A one percent party has taught the Inkatha Freedom Party a lesson of biblical proportions, writes Ann Eveleth
When push finally came to shove it took a political David to bring Goliath to his knees and turn KwaZulu- Natal’s interminable constitutional process on its head.
Holding out for a controversial clause prohibiting abortion, the minuscule (0,7%) African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) quashed the Inkatha Freedom Party’s hopes of railroading minority parties into a constitutional settlement which would bypass the African National Congress.
The ACDP says its demand for an anti-abortion clause in the constitution is bottom line and the party will not vote for a constitution that excludes it: Abortion [prohibition] is a cardinal principal of the ACDP. If we give up on this demand, we might as well not exist, declared the party’s lone MP, Alex Fakude.
The ACDP’s stand was the final spoke in the wheel of the IFP’s erstwhile strategy to secure minority party support for its constitution. The fragile political balance in the province is such that a single minority party opposition vote would require the IFP to seek ANC support.
Unable to support the ACDP’s controversial clause, the IFP realised in the 11th hour that its chances of pleasing the five disparate minority parties were fading fast, and was forced to turn the other cheek to seek agreement with its nemesis, the ANC.
One of many lessons IFP hardliner Walter Felgate learned in his failed bid to entrench the party’s original confederal demands in the provincial constitution, the ACDP’s unwavering demand has also dramatically shown up the folly of the IFP’s Constitutional Assembly boycott. The ACDP’s one percent party packed a heavy punch despite its complaints of early trivialisation of its issues by the leading parties.
In contrast, the IFP decided early in the national constitutional talks that its 10% party would gain little from participation in the Constitutional Assembly. Sceptical of a potential anti-ANC alliance with the National Party and Democratic Party, the IFP deserted its backbench colleagues for greener pastures. Putting all of its eggs in the provincial basket, the party abandoned the Constitutional Assembly and set its sights on guaranteeing greater provincial powers through the backdoor.
If KwaZulu-Natal could adopt a provincial constitution in advance of the national constitution, the Constitutional Assembly would face enormous political pressure to incorporate IFP demands into the final national document or at the very least, to agree to international mediation on a formal list of outstanding issues.
Although the interim constitution does not bind the Constitutional Assembly to respond to provincial constitutions, the fact that the ANC understood the political implication of the strategy is borne out by its instruction to the seven ANC-controlled provinces to delay their constitutions until after adoption of the final national constitution.
The ANC’s apparent stalling tactics in KwaZulu-Natal easily sustained with legitimate demands occasioned by IFP bluster and steamrolling strategies also suggests the ANC understood the impact of the IFP strategy. The strategy rested, however, on two pillars: the speedy conclusion of the KwaZulu-Natal process and a two- thirds approval for wide-ranging provincial powers, neither of which was attained.