration. President Jacob Zuma indicated that his presidency would focus on producing a more rational and streamlined chain of command, to enhance co-ordination and ultimately to facilitate delivery and improved governance at all levels. A performance-monitoring and evaluation department was created to oversee the performance of government at all levels. The NPC was set up to facilitate long-term planning and co-ordinated governance.
Administratively, this fourth phase has set South Africa on the right course — potentially. The NPC proposals mentioned earlier, as part of the country’s first national plan, continue in the right direction.
Still, there remain three prerequisites — all in the political sphere — if South Africa is to improve implementation.
First, political governance and professional management are both needed, rather than these being binary opposites. The former entails political leadership to guide the state strategically. The latter is the responsibility of political leadership: to ensure that there is professional management in place, so that the state works. It is interesting to note that even in China, with all its political controls, there is a heavy emphasis on management competence within the state. Second- and third-tier leadership are trained and exposed to technical experience in anticipation of assuming their administrative leadership roles. France and Singapore are among the best examples of selecting, grooming and retaining a highly competent layer of top management in the civil service.
Second, we must not assume that the growing insistence on competency and skills is resistance to affirmative action. With rising numbers of black graduates, skills and transformation are no longer contradictory. Even though there are national skills shortages, these do not stop the state from attracting skills for targeted interventions. For example, the number of black chartered accountants (CAs) has increased by 237% since 2002 to more than 5 000 (out of a total of 31 000). Thus, if the state wants to turn around financial management in dysfunctional municipalities, for instance, there is no reason why it cannot insist on finding and incentivising 100 competent CAs for the most troubled municipalities.
Third, we need a high degree of realism about what policies we can implement. We need to set our policies to the implementation capacity we have, not to the capacity we wish we had. We need political leadership that is mature enough not to make excessive promises to the electorate, as well as a professional management that can give honest advice to the political leadership.
The state could also enhance capacity through public-public partnerships. Development-finance institutions, state-owned enterprises and particular government units can together implement priority programmes. Partnerships with civil society and business, as part of a “South Africa Incorporated” approach, could further build on these public-public partnerships.
As we head for 20 years of democracy, more positive results need to be shown. It is therefore a political imperative that the state works — and that achieving our national potential becomes a high probability.
Ravi Naidoo is group executive for development planning at the DBSA
For the latest COP17 news and special features view our special report.
