Referendums would put an end to the violence and acrimony arising out of border disputes, argues Richard Griggs
ALL hell broke loose this year along the boundaries that separate South Africa’s provinces. Deaths, intimidation, house- burnings and other acts of violence related to provincial boundary disputes are rife.
The conflict is not just the product of “street law” and hooliganism, but stems from boundary problems left unresolved by the 1993 Commission on the Demarcation and Delimitation of States, Provinces, or Regions. Although discussion and debate lasted from May to November 1993, the commission took only six weeks to define the provinces.
The haste left 14 unresolved boundary problems. Some of these faded away, but others still simmer on a back burner. Three have come to a violent boil: Kuruman/Kudumane, Bushbuckridge and East Griqualand/Umzimkulu.
A decisive and democratic means for resolving boundary disputes was once part of South Africa’s Constitution. The 1993 Constitution allowed six months from April 1994 for area-based referendums on 14 specific boundary problems involving eight of the nine provinces.
This mechanism was never tested, for several reasons. First, the government sought to discourage its use because of the “expense” and the fear of inciting similar problems elsewhere. The African National Congress was most vociferous on this point because many of these disputes were among its own members, and therefore it sought to work these out through the political party process.
Second, the referendum option expired before most groups could experience the boundaries, assess the problems and organise a response. The Action Referendum Eastern Cape, an organisation supported by business leaders, was the only group to attempt a petition. It failed to obtain even half of the 158 154 signatures needed to split the province along the Kei River.
However, calls for referendums increased in East Griqualand, Bushbuckridge, Kuruman and former KwaNdebele after the date for filing elapsed.
The new Constitution now simply states that “the boundaries of the provinces are those that existed when the Constitution took effect”. We are functioning in a vacuum, without procedures or mechanisms to adjust provincial boundaries.
In the absence of any constitutional instruments, power is referred to higher levels of authority and party politics. This is problematic because the temptation to “horse trade” territories to capture voters has stalemated the entire process. The lack of referendums and constituencies also allows no space for the expression of regional concerns.
Most importantly, decision-making at a distance is creating tensions at the grassroots level by sidelining local actors who then seek alternative ways to demand attention, such as mass action, localised protests and violence.
Much of the central government’s response to mass action has been decision-making from a central level, rather than bringing affected communities into the decision-making process. This compounds the problem rather than mitigating tensions.
A referendum offers the maximum degree of transparency and participation in a demarcation process. It provides a decisive answer, and is usually accepted because it is perceived as legitimate. The government has resisted referendums on three grounds: “such moves will only lead to a spiral of similar demands”; the high cost of referendums; and since South Africa has “soft boundaries”, location is irrelevant.
Boundaries create the territorial spaces in which we live, distribute power to people who influence our lives, determine where we vote, create tax bases, construct regional identities, facilitate or impede easy transport, and determine access to public services.
Two examples can help illustrate these points, and hopefully lead to a reconsideration of a referendum as a mechanism for resolving highly sensitive territorial disputes:
Bushbuckridge/Groblersdal: In 1994 premiers Mathews Phosa (Mpuma-langa) and Ngoako Ramathlodi (Northern Province) negotiated an agreement to transfer Bushbuckridge to Mpumalanga. Northern Province insisted on linking an exchange of Groblersdal and Marble Hall to the cession of Bushbuckridge.
This territorial trading deadlocked an already complex constitutional process because the people of Groblersdal and Marble Hall vigorously protested.
More angry and alienated by the political process were the residents of the former Gazankulu and Lebowa homelands (Bushbuckridge), who have seen virtually no development since the days of apartheid. The Reconstruction and Development Programme cannot function if provinces are afraid to invest in an area they may lose.
Prior to the 1994 elections, residents sought to form a referendum committee to make their demands clear, but then were discouraged by ANC officials. They were advised that referendums were costly and that negotiations would lead to an eventual transfer to Mpumalanga (thereby winning the Bushbuckridge vote). Such a change was never effected.
Undelivered promises and the active discouragement of community participation in the decision-making process fuelled the present wave of mass protest which began in April.
The costs associated with the violence, strikes, lost business and destruction of property are far higher than any referendum. Any calculation of the costs would include: expensive government task teams to investigate the problem; troops and casspirs to patrol the roads; R25-million lost in tourism revenue; a Constitutional Court case filed against the ANC and the two provinces by the Bushbuckridge Border Committee; and 15 schools, 10 government office complexes, 13 commercial vehicles, and a sawmill valued at R1,5-million destroyed by arson.
