One of South Africa’s challenges appears to be the relentless creation of controversial soundbites and scant broadcasting for mere story-selling rather than providing ethical journalism and informing the citizens.
The Thabo Mbeki Foundation hosted a second African Peace and Security dialogue (APSD) in September, but for whatever reason, certain South African media houses distorted the context of that continental dialogue and called it the “South Africa’s peace and security dialogue”. This may be a deliberate choice or perhaps journalists are generally not well-informed about the dynamics of peace and security architecture and the challenges the continent faces. As an invited delegate who participated in both dialogues of 2024 and 2025, I should assist the media in providing essential information and reflective clarity to my fellow Africans.
For example, last year at the inaugural annual peace and security dialogue, and again this year at the second dialogue, the foundation clarified the purpose of the engagement as a high-level continental platform for Africa’s policymakers, scholars, diplomats, political and civil society organisations, former and current African leaders, former and current ambassadors, ministers, and peace and security experts to discuss critical issues and develop an actionable plan to ensure African-led solutions to African peace and security challenges.
The foundation has further reiterated that this annual dialogue is not necessarily a formal mediation structure as distorted, and it does not compete or seek to replace the existing structures of the African Union and regional economic bodies that have the responsibility to offer official and formal mediation to warring parties in conflicts. But the APSD serves as a supporting platform for the structures mentioned above. In my view, this annual dialogue is contextually convened within aspiration 4 of the AU Agenda 2063 of building a “peaceful and secure Africa”.
In 2024, the dialogue primarily focused on the Horn and West Africa, with particular emphasis on the ongoing conflicts in Sudan and South Sudan, as well as political developments in the countries in the Sahel region, particularly Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso; some of the outcomes were for the foundation to engage with the AU and regional bodies to integrate the outcomes of APSD into their strategic and policy frameworks, and for the foundation to monitor and guide the implementation process.
I consider this clarity essential because the creation of the controversial soundbite by various media houses in South Africa has consequently reduced the African dialogue to controversies, such as the presence of the M-23 rebel group in South Africa after the Goma violent conflict that led to the deaths of South African soldiers and squabbling over the announcement by the government of Democratic Republic of the Congo’s declining the attendance of the APSD as the only issues of concern. I am not trying to downplay or condone the unfortunate loss of lives of fellow South Africans in the Eastern DRC; may their souls rest in peace, but it is quite evident that the media subtly tried to create unnecessary controversy to obscure the great initiative of the foundation.
Last year, a similar situation occurred when Sudan’s Transitional Sovereign Council (the government in Sudan) refused to attend the dialogue, citing the invitation of civil society organisations and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) as an excuse. The media have not asked relevant questions about this refusal of government and state leaders, especially presidents, to attend platforms that seek to resolve conflict and restore durable peace and stability on the continent.
For instance, this year, the government of Kinshasa declined to participate in dialogue because it accused former president Thabo Mbeki of being in favour of the M-23 rebels. Therefore, in their view, the government cannot share a platform with the rebel groups. We must not forget that when the South African government and Southern African Development Community (SADC) decided to withdraw the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) from the DRC, it was clearly stated that the action was intended to facilitate dialogue for the purpose of finding a lasting peace to the conflict that had been ongoing for decades in the country of Patrice Lumumba.
Mnbeki, the patron of the foundation, made it clear that no one can successfully resolve the conflict in DRC without including the M-23 rebel group in the pathways to durable peace; therefore, the emergence of M-23 must be understood within the historical context of the existential conflict in the Eastern DRC. The media’s controversial soundbites about the M-23 rebels’ attendance at the dialogue in our country have sparked a debate, but no one has clearly identified and concretely shared with the public which international, continental, or national laws or protocols, or foreign policies have been violated by the foundation or the M-23 rebels’ presence in the country. Alternatively, the South African government should clarify if any sanctions have been imposed against the M-23 from coming to the country as a result of the fight between the M-23 and the SANDF. However, I suspect this issue is more about moral considerations than legal grounds.
I am tempted to expose and clarify the peddlers of controversial soundbites who thrive on distortion at the expense of informing the public. The fact is that there were representatives from the government of the DRC, including one of the longest-serving MPs, who was also part of the participants in the historic 2002 Sun City peace agreement, which civil society organisations, the then transitional government, and militias of the DRC signed on South African soil.
This year’s (2025) peace and security dialogue was also attended by civil society organisations and more than five political opposition parties from the DRC, despite Kinshasa’s refusal to attend. It is surprising that the media, except for reporting the absence and presence of certain actors at the dialogue, has failed to inform the Africans that there were various panels of discussion reflecting on the previous dialogue on the state of peace and security in the Horn of Africa, West Africa, and other panels that deeply analysed the conflict in the Great Lakes region, focusing on the Eastern DRC, as well as the SADC, specifically dissecting the ongoing violent conflict in Mozambique, particularly in the province of Cabo Delgado.
In fact, the majority of the delegates from the DRC expressed their gratitude to Mbeki for successfully facilitating the 2002 Sun City Peace Agreement, which led to the first multi-party general elections in 2006 after more than four decades of dictatorship. They further called for a second Sun City peace agreement. Instead, the patron of the foundation reiterated that he cannot impose his views on the Congolese; they must go back home, meet, and initiate dialogue to determine their path to sustainable peace. He furthermore committed to providing the necessary support wherever possible.
It is also important to note that the dialogue has emphasised the concern that Djibouti, an African country, has become home to many foreign military camps of the so-called superpower countries, which pose a serious threat to the peace and security of the continent and the world, and action must be taken to address this situation.
Ultimately, at the conclusion of the second peace and security dialogue, various proposals were presented on how to support the AU and its structures in resolving conflicts within the framework of the founding vision of Agenda 2063 of the AU, to build a continent that is “integrated, prosperous and peaceful … driven by its own citizens”. Indeed, Africans use platforms such as the APSD to counter the scavenging and the new scramble for Africa. This is a critical platform that aims to revive the spirit of Africanism and place all ongoing dialogues on the continent within a decolonial framework in the pursuit of building the Africa we want and aspire to as Africans in the “global Africa”.
Orapeleng Matshediso is a master’s graduate of Pan African Development Studies and Research Fellow at the University of Johannesburg (Institute for Pan African Thought and Conversation). The author is also an alumnus of the then Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute (TMALI).