Zambia’s president Hakainde Hichilema this week secured a second term with 60% of the vote and, in the process, overturned one of the key pre-election assumptions: that economic pain, particularly in the cities, would translate into a decisive rejection of his government.
The 13 August election was widely seen as a referendum on Hichilema’s economic reforms, which included cuts to government subsidies on fuel and electricity and triggered a jump in the cost of living. Going into the election, there were two competing narratives. Hichilema’s governing United Party for National Development (UPND) presented a story of restoring macroeconomic stability through debt restructuring, a stable exchange rate, reduced inflation and increased investor confidence. The opposition dismissed that as a mirage and sought to turn economic frustration into a winning message.
But the election result suggests voters did not treat their economic grievances as sufficient reason to remove Hichilema. His victory is seen as more than a second term. It is an opportunity for him to convert macroeconomic gains into benefits families can feel.
“It was politically risky because macroeconomic reforms do not always produce immediate benefits,” says economist Lubinda Haabazoka. “The overwhelming mandate represents public recognition that, although the cost of living remains a serious challenge, Zambia is no longer where it was in 2021.”
Why, then, was a government facing economic grievances difficult to dislodge?
The opposition failed to provide a compelling alternative. Most of their proposals revolved around continuing what the current government is already implementing. As such, most voters saw nothing fundamentally different to make them switch. More importantly, the main opposition figures were associated with the previous administration and were blamed for creating the economic problems the UPND inherited. This made it harder for the opposition to present themselves as a credible break from the past. For many voters, the choice was not simply between a government struggling with the economy and a promising alternative but between an incumbent they believed was addressing inherited problems and opposition figures associated with their origins.
Hichilema retained credibility on economic management. Although the economy has not yet delivered to everyone’s satisfaction, his reforms and long-term view of development were seen as more persuasive than some of the quick fixes his opponents were offering on the campaign trail.
Away from the middle-class frustrations of the cities, Hichilema delivered something rural voters could see and feel. Free education from primary to secondary, school feeding programmes, social cash transfers, hiring thousands of new teachers and health workers and investment in new schools, health facilities, roads, bridges and agricultural support gave the government a tangible presence in communities. Consequently, the results show that the incumbent made deep inroads even in opposition strongholds, suggesting that for many rural voters, the benefits of public services outweighed the economic hardships dominating the urban debate.
The president succeeded in reaching young people in colleges and universities, a crucial and politically influential demographic. Through scholarships and meal allowances, he connected with a constituency that is politically vocal and highly sensitive to economic pressures. In an election where jobs and the cost of living were major issues, these programmes gave Hichilema a direct connection with students and their families, helping him build support beyond his traditional bases.
The UPND broadened its 2021 coalition, retaining its traditional strongholds in Southern, Western and North-Western provinces, while making big gains in areas once firmly associated with the PF. Crucially, it also ate into the opposition’s expected dominance in Lusaka and the Copperbelt.
Hichilema benefitted from the advantage of incumbency, with the visibility, institutional reach and political networks built over time. Government programmes were identifiable across the country, while the ruling party could campaign around the benefits it had delivered. In contrast, the opposition had to convince voters to abandon an incumbent who was already able to point to concrete achievements.
The opposition coalition
The opposition’s 38% understates how significant its performance was. Few expected the fragmented opposition to consolidate enough support to seriously threaten Hichilema. But the result exposed a substantial reservoir of anti-UPND sentiment that the ruling party had badly underestimated.
Until May, it appeared Hichilema was heading for an effortless second term. Within the UPND, the assumption that “there’s no opposition” had become dangerously comfortable. That changed when former minister Brian Mundubile stepped forward to lead the opposition under the banner of the Tonse Alliance. Elements of the former ruling Patriotic Front (PF), which lost power five years ago, rallied behind him, turning what had looked like a routine re-election into a genuine contest. The emerging coalition gave the opposition momentum and jolted the UPND into a late campaign frenzy.
The coalition’s breakthrough was its ability to reassemble much of the old PF vote. In the Northern, Eastern, Luapula and Muchinga provinces, former PF loyalties provided a ready-made electoral base, allowing the opposition to secure support that had previously been scattered among competing parties and candidates. What the UPND had dismissed as a disjointed opposition suddenly looked like a coherent political bloc.
The opposition had also hoped to sweep Lusaka and the Copperbelt, the country’s most populous and politically competitive provinces, where the cost-of-living crisis and urban grievances were expected to work heavily against Hichilema. But the president denied them that surge, effectively splitting the two provinces down the middle. That meant the opposition could not turn urban discontent into the massive swing it needed to seriously threaten Hichilema nationally. Ultimately, the opposition fell short but it succeeded in giving the incumbent a real scare.
The parliamentary matrix
The parliamentary result is significant because Zambia was voting under a substantially changed electoral system. Constitutional amendments passed last December expanded the number of constituency-based seats from 156 to 226 and introduced a mixed-member proportional representation system designed to widen the representation of marginalised groups. The 40 additional seats are allocated according to parties’ presidential vote shares, with 20 reserved for women, 15 for young people and five for persons with disabilities. Hichilema also has the power to nominate another 11 MPs, giving him another opportunity to shape the composition of the enlarged assembly.
The final tally for the 226 elective seats was still being compiled but preliminary figures put the UPND at 137 seats, Mundubile’s NRPUP at 60, independents at 20, with the remainder going to smaller parties. The numbers suggest that Hichilema has not just secured a presidential mandate but also has considerable legislative room to pursue his second-term agenda. The parliamentary result also shows that the opposition has a substantial platform from which to organise and challenge the government.
The democratic space
Hichilema’s second term begins with questions about the state of Zambia’s democratic space. Local and international civil society groups have criticised him over the use of cyber laws and the prosecution of opposition figures, arguing that such measures risk narrowing the space for legitimate dissent.
But in his victory speech, Hichilema strongly pushed back, saying criticism of his government was welcome, but criminal activities and actions undermining state security would not be tolerated.
His comments came against a backdrop of heightened tensions. A day after the vote, authorities raided Mundubile’s home in Lusaka, where they said they found “high-grade military gadgets” and arrested several opposition figures. Mundubile denies the allegations. The confrontation had been building before election day. Two weeks earlier, Mundubile’s campaign disclosed that three members of his team sent to Russia for training in VVIP protection were missing. Authorities later announced they had arrested the trio upon their return, accusing them of plotting an insurrection, an allegation the opposition rejected.
These incidents have raised concerns about the boundaries between legitimate security enforcement and political repression. The government insists it is acting against genuine threats to national security; the opposition sees a pattern of intimidation. How these cases are handled and whether the allegations are tested in court, will be an important measure of the political climate Hichilema intends to preside over in his second term.
The mandate and the test Hichilema’s victory is more complicated than the 60% suggests. He overcame economic discontent, held his traditional bases, chipped into opposition territory and prevented the opposition from sweeping the urban centres it had counted on. At the same time, the opposition’s 38% showed that Zambia remains politically competitive and that the UPND’s assumption that it had no serious challenger was badly misplaced.
The opposition came out energised. At a time when Hichilema appeared to be cruising towards an easy re-election, it succeeded in making the contest genuinely competitive and forcing the incumbent to fight for votes he might once have taken for granted. Its challenge now is to turn that 38% into something more durable than an election alliance.
The 2026 election, therefore, did not amount to a simple endorsement of Hichilema’s economic record. It was a vote for continuity.