The US's decision to impose sanctions on Kigali's Gasabo Gold Refinery Ltd has once again brought international sanctions policy in the Great Lakes region into focus.
Washington presents the measure as part of a broader effort to disrupt financial networks believed to sustain instability in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and reinforce accountability in the mineral economy.
In isolation, the decision fits within a well-established foreign policy instrument. Placed in the broader diplomatic architecture, however, it raises a question: Can the principal sponsor and guarantor of a peace agreement exercise unilateral coercive measures against one of the parties without affecting confidence in its own mediation role?
The question goes to the heart of the Washington Accord for Peace and Prosperity. The accord was presented as a framework designed to reduce tension between Rwanda and the DRC while laying the foundations for regional stability and economic cooperation. Its significance lies in the commitments undertaken by Kigali and Kinshasa and the US's central role as facilitator, guarantor and principal diplomatic sponsor.
The position requires the confidence of all parties that the rules of engagement are applied consistently and impartially. The confidence becomes harder to sustain when coercive measures appear to be directed more frequently toward one side of a conflict that is more complex than a binary confrontation.
Eastern Congo is a layered security crisis involving the Congolese Armed Forces, the AFC/M23 movement, hundreds of armed groups operating across the eastern provinces, the Wazalendo militias integrated into Kinshasa's military strategy, foreign military contractors engaged by the Congolese government and neighbouring states whose security concerns intersect with regional grievances. Among the dynamics remains the FDLR, a movement rooted in the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, which Rwanda continues to regard as an existential security threat.
Against this backdrop, sanctions must also be evaluated in terms of whether they contribute to a political environment that encourages reciprocal compliance with commitments. Earlier sanctions directed at the Rwanda Defence Force were likewise presented as tools intended to support de-escalation and reinforce accountability.
Peace processes depend on perceptions of fairness. When the principal guarantor of a peace agreement applies coercive pressure in ways that appear asymmetrical, it raises questions about even-handedness.
The accord did not establish obligations for Rwanda alone. It was designed as a reciprocal framework, complemented by parallel negotiation tracks between Kinshasa and the AFC/M23 facilitated in Doha and subsequently in Switzerland.
Yet implementation has been uneven. Publicly available information and statements from the parties indicate divergence over key commitments, including ceasefire arrangements and provisions linked to parallel negotiation outcomes. The perception has emerged that implementation is asymmetric while diplomatic pressure has not been.
A peace architecture cannot function effectively if obligations are perceived as selectively enforced. The same concern extends to other dimensions of the conflict. Kinshasa's reliance on Wazalendo militias in its military strategy is publicly acknowledged, as is its engagement of foreign military contractors. Africa also possesses a legal framework addressing such practices through the 1977 OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, which reflects a continental position on the destabilising effects of mercenary activity.
The economic dimension of sanctions cannot be separated from perception. The targeting of mineral-related infrastructure occurs at a time when several African states, Rwanda and Uganda among them, are investing in domestic refining capacity to capture greater value from their natural resources. There is no basis for attributing improper motives to the measures. Yet in international politics, perceptions often shape legitimacy.
What emerges from the overlapping dynamics is a broader structural concern. Peace agreements are sustained not only by the commitments of the signatories but also by the credibility of those tasked with facilitating their implementation. If a guarantor is perceived as applying pressure asymmetrically, the perception affects confidence in the process. Once the confidence erodes, diplomatic initiatives risk being interpreted through the lens of alignment rather than impartial facilitation.
Economic measures remain a legitimate instrument when calibrated and embedded in a coherent political strategy. But they cannot substitute for diplomacy nor can they resolve conflicts rooted in governance deficits, contested authority, regional insecurity, historical grievances and mutual distrust.
The Washington Accord represents an opportunity to move beyond conflict management towards genuine conflict resolution. Its success will not be measured by the sanctions imposed or statements issued but by whether it succeeds in establishing a framework in which all parties believe the commitments are applied evenly and expectations are shared. It will endure only when the architecture of peace is regarded as impartial, consistent and credible by those it seeks to bind. That is the real test facing the Washington Accord and its principal guarantor.