/ 16 August 2022

Slate politics reflects the decline of the ANC

ANC spokesperson Pule Mabe said the ruling party was following its internal disciplinary policy and would ensure appropriate action was taken.

In a 1956 speech at the 20th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the then leader of the USSR, Nikita Khrushchev, introduced the term “cult of personality” to criticise the devotion to Joseph Stalin, who had died three years earlier. 

Stalin led the Soviet Union after the death of Vladimir Lenin in 1924.  As a result of his five-year plans, the country underwent agricultural collectivisation and rapid industrialisation, creating a centralised command economy. While this would have devastating consequences on the working class and peasants, it would set parameters for Stalin’s absolute control of the party and the state. Stalin would use this power to entrench himself, facilitating the politics of a personality cult. This would be challenged many years later by Khrushchev, who denounced Stalin’s rule and initiated the de-Stalinisation of the Soviet Union.

The politics of the personality cult are finding expression in South Africa’s governing party, which was once hailed for its role in the struggle for liberation. The ANC is now a shadow of its former self and breeds corruption and lawlessness, leading to the obliteration of its hegemony in electoral politics. In an attempt to gain back its dwindling support, it has resorted to politics of the personality cult. 

This is not a new phenomenon in the ANC. Over the years, we have seen leaders being accorded saviour status. ANC Ekurhuleni regional chairperson Mzwandile Masina argues that this tendency is rooted in the great man theory. In 2007, Jacob Zuma became the ANC president after he was touted as the man to save the ANC from Thabo Mbeki, who wanted to bring an end to the tradition that automatically renders the leader of the ANC the president of the state. 

But the conference in Polokwane was more than a contest between Zuma and Mbeki. It was about one faction of the ANC overthrowing another and seizing control. This gave rise to slate politics, with the Zuma slate occupying all top six positions in the ANC and dominating the 80-member national executive committee. 

Kgalema Motlanthe’s unsuccessful bid for the ANC presidency in 2012 saw his camp lose to Zuma and his faction. The “construct” by the media and civil society of Cyril Ramaphosa as someone who would undo the damage of the “nine wasted years” saw him win the presidency by a slim margin over Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma at Nasrec in 2017. This time, the top six positions were divided equally, with the positions of president, chairperson and treasurer held by one faction and the secretary general, deputy secretary general and the deputy president held by the other. 

A similar phenomenon took place at the ANC Gauteng conference in June this year when Panyaza Lesufi’s “‘panya panya” slate went head to head with Lebohang Maile’s “adiwele” slate. The former won the positions of chairperson, deputy chairperson and treasurer while the secretariat was won by the latter slate. But the 30-member provincial executive committee was dominated by 22 members of the “adiwele” slate. This is an organisation that is at war with itself. 

When reflecting on five years since the party’s Nasrec conference, the ANC has failed largely because it is not united and party politics find expression in governance and service delivery — and, to some extent, uses state institutions to purge and settle political scores. 

Now, is the ANC in Gauteng able to maintain its hegemony in the country’s economic hub against the Democratic Alliance, the Economic Freedom Fighters and the new kid on the block, ActionSA? Can this divided provincial executive committee prevent these other parties from taking it below 50% in 2024? 

Since Nasrec, the party has deteriorated to a point where it recorded its worst electoral performance in last year’s local government elections. The president of the party said the ANC was not desperate to be in power and that it had not really lost elections, while suspended secretary general, Ace Magashule said: “We lost elections. If you lose power it means you have lost power, if you are not in charge of the government it means you are not in charge, you have lost power.” Two senior leaders of the ANC are at loggerheads with each other over the characterisation of the party’s electoral performance and slate politics are the cause of this division. 

Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga, Gauteng and North West have seen their provincial conferences dominated and marred by issues of credentials — the process of determining who is eligible to vote for the incoming leaders. What this tells us is that the party has inculcated a culture of prioritising leadership tussles over policy imperatives.

This stands in stark contrast to, for instance, the conferences in 1997 and 2002, where, at the former, several slates competed for the positions of chairperson, deputy secretary general and treasurer general, but there was consensus regarding the positions of president, deputy president and secretary general. To avoid a slate strategy, the ultimate outcome was leaders who did not always concur with the dominant slate. Similar consensus-building techniques were used at the 2002 Stellenbosch national conference. In the elections of 1999 and 2004, the ANC was able to strengthen its position and increase the size of its national majority thanks to this approach.

The underlying issue is that slate politics is not just about party positions. It is about one group seizing power, dominating the ANC and, by extension, the government and having access to resources. What this tells us is there is no separation between party and state and, with two groups leading one organisation, governance and running of the nation’s affairs are affected by this phenomenon in the ANC. 

Because it is hostile to its tradition of compromise, the ANC cannot continue to uphold a particular democratic procedure or concept that permits slate politics. Empirical research shows that this strategy causes the party to become more polarised and weaker. 

Vusi Gumbi is a research assistant at the Institute for Pan African Thought and Conversation at the University of Johannesburg.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Mail & Guardian.