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Police ignored more than 30 intelligence reports about Pagad’s potential for violence and had been monitoring the organisation for six months before gang leader Rashaad Staggie was murdered.
Police intelligence began monitoring People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad) in March, after members of the organisation invaded Justice Minister Dullah Omar’s home in an attempt to put pressure on him to take action against drug dealers.
The intelligence reports compiled before last Sunday’s murder of Staggie detailed Pagad’s plan of action and the potential for conflict with gangsters.
But until Staggie’s murder, no action had been taken to quash Pagad’s plans and police found themselves unprepared when the organisation besieged Staggie’s home.
The attack on Staggie was launched from the Gatesville mosque, where a convoy of 500 cars left for his Salt River house. There were only two police vehicles monitoring the mosque.
A police intelligence source said a report — saying Pagad was gearing up to confront Staggie — had been sent to the public order division two days before the attack: “Although the report said Staggie’s Sea Point house was the target, much more could have been done to avoid the bloodshed.
“The report said the attack would be launched from the Gatesville mosque and that the potential for violence was very high. So why were only two police vehicles sent to the mosque?
“By that stage, Pagad had already been involved in nine violent attacks on alleged drug dealers.
“There is a task team of 400 for visible policing, working in shifts of 100 at a time. They could have been sent to the mosque. They could have used teargas to head off the marchers when they reached Staggie’s house.”
Some of the earlier intelligence reports made specific recommendations to police provincial management, particularly that they meet Pagad in an attempt to head off conflict before it became violent.
Yet the first meeting between Pagad and police management took place on July 29, after the organisation had attacked drug dealers’ homes on the Cape Flats.
“The reports were just not taken seriously. There was a belief these people were just a bunch of fanatics,” said another police source. “There was no understanding of Muslim politics. When Muslims come together, police intelligence immediately reacts by saying it’s a fundamentalist conspiracy; Libya and Iran must be involved.
“There was only one person working on collecting intelligence on Pagad. Despite reports indicating that there was a potential for violence, the person only received assistance after Pagad started violent action.”
Police sources complain that the reason for the police inaction on the intelligence reports is a lack of understanding among police operatives of the situation on the Cape Flats.
“The majority of the senior members in intelligence are former security policemen. They were notoriously uncaring of black lives in the past and there is no reason to believe they have changed,” said a police source.
“After the integration of the ANC and South African Police, the majority of senior ranks went to former security policemen. The ANC operatives, who were very close to their communities and had complete understanding of what was happening there, were not given any authority.
“Police intelligence is still caught in the past, they can’t see beyond their old understanding of how black politics works. They were warned that Pagad was linking crime with bad government, that it was blaming the government for the problem in their areas, and that at some point it was going to act against government authority.
“Even now, with the establishment of a national task team to deal with the situation in the Cape, only two of the 25 people on the team are not white.”
Reports from operatives in the field are forwarded to a provincial desk officer who forwards them to an analyst to make recommendations. An information manager recommends what action has to be taken, whether cases have to be opened, negotiations begun or more intelligence collected.
The National Intelligence Agency, army intelligence and police intelligence meet weekly, and intelligence reports are passed on to an intelligence production unit.
“It was only after Pagad began its violent attacks on drug dealers that the first police intelligence reports went to those meetings, so there was no possibility of a joint response,” said a police source.
Western Cape Anti-Crime Forum leader Irvin Kinnes said he had been approached by “disillusioned” police officers, who told him senior police management had been warned Staggie would be killed but had taken no action.
He had arranged for them to brief the justice minister on the situation on Sunday.
“It was quite clear to me that the police had no plan to deal with Pagad. The forum had warned Safety and Security Minister Sydney Mufamadi as well about the increase in vigilante activity in the Western Cape. It now appears the police not only ignored us, but their own people as well,” Kinnes said.