/ 24 December 1996

Oil buys excuses for Nigeria

The crises besetting Africa’s most populous nation show how the West has turne d its back on the continent, writes Glenn Frankel

WHEN Nigeria’s military government hanged the writer Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight o ther political activists in November 1995, world leaders such as Bill Clinton and Nelson Mandela reacted with shock, anger and the promise of punitive measu res. But the campaign for severe sanctions never got off the ground – thanks i n large part to an aggressive lobbying effort spearheaded by the Nigerian gove rnment and the oil companies that have a major financial stake in the African country.

Nigeria’s lobbying success is a textbook example of how even the most unpopula r of foreign regimes can neutralise their opposition in Washington with money and influential friends. It also illustrates the Clinton administration’s lack of resolve when it comes to Africa. Rather than take the lead, the administra

tion sought a consensus with countries in Europe and Africa for harsh measures against N

igeria. When that effort failed, it allowed the fate of the world’s largest bl ack-ruled nation to slip silently from its agenda.

”The very aggressive rhetoric of a year ago ended up basically as just hot air ,” said Janet Fleischman, Washington director of Human Rights Watch/Africa.

Nigeria is both Africa’s most promising country and one of its most troubled. The world’s ninth largest oil producer – it supplies about 600 000 barrels a d ay to the United States, 8% of total US oil imports – Nigeria remains burdened by ethnic, geographic and religious conflicts and has spent most of its 35 ye

ars of independence under military rule.

General Sani Abacha became the latest of a long line of Nigerian military mast ers in 1993 when he annulled the presidential election that was supposed to re store civilian rule and imprisoned the apparent winner, Moshood Abiola, along with hundreds of supporters.

Abacha’s regime has staged its harshest crackdown in Ogoniland in south-easter n Nigeria, home of some of the country’s richest oilfields. Saro-Wiwa’s dissid ent movement began as a protest against the poverty of Ogoniland and environme ntal degradation there, and demanded a share of oil revenues for the region.

The government saw the movement as a secessionist threat. A military tribunal convicted Saro-Wiwa and his backers of inciting the murder of four pro-governm ent tribal leaders, and sentenced them to death without appeal to civilian cou rts.

Royal Dutch Shell, which has been criticised by human rights advocates and env ironmentalists for allegedly colluding with the regime in repressing local pro tests and despoiling the region, declined to intercede on Saro-Wiwa’s behalf, and then made a plea at the last possible minute.

After the hangings, a coalition of US human rights, environmental, black and l abour groups launched a campaign for strong sanctions. One of its leaders, Ran dall Robinson, president of the lobbying group TransAfrica, organised a letter to Clinton signed by 54 prominent US blacks – including Bill Cosby, Jesse Jac

kson, Coretta Scott King and 28 members of Congress – calling for tough measur es against the Abacha regime.

Republican Senator Nancy Kassebaum and Democratic Representative Donald Payn i ntroduced companion bills in the Senate and House that would have cut off most new US investment in Nigeria and laid the groundwork for an international oil

embargo.

At the same time, the Clinton administration announced a set of mild sanctions , including a ban on sales of military equipment, a reduction in humanitarian aid, a recall of the US ambassador and a broadening of an existing ban on visa s for Nigerian officials and their families.

Then, after an initial high-level review, State Department officials said they would take further steps in collaboration with European and African states, a

nd did not exclude an embargo on Nigerian oil sales.

Nigeria receives more than $10 -billion a year from oil, accounting for 90% of its foreign export earnings and 80% of government revenues, and an internatio

nal embargo would have caused immediate economic pain.

Nigeria fought back. The Lagos government employed the services of nine US pub lic relations and lobbying firms spanning the US political spectrum. Among the m were the law firm of Washington & Christian, run by liberal black Democrats, which reported receiving $600 000 from Nigeria for the first six months of th

e year, and Symms, Lehn & Associates, an Alexandria firm headed by former Repu blican sen ator Steve Symms and Alfred Lehn, former aide to Bob Dole, which reported rece iving about $300 000.

Based on disclosure reports and other information, Nigeria’s critics have esti mated that the regime has spent more than $10-million in the US on lobbying an d public relations efforts since the hanging.

One of Nigeria’s most effective representatives was Maurice Dawkins, a former Republican senatorial candidate in Virginia and an associate of Symms, Lehn. H e recruited prominent American blacks, such as newspaper publishers and clergy men, for fact-finding trips to Nigeria paid for by the military government, wh ich also ran eight-page, full-colour advertising supplements in a dozen or mor e black-ow ned newspapers in the US.

Carol Moseley-Braun, the Senate’s lone black member, and Nation of Islam leade r Louis Farrakhan returned from their own trips to Nigeria urging American bla cks and the Clinton administration to give the Nigerian government a chance to enact democratic reforms.

Robinson, a longtime opponent of military rule in Nigeria, argued that America n blacks who had demanded US sanctions against white-ruled South Africa in the 1980s could not ignore repression when practised by black rulers in Africa. B

ut he said he knew from the beginning that sanctions against Nigeria would be a hard sell as the regime had lots of oil money.

