/ 31 January 1997

Ominous paralysis of foreign policy

Peter Vale

IT was never possible that South Africa’s=20 foreign policy would be a glorious success;=20 that we would ride into the setting sun of=20 the 20th Century – national dreams=20 fulfilled, collective destiny guaranteed,=20 all insecurities stilled.

But we had a right to expect that the=20 discussion on South Africa’s place in the=20 world might become more nuanced, more=20 negotiable. Because this has not happened,=20 the paralysis in the country’s foreign=20 policy-making looks ominous.

It is worth recalling that the country’s=20 foreign policy has always been pitted in=20 simplistic power-plays. The ”system’s”=20 opponents called for a total isolation of=20 the South African state; in response, the=20 minority government conjured up a total=20 onslaught which aimed to defend its=20 interests against a prying world.=20

Given these positions, there was no=20 opportunity to ask searching questions. To=20 do so courted the wrath either of the=20 state, or a liberation movement which=20 brooked little internal dissent. For all=20 their differences, however, the two sides=20 approached international relations with the=20 same one-dimensional logic.

This background has produced a near- national consensus that success or failure=20 in international relations is only=20 determined in terms of might. Given this,=20 it is really not surprisingly that the=20 debate on South Africa’s foreign policy=20 was,and is,very narrow.

Not to put too fine an analytical point on=20 it: the way in which we discuss=20 international relations in the new South=20 Africa – sounds exactly like the old.=20 There are more players and isolation has=20 ended, but the rules of the game are=20 portrayed as fixed and unchanging. It is=20 also true that within the policy process=20 democratic markers, like the tier-structure=20 of arms sales, have been set. But because=20 we are constantly told that power and=20 national interest drive foreign policy – =20 instruments like these are seen as scant or=20 a wish-list to appease the faint-hearted.=20

This perspective accounts for why our=20 foreign policy challenges are always pitted=20 in simple either/or terms and it suggests=20 why the range of options is always stark -=20 the US will cut its aid to South Africa if=20 the Syrian arms deal goes ahead, or the=20 country will lose $3-billion in foreign=20 exchange if it does not. And it explains=20 why we are encouraged to believe that all=20 decisions must rest on crude asymmetries of=20 power – the US is the remaining=20 superpower; South Africa must bend to=20 Washington’s will!

Can this perspective change? Yes, but to=20 succeed it will require both levels of=20 international understanding and analytical=20 critique which the country has yet to=20 produce. And here the focus must shift from=20 the world of policy-making to the world of=20 commentary.

Most authorities who are called upon to=20 comment on foreign policy turn to the same=20 power rituals of international relations as=20 those used by politicians.

This is why the policy process has been so=20 poorly analysed, and why any academic=20 advice appears one-dimensional and wholly=20 inadequate for a country, like South=20 Africa, in search of an open discussion=20 which might produce creative outcomes.=20

South Africa’s international relations are=20 like those of most states at the edge of=20 the millennium – trying to make sense of a=20 world in constant flux. The only difference=20 is that critical capacity seems more=20 developed elsewhere.

What is at stake is more than a simple=20 academic difference. How South Africa comes=20 to understand the world is central to how=20 it will exercise its options.

— Peter Vale is professor of Southern=20 African studies, University of the Western=20 Cape