Democracy is often understood as the presence of elections, constitutional protections and representative institutions. Yet these formal features can conceal a more troubling reality.
Citizens may have the right to vote, political parties may compete for office and courts may function independently, while criminal networks simultaneously shape political outcomes, influence governance and undermine public trust.
This paradox is vividly illustrated in two seemingly unlikely cases: Colombia and South Africa.
At first glance, the two countries appear fundamentally different. Colombia's modern history has been shaped by decades of conflict, powerful drug cartels and armed insurgencies. South Africa's democratic journey emerged from the dismantling of apartheid and the promise of a more inclusive political order.
Yet despite their different historical trajectories, both countries reveal an uncomfortable truth: democracy can coexist with deeply entrenched criminal governance.
This is something that we should also keep in mind as we marked the International Day of Democracy on 15 September.
The danger lies not in the collapse of democratic institutions but in their gradual infiltration by criminal interests. Elections continue to take place, constitutions remain intact and governments retain democratic legitimacy on paper.
However, the substance of democracy becomes weakened when criminal actors gain influence over political decision-making, public resources and local governance structures.
In such circumstances, citizens increasingly find that power is exercised not solely through democratic institutions but also through informal networks that operate beyond the reach of the law.
Colombia provides perhaps the clearest example of how this process unfolds.
The growth of the cocaine economy from the late 1960s onwards generated enormous resources for illicit actors. But wealth alone did not create criminal governance.
Rather, criminal groups flourished because they exploited existing weaknesses within political institutions and forged alliances with regional political elites.
Over time, armed groups moved beyond simply protecting illegal enterprises. They became political actors, exercising territorial control, influencing voting behaviour and developing sophisticated relationships with elected officials. The result has been a system in which democratic procedures continue to function formally while many citizens experience profound constraints on their political freedoms.
Elections are competitive and votes are counted fairly but communities in some regions have historically faced coercion, intimidation and manipulation by armed actors.
In these contexts, citizens are not always free to exercise genuine political choice. Democracy survives but its legitimacy is compromised.
What makes the Colombian experience particularly important is that it demonstrates how organised crime can become interwoven with the state rather than simply opposing it.
Criminal groups often find it more advantageous to influence existing institutions than to overthrow them.
As a result, the line between legal and illegal authority becomes blurred, creating a system in which criminal governance operates alongside formal democratic structures.
South Africa's experience differs in important ways, yet many of the underlying dynamics are remarkably similar.
The country entered democracy in 1994 with immense expectations. Political liberation promised social inclusion, economic opportunity and accountable governance.
However, the legacies of apartheid created enduring structural inequalities that proved difficult to overcome. High unemployment, poverty and marginalisation in many communities created fertile ground for criminal networks to expand.
As South Africa reintegrated into the global economy, organised crime evolved rapidly.
International criminal syndicates established operations in the country, while local gangs expanded their reach.
In many marginalised communities, criminal organisations increasingly filled governance gaps left by weak state institutions. They provide employment, protection and social assistance, albeit through coercion and often violent means.
Perhaps the most worrying development has been the intersection of organised crime and corruption.
Over the past two decades, numerous scandals have revealed how political power can be used to advance private interests rather than public welfare.
The phenomenon, commonly referred to as state capture, exposed the extent to which institutions could be manipulated from within. This not only weakened public confidence in government but also created opportunities for criminal economies to flourish.
The Cape Flats offers a particularly stark illustration of these challenges.
In many communities, gangs exercise varying degrees of territorial influence, providing services and opportunities that local government has struggled to deliver.
Such arrangements may offer short-term benefits to residents but they also erode the state's monopoly over governance and security.
When citizens increasingly depend on criminal networks rather than public institutions, democratic legitimacy suffers.
The comparison between Colombia and South Africa highlights a broader lesson about contemporary democracy.
Democratic decline does not always occur through military coups, authoritarian takeovers or the suspension of elections.
It can emerge more subtly through the growing influence of criminal actors within democratic systems.
The threat is not necessarily the disappearance of democratic institutions but their gradual hollowing out.
This challenge is particularly acute in societies characterised by deep inequality and limited state capacity.
Where governments fail to provide security, opportunity and effective public services, criminal organisations can step into the vacuum.
They offer alternative forms of authority that may appear attractive in the short term but ultimately undermine democratic accountability.
Citizens become clients of criminal networks rather than participants in democratic governance.
Importantly, neither Colombia nor South Africa should be viewed as failed democracies. Both retain significant democratic strengths, including constitutional protections, competitive elections and vibrant civil societies.
Yet their experiences remind us that democracy is more than a set of institutions.
It depends on citizens' ability to participate freely in political life and to trust that public authority serves the common good rather than private criminal interests.
The fundamental question raised by these cases is not whether democracy can survive organised crime. Clearly it can.
The more pressing question is what kind of democracy emerges when criminal governance becomes embedded within the political system.
If democratic institutions coexist with corruption, coercion and illicit influence, then elections alone cannot guarantee democratic legitimacy.
It is in this context that oligarchic theory (political power in the hands of a small group of disproportionately rich individuals and families) has become a new tool of understanding precisely this interwovenness between legal and illegal forms of authority, at the expense of public legitimacy.
The experiences of Colombia and South Africa serve as a warning to democracies everywhere. The greatest threat to democracy may not come from those who openly reject it but from those who quietly exploit its weaknesses while leaving its formal structures intact.
Protecting democracy therefore requires more than safeguarding elections.
It requires confronting inequality, strengthening state institutions and ensuring that public power remains accountable to citizens rather than criminal networks.
Only then can democracy become and become a genuinely meaningful form of governance.
Dr Jan Boesten is a founding member of the Interdisciplinary Study Group for Peace and Conflict Studies (by the German abbreviation: GIFK; gifk.org). Professor Derica Lambrechts is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Stellenbosch University. They are both research associates at the Centre for Research on Democracy at SU. This article is based on their paper 'Democracy and Crime: The Cases of Colombia and South Africa', published recently in the Journal of Asian and African Studies (2026).