Even before the hangings, he said, he was approached by a Nigerian businessman with close ties to the government who offered him up to $1-million to drop hi

s criticism of the regime. Robinson rejected the offer.

”Oil money makes a huge difference because it puts spunk in the spine of your enemy,” he said. Testimony against the sanctions bill before a Senate subcommi ttee by Moseley-Braun and Democratic Representative William Jefferson helped c reate the impression that the Congressional Black Caucus was divided on the is sue, according to a Senate staff member who worked on the bill.

This made it easy for other lawmakers to beg off. But he said a bigger factor was the lobbying effort by major oil companies such as Mobil, Amoco and Chevro n, as well as several non-oil firms with involvement in a $3,8-billion liquifi ed natural gas project in south-east Nigeria.

One of the key lobbying groups was the 107-member Corporate Council on Africa, a private, non-profit organisation dedicated to promoting Africa’s economic d

evelopment and business relationships between African countries and US corpora tions.

The council, which reported receiving $10 000 each from Conoco and Chevron to lobby on the issue, argued to lawmakers and administration officials that dial ogue rather than confrontation was more likely to produce political reforms in Nigeria.

”We honestly don’t believe a unilateral oil embargo against Nigeria would acco mplish much except to further concentrate power and wealth in the hands of a f ew,” said David Miller, the council’s executive director. ”It’s a great press release but it would be counterproductive.”

The lobbying effort effectively killed the Kassebaum-Payne bills, which were n ever even voted on in their respective legislative committees.

Meanwhile, the Clinton administration was also spinning its wheels. Advocates for further sanctions – including then-national security adviser Anthony Lake, John Shattuck, the assistant secretary of state for human rights, and Timothy

Wirth, undersecretary of state for global affairs – pressed for tougher measu

res. They were opposed by representatives from the Department of Commerce and other econ omics-oriented Cabinet agencies, who argued that unilateral sanctions would on ly succeed in pushing up the price of heating oil for Americans.

Among the documents they cited was a report from the Petroleum Industry Resear ch Foundation in New York that an oil embargo would disproportionately affect New England, a region that is a major customer for clean-burning Nigerian ”swe et” crude used in heating oil.

Pointing to the example of Iraq, opponents within the administration also said sanctions would likely hurt average Nigerians while leaving the country’s rul

ers unscathed – and could lead to retaliation against US companies doing busin ess in Nigeria.

Before his trip to Africa in October, then-secretary of state Warren Christoph er told a breakfast meeting of representatives of non-governmental organisatio ns that he was ”very uncomfortable” with the administration’s Nigeria policy, according to two participants. But Robinson and other critics said Christopher himself had appeared disengaged from the issue.

The administration opted instead for more consultations with its allies. Clint on wrote to European leaders last March, proposing a series of steps – such as freezing Nigerian assets in their countries – designed to pinch the country’s

rulers without damaging its economy.

But US officials say the leaders of Britain, Germany and France – home to seve ral large oil companies with stakes in Nigeria – were lukewarm at best. Mandel a, who had helped engineer Nigeria’s suspension from the Commonwealth of Natio ns within days of the hangings, backed off after the US failed to respond to h is public call for more severe sanctions.

”The US wanted cover from Mandela and he wanted cover from us,” said one US di plomat. ”It just didn’t work out.”

Because of its size and wealth, Nigeria dominates the Organisation of African Unity and contributes a major portion of the peace-keeping force in war-torn L iberia, and other African states are reluctant to challenge the regime. When C hristopher raised the subject of sanctions with African leaders during his Afr ica trip, he got a cold response.

With the first anniversary of the hangings, human rights activists relaunched their campaign with demonstrations and renewed calls for an oil embargo agains t Nigeria and a boycott of Shell, which is the biggest and most influential of the foreign companies operating there.

Relatives of Saro-Wiwa and another of the victims have filed suit against Shel l in federal court in New York, alleging the company collaborated with the reg ime in human rights and environmental abuses, allegations the company has deni ed.

The Nigerian government has released some political prisoners and held local e lections in an attempt to show it is moving toward a return to civilian democr acy in 1998. But Abiola and many of his supporters remain in detention and Kud irat Abiola, who had pressed publicly for her husband’s release, was killed in June on the streets of Lagos by unknown gunmen. The government used the killi

ng as just ification for the arrest of two dozen family members and supporters.

Administration officials say they have not ruled out further sanctions against Nigeria, and they believe the Lagos regime is acting cautiously because it kn

ows its behaviour is under scrutiny. But a new test looms.

Nineteen more of Saro-Wiwa’s followers still face trial for the same charges t hat led to his execution. Will the threat of sanctions stay the hangman? Or wi ll the regime calculate that the Clinton administration and the West will agai n opt for sweeping declarations of condemnation – and no action? – The Washing ton Post

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