The increasingly bitter trade war between the United States and Canada is raising new questions about the future of the two countries’ decades-long economic and political partnership. It is also forcing Ottawa to reconsider how it manages its dependence on Washington.
Canada’s retaliatory tariffs on US goods and Washington’s new restrictions on Canadian products have transformed what was once a largely stable economic relationship into a source of growing uncertainty. Tensions took another turn after US President Donald Trump shared a social media post depicting Canada, Mexico, Greenland and Iceland as if they were US territories.
Yet Ottawa is not seeking to sever its relationship with Washington. The United States remains Canada’s most important economic and security partner. Instead, under Prime Minister Mark Carney, Canada appears increasingly focused on reducing its vulnerability to dependence on a single market and a single major power.
Its expanding diplomatic and economic engagement with Africa, Europe and Asia suggests that Ottawa is pursuing what can be described as a “middle power” strategy: not confronting a superpower directly, but increasing its own room for manoeuvre by developing multiple partnerships.
A speech by Canada’s High Commissioner to South Africa, James Christoff, at the newly established Nucleus think tank in Johannesburg offered important clues about this approach. The meeting focused on what Nucleus founder Mcebisi Jonas, former Deputy Finance Minister and President Cyril Ramaphosa’s Special Envoy to North America described as a new “middle power moment” in international affairs.
Christoff argued that the international system is undergoing a major transformation. Institutions and rules that shaped international relations over the past four decades are weakening, while trade, security and geopolitical competition are entering a new phase.
For Canada, this is particularly significant because of its dependence on international trade. Christoff noted that approximately two-thirds of Canada’s GDP is linked to international trade, making changes in the global trading system a direct economic and security concern.
Ottawa’s response is not to retreat but to build greater economic resilience and develop new partnerships.
From one partner to multiple partnerships
Canada’s trade diversification strategy is central to this effort. Ottawa aims to double its exports outside the United States over the next decade, potentially generating approximately $300 billion in additional trade. Christoff said non-US exports had increased by $33 billion over the past year, with roughly one-third of Canadian exports now going to markets outside the United States.
The objective is therefore not to replace the US, but to reduce the risks associated with excessive dependence on it.
China has become one important component of this strategy. Carney’s visit to Beijing and his emphasis on a “new strategic partnership” with Chinese President Xi Jinping demonstrate Ottawa’s willingness to rebuild economic relations with a country with which Canada has experienced serious tensions in recent years.
Canada has moved to ease tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, while Beijing is expected to reduce tariffs on important Canadian agricultural products such as canola. Ottawa has also set a target of increasing exports to China by 50 per cent by 2030.
At the same time, Canada is strengthening economic relations with India. Ottawa and New Delhi aim to conclude negotiations on a comprehensive economic partnership agreement by the end of 2026 and have agreed to begin negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty. They are also seeking to expand investment in areas including finance, technology, energy and infrastructure.
India’s importance to Canada extends beyond its role as a major market. As an increasingly influential middle power itself, India provides Ottawa with another important economic and strategic connection in Asia.
Europe represents another pillar of Canada’s diversification strategy. Ottawa is seeking deeper cooperation with the European Union in trade, defence, security, supply chains, critical minerals, space and scientific research.
Taken together, Canada’s engagement with China, India and Europe suggests a broader policy of strategic diversification, rather than a series of isolated diplomatic initiatives.
Africa and the South Africa connection
Africa is another important part of this strategy.
Canada announced its Africa Strategy last year, signalling its intention to deepen economic and diplomatic relations across the continent. South Africa is particularly important in this effort.
Christoff described South Africa as Canada’s largest trading partner in Africa and highlighted opportunities in mining, critical minerals, energy, technology, agriculture, education and innovation.
Critical minerals are especially significant. As competition over strategic resources intensifies, Canada and South Africa possess complementary strengths. Canada has expertise in mining finance, technology, geology, engineering and governance, while South Africa has substantial mineral resources and a strategic position within the African economy.
Energy is another area of growing cooperation, including climate finance, energy transition and nuclear energy.
The relationship therefore reflects a broader Canadian effort to develop partnerships in sectors that will shape the global economy of the future.
The “middle power moment”
The most important element of the Canadian approach, however, may be its flexibility.
Christoff referred to the concept of “variable geometry” to describe a diplomatic model in which Canada can work with different countries on different issues. Ottawa does not have to stand alongside the same partners on every issue. It can cooperate with one country on trade, another on energy and others on security, climate or technology.
This represents a departure from traditional alliance politics.
Canada is not seeking to create a new bloc against the United States. Rather, it is trying to increase the number of options available to it.
This is where Mcebisi Jonas’ concept of a “middle power moment” becomes particularly relevant.
Jonas argues that middle powers cannot determine the international system on their own in the way that superpowers can. However, they can establish coalitions, create new partnerships, mediate disputes and influence international rules.
For middle powers, the objective is therefore not necessarily to replace one major power with another, but to expand their own strategic autonomy.
This approach has implications beyond Canada. South Africa, India and Türkiye, for example, all have different geopolitical interests and capacities, but each seeks greater influence in an international system increasingly shaped by competition among major powers.
The challenge is whether these countries can cooperate without becoming dependent on another major power.
A new model of strategic autonomy?
Canada’s advantages include strong institutions, investment capacity, energy and critical mineral resources, membership of organisations such as NATO and the G7, and a long tradition of middle-power diplomacy.
South Africa brings different strengths: its position on the African continent, its diplomatic connections across the Global South and its role in platforms such as BRICS and the G20.
Their interests are not identical. Nor do they need to be.
The important question is whether countries with different capabilities can use areas of shared interest to expand their strategic room for manoeuvre.
For Canada, the answer increasingly appears to lie in diversification.
The United States will remain an indispensable partner but Ottawa appears to recognise that relying too heavily on one economic and security relationship creates vulnerabilities. The trade tensions with Washington have made those vulnerabilities more visible.
Canada’s growing engagement with Africa, Europe, China and India should therefore not be interpreted simply as an attempt to build an anti-American coalition. A more accurate interpretation is that Ottawa is seeking to redefine its position in a changing international system.
Its strategy is not “breaking away from the United States” but “not being dependent on the United States.”
And this may be the essence of the emerging middle-power moment described by Jonas.
As competition between the United States and China intensifies and the global system becomes increasingly fragmented, the influence of middle powers may depend less on their individual strength than on their ability to build flexible networks of cooperation.
The question for Canada, South Africa, India, Türkiye and others is therefore not whether they can become superpowers.
It is whether they can become sufficiently connected, resilient and strategically autonomous to ensure that the future international order is shaped not only by the great powers, but also by the middle powers willing and able to work together.
Türkmen Terzi is a foreign journalist based in South Africa. He regularly comments on international politics across various media platforms. Terzi is also pursuing his PhD at the University of Johannesburg