Jakkie Cilliers
a second look
White farmers and rural blacks perceive themselves to be under attack the former by what they consider to be a political campaign to drive them off their land and the latter by unemployment and, sometimes, racial assault.
To be sure, our commercial agricultural system is under threat. Jobs are being lost and the pressure on towns and cities is increasing as people move to the urban areas in search of better opportunities.
Internationally crime is generally an urban phenomenon, with police resources therefore necessarily concentrated in the high-density areas. Not surprisingly, a survey of rural victims conducted by the Institute of Security Studies in 1998 found that a third of respondents stated that they “never see a police officer” in their village or area, a finding that underlines the fact that rural policing is also largely a reactive matter.
Interactions between the police and the public occur at police stations, when complainants seek assistance. Because of the remoteness of many police stations and a lack of telephones and transportation in the rural areas, seeking help from the police can be a lengthy and delayed process.
Since spending on the criminal justice system is already at an all-time high, there is little room for additional police in sufficient numbers to make any meaningful impact upon rural safety, or for the diversion of resources from high-priority urban crime areas to rural areas.
Under present policing scenarios, the crime picture for rural South Africa, where violent crime is already high and increasing, is grim. This situation could become even worse if the purported plans to curb the already limited support that the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) provides to the police are implemented and the reduction in policing powers provided to the military in the new Defence Act accepted.
The African National Congress came to power in South Africa deeply suspicious of the then South African Defence Force, fearing a coup and with a view of a racist commando system. No surprise, therefore, that the subsequent White Paper and Defence Review were essentially political processes designed to emasculate and gain control over the defence complex, rather than to serve the security requirements of the country.
The results have, however, outlived their initial transient political ends.
One of the ongoing casualties of defence restructuring is the declining ability of the military to support the police generally and, more specifically, to contribute to safety in rural areas.
When former president Nelson Mandela placed the SANDF “in service” in 1996 to support the police, the requirement was for 54 infantry companies at a time when police numbers were higher than they are at present and crime much lower.
Each company consists of roughly 120 persons, but includes the back-up and support of stores, vehicles, accommodation, communication systems and so on. At the time the SANDF could only provide 19 companies, leaving a shortfall of some 26 companies, arguing budget constraints. This is still the situation today, with 10 companies deployed in support of border security duties and a further nine in use elsewhere in support of the South African Police Services.
The SANDF also provides 27 commando platoons (each of about 35 soldiers) specifically for the rural protection plan. Given the lack of police resources, these commandos constitute the backbone of the rural protection plan. Each commando consists of between 300 and 500 members, divided into three components consisting of local farm protection units, platoon-size local reaction units and area-bound reaction forces.
There are at present 186 commando units in South Africa, with fluctuating levels of personnel and equipment. Nonetheless, they are generally much better equipped in rural areas than police stations and they have the potential to enhance their contribution to the rural safety plan in a dramatic fashion. For despite the odd incident highlighted by the media, the commandos are increasingly racially representative, partly because they provide employment in rural areas.
The Department of Defence spends only about 1% of its budget providing this support to the police and even these limited resources are under constant financial threat. Looked at differently, less than an additional R200-million a year would allow for 38 instead of 19 infantry companies to be deployed in support of the police and 54 instead of 27 commando platoons to be active as part of the rural protection plan. The marginal expenditure is possible because military personnel and the associated infrastructure are available.
In the absence of strategic coherence in national security matters, rural safety continues to fall between two chairs.
On the one hand is the belief by some within the police that rural security should be only a police function, despite the obvious lack of police resources to fulfil this requirement.
On the other hand, the Department of Defence broadly operates within the inappropriate conventional defence paradigm set by the Defence Review process, but in reality continues to drift aimlessly in search of political and strategic direction.
When looking at present crime trends, it does not make sense to withdraw the SANDF from rural areas or to seek to downscale military support to the police in general. Military support to the police in both rural and urban areas has been a feature of South Africa for several decades and will remain an important component of our strategies for the prevention and combat of crime for the foreseeable future. It is perhaps time that we accept this reality, plan accordingly and jointly revel in the benefits.
One idea advanced several years ago is to remove the commandos from the SANDF and make them part of the police, but it is doubtful if this would be acceptable to the commandos, who have a long association with the military and are imbued with a military and not a policing ethos. Perhaps even more problematic would be the additional management burden and hidden costs that such a reorganisation would entail.
A second concept would be to establish a separate gendarmerie, or paramilitary agency, based on the commandos and dedicated to the provision of police services in rural areas in time of peace and serving as territorial forces for the military in time of war. Although the opportunity to use the ill-fated National Peacekeeping Force as the core of such a third security agency was squandered at the time, the idea still deserves investigation.
Decisions on options such as these are political and strategic in nature and will have to await a long overdue initiative to develop a national security framework for South Africa, in tune with our domestic and regional security challenges.
In the interim we should either marginally bolster the SANDF budget to support the police, particularly by upgrading and investing in the commando system, or push for appropriate defence priorities. Such actions would make an immediate and dramatic impact upon security in rural areas, including the policing of priority areas.
Jakkie Cilliers is executive director at the Institute for Security Studies