Illustration by Tshepo Mosoeu
If 1994 inaugurated democracy in South Africa, 2024 may seal it. For 2024 may irreversibly pierce the once-impenetrable ANC electoral majority. If this moment arrives, what possible coalitions could replace an ANC majority government?
Government of national unity?
One lesser-explored scenario is power sharing between South Africa’s main political parties. One interesting possibility involves power trading across cabinet and parliament. For example, the ANC could retain the presidency, if it emerges as the largest party. But the Democratic Alliance would get the deputy presidency and other key ministries such as public enterprises or education. Other parties, for example ActionSA, the Inkatha Freedom Party and Good, could also constitute this unity cabinet.
But — and here is the twist — other opposition parties such as the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the United Democratic Movement and African Transformation Movement could assume key posts in parliament, like the speaker. This opposition coalition would then oversee the unity cabinet.
This arrangement has some benefits. First, it keeps all parties happy, thereby promoting stability. And stability will be prized in the coalition era. Further, this arrangement ensures that parliament has an incentive to hold the executive accountable. In this way, parliament would finally gain some teeth. Handing parliamentary power to the EFF might also reduce disruptions because the onus would be on the EFF to make parliament function — a true turn-around.
Another scenario is a traditional government of national unity, as seen in 1994. This would involve cross-party representation in both cabinet and parliament.
Picture a government led by a compromise ANC candidate agreed to by all parties (someone like Thoko Didiza or Naledi Pandor) featuring John Steenhuisen, Julius Malema, Herman Mashaba et al.
As an aside, the gross under-representation of women in our politics is tragic.
In this case, Steenhuisen might be the deputy president, Mashaba the minister for public enterprises and Malema the minister of international relations, for example.
The drawback here is incoherence and instability. After all, the unity government of 1994 collapsed under the weight of both. Nevertheless, a unity government may still be preferable to an ANC majority government, in which South Africans are subjected to another tainted ANC president and a totally unaccountable cabinet.
Opposition coalition?
What about an opposition coalition? This would eject the ANC from power. It is a delightful and tempting thought. Imagine all those loathsome ANC grandees finally consigned to the ignominy of the opposition benches.
But who would lead such an opposition coalition? That is the four million dollar question. Can you imagine Steenhuisen as president of South Africa? It is just too soon for a white man, whose party has not earned an outright majority, to grace the Union Buildings.
If not Steenhuisen, then who? Mashaba? ActionSA is unlikely to garner enough votes to legitimately control the presidency. Malema? A Malema presidency would certainly be eventful but the same legitimacy questions would arise. Could a compromise independent candidate such as Mmusi Maimane ascend? Again, legitimacy is the problem.
This is a genuine bind, then. A bind that opposition parties should solve before 2024. If the ANC is to be removed from power, then a credible presidential candidate must be considered in advance.
On the upside, an opposition coalition could truly impose anti-corruption reforms and advances in service delivery. South Africa would no longer be held ransom to ANC factional politics, and law enforcement agencies would be free from ANC interference.
ANC coalition?
Another scenario is an ANC-led coalition. My heart sinks even as I contemplate the possibility. Imagine another government filled with the same old, tired faces. Nonetheless, consider it we must.
One eventuality is an ANC-EFF coalition. True, the ANC and EFF share ideological ground and political history. But, if the EFF joins with the ANC, the EFF may forever be accused of rescuing a dying ANC and betraying South Africans in the process. And this could irreparably taint the EFF.
What about the ANC and the IFP? If the 2021 local election is any guide, these two parties may squeak past the 50% threshold. But, as in the previous case, the IFP would also be crucified for giving the ANC undeserved power. The IFP may be tempted into this partnership if they can extract concessions in KwaZulu-Natal.
Grand coalition?
Another possibility is a “grand coalition”, defined as a coalition between a country’s two biggest parties. In this case, the ANC and the DA. The two parties flirted with this idea in 2021. Before Phala Phala marred Cyril Rampahosa’s political prospects, the DA all but
endorsed Ramaphosa — even exempting him from a motion of no confidence in his own cabinet.
In hindsight, the DA might have been hoping to use Ramaphosa as a figurehead for a grand coalition. The ANC could also help the DA in the Western Cape, where the DA’s majority is under threat.
From a policy perspective, this arrangement would be a neoliberal nightmare. It would also be a gift to both the EFF and ActionSA, who will paint themselves as the rightful alternatives to this elite bargain.
A grand coalition would also render parliament toothless: what incentive would DA and ANC MPs have to hold their own coalition government accountable?
People often say that there is no alternative to the ANC. But this is the wrong question. The question is whether there is an alternative to ANC dominance. As these scenarios show, there are clearly several alternatives to gross ANC misrule.
The alternatives may multiply, too. Independent candidates may intervene, depending on changes to the electoral system. And new parties are bound to emerge, as they always do. The outcome of the ANC’s elective conference will also resound into 2024.
The death of ANC dominance is nigh — the only question now concerns the optimal coalition to replace it.
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The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Mail & Guardian.