The local demand to be part of Mpumalanga is motivated more by rational factors than irrational ones. On the map Bushbuckridge juts like a finger of space into Mpumalanga. Development can be better facilitated within Mpumalanga.
There are also irrational, emotive issues. When political organisations were unbanned in 1990, the people of Bushbuckridge thought they would be free of apartheid demarcations. They are the heirs of many forced removals, including those that made way for the Kruger National Park, and they now want to express the right to live in the area they please.
Nonetheless, the ANC’s national working committee and President Nelson Mandela announced in June that there will be no boundary changes. This produced an awkward situation for the special task team under the auspices of the Ministry of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development.
Last week the task team recommended some service delivery from Mpumalanga without changing the boundaries. This half-way measure, meant to appease both the region and prevent back-tracking on government policy, fell flat with the local actors who were excluded from the decision-making process. Locally, the issue of representation and self-determination are the priority issues, not service delivery.
Now the government faces a new rebellion: the residents are refusing to co-operate in any manner with Northern Province officials. They will not even allow them to address meetings in the area.
East Griqualand/Umzimkulu: The struggle over the boundary between the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal (East Griqualand) has sparked killings, house-burnings and other violence that also requires an army presence.
Prior to the “independence” of Transkei, much of the former Matatiele magisterial district was incorporated into Mount Currie and annexed to Natal.
Formerly it had been part of the Cape province. Then, 20 years later, the Trengove Commission was formed to take testimony from affected citizens and make recommendations as to whether the areas of Umzimkulu, Mount Currie and East Griqualand should be placed in the Eastern Cape or KwaZulu-Natal.
Like Bushbuckridge, the central problem with the boundary is fairly obvious: Umzimkulu is an exclave of the Eastern Cape and an enclave inside KwaZulu-Natal. Likewise, Mount Currie can be seen as an enclave inside the Eastern Cape or an exclave of KwaZulu-Natal.
Using a commission of inquiry to resolve this problem has one central weakness: consultants and advisers are not the decision-makers. The Trengove Commission was also fraught with problems and highly expensive. Its very presence created tensions as various political forces focused on swaying the decision-making process by packing halls and sometimes using intimidation to create the impression of unanimity.
In May 1996 the report was released. The conclusion was that all of East Griqualand be placed in the Eastern Cape. Within days a protest of about 2 000 people was held in Kokstad, during which copies of the Trengove report were burnt in the streets.
Protesters from the Eastern Cape, primarily organised by the local ANC, later crossed the border to show their support for the Trengove report.
The commissioners had argued that a referendum would be too expensive, logistically difficult, and they did not find any strong sentiment in favour of a referendum (the calls have been stronger and more powerful since then).
Most who live in Umzimkulu appear to support joining KwaZulu-Natal because delivery of services is obviously easier from Pietermaritzburg than Bisho. Those living in the Eastern Cape appear to be the greatest supporters of incorporating Kokstad and Matatiele as hub cities for development there. Many around Kokstad would prefer things to remain as they are.
A referendum could have dispelled all doubt and established a legitimate means of resolving the problem permanently.
The advantages of referendums on long- standing boundary disputes are clear-cut. Where decision-making power is concentrated, political parties will act in the best interests of the party, not the local people whose lives are at stake.
A properly structured referendum allows citizens the opportunity to express a democratic will that may differ from their representatives. Voters are freed from the intimidation of public meetings and feel responsible for the referendum result.
Politicians routinely claim that referendums create the divisions that they are meant to resolve. They also fear a loss of both individual and party power through an erosion in its ability to maintain a hierarchy.
This fear is unfortunate because referendums can actually be good for those who promote them. The perceived legitimacy of referendums raises citizens’ confidence in the democratic system and translates into investment because participatory democracy is linked to stability.
Grassroots participation in decision-making can also help build political party power rather than reduce it. For instance, the ANC’s squelching of the referendums has caused it political set-backs rather than gains. Pan Africanist Congress membership cards are being printed as fast as they can be dished out in Bushbuckridge, formerly an all-ANC area.
Support for referendums to resolve boundary disputes suggests an interest in moving South Africa toward a system of more direct democracy and community empowerment – still a debated issue in our transitional democracy.
— Richard Griggs is the head of research at the Independent Projects Trust