The Congolese war is rehabilitating previously unpopular heads of state, while muddying the reputations of the popular and virtuous, writes Gregory Mthembu-Salter
War in the Democratic Republic of Congo is having curious consequences. There are the unholy alliances, like Congolese President Laurent-Desir Kabila’s courting of the same Rwandan Hutu interahamwe militia that his troops helped butcher in 1996. Or his enemies, the rebels, drawing support not only from Rwanda and Uganda but also from Mobutuist generals they fought to remove only a year ago.
Then there is the new-found passion of regional governments to defend the “legitimate” Congolese government, so notably absent when Kabila’s army blasted its way to power without a ballot box in sight, defeating a regime that had rigged many elections, and earned the kind of 90% mandate so many of its neighbours crave.
Finally, the Congolese war is rehabilitating previously unpopular heads of state, while muddying the reputations of the popular and virtuous. President Nelson Mandela’s refusal to send troops to Congo played well in South Africa, but elsewhere in the region suspicions are strong that it was more to support Rwanda and Uganda than because of a commitment to political solutions to political conflicts – a suspicion strengthened by the South African foray into Lesotho.
Meanwhile, Burundi President Pierre Buyoya, punished by sanctions since seizing power in 1996, is now held up in some quarters as an example. Jan van Eck of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, among others, is arguing that Buyoya’s preparedness to talk and share power with his opponents puts him streets ahead of his Rwandan and Congolese counterparts, who prefer rather to demonise them and fight on.
Then there is Zambian President Frederick Chiluba. The animosity between his government and South Africa’s, generated by links between the African National Congress and Chiluba’s old rival, Kenneth Kaunda, is well known.
But mutual distrust of South Africa’s intentions has not generated a bond between Chiluba and Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe. The main reason is economic, as the Zambian government is indignant at Zimbabwe’s high tariffs, which keep out Zambian goods, and its tax breaks for Zimbabwean manufacturers, which give their products the edge in Zambia.
Despite Zambia’s hosting of peace talks between the Angolan government and Unita, culminating in the 1994 Lusaka protocol, the Angolan government has long suspected members of the Zambian government, and particularly former minister of defence Ben Mwila, of secretly supplying weapons to Unita. It appears that in October 1997, Angolan jets were on alert to attack Zambia, and many Zambians believe, probably wrongly, that Angola was behind a coup attempt in Lusaka in October 1997.
The Zambian government has always denied supporting Unita and has invited United Nations and Angolan officials on several verification missions to the border, which have all come away with nothing. But three weeks ago a weapon-filled truck was apparently impounded by Zambian soldiers close to the border, but released after Unita forces crossed over to collect them. The Zambian government denies the incident.
There is also little love lost between Chiluba and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. In fact, until the current Congolese conflict began, Kabila was Chiluba’s one true regional ally. Chiluba allowed Kabila’s troops to pass through north-east Zambia as a short-cut to Lubumbashi in early 1997, and the two presidents have met often since Kabila came to power last May.
So it was not surprising that when the Congolese rebellion began in August, Chiluba wanted to send troops to stop it. Eric Silwamba, a minister in the president’s office, visited Kinshasa with a message of solidarity on August 11, a move applauded by the Congolese state media.
After the August 18 Southern African Development Community (SADC)defence ministers’ meeting in Harare at which Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe decided to intervene, Chiluba reportedly told his Cabinet that Zambia had “no choice” but to follow suit. But Chiluba and foreign affairs ministers were subjected to a flurry of visits from businesspeople, other Cabinet ministers, civil servants and military officers to persuade them to change their minds.
The business community argued that Zambia could not afford the intervention and that overseas investors would write off Zambia as too dangerous, since going in would increase the risk of the conflict spilling across the border. Civil servants and ministers stressed that intervention would be unpopular with Zambians.
Also mentioned was the strong suspicion that Chiluba’s parents are Congolese, as alleged in court by Zambian opposition parties after the November 1996 general election, fought under a Constitution that barred presidential candidates whose parents were not Zambian. The rule was intended to exclude Kaunda, whose parents are Malawian. The court case ended in January, but judgment has still not been given. If Chiluba intervened on Kabila’s side, it was argued, Zambians would believe he is Congolese.
Probably the most decisive arguments came from Zambia’s top military officers. Their predecessors were sacked after the coup attempt, almost certainly to appease loyal junior officers fed up with the way they had apparently been systematically stealing from the armed forces.
It appears that on several occasions contracts for new equipment had been entered into, with those at the top pocketing the money and leaving the rank and file to make do with lousy pay. Zambia’s new military commanders apparently told Chiluba that the army could not be expected to fight an unpopular war with demoralised troops. The word “mutiny” was never used, but Chiluba took the point and on August 20, Zambia’s troops were told they would not be intervening.
Chiluba began exploring new possibilities. When Rwandan Minister of Defence and Vice-President Paul Kagame came to Lusaka on August 21, Chiluba played mediator. Mugabe was reportedly unhappy with the Zambian stance and applied pressure for Zambia to take sides. At a Harare meeting later, Chiluba endorsed Kabila as Congo’s president, condemned the rebels and refused to rule out sending troops in the future. A week later and back in Lusaka, Chiluba said he would not send troops and insisted that Zambia was committed to a ceasefire.
Chiluba’s diplomacy paid off, and he was appointed chair of the Victoria Falls talks of September 7 and 8 which gathered regional heads of state and rebel leaders. But the talks went nowhere, with the heads of state refusing to meet the rebels and Chiluba having to shuffle between rooms conveying messages, before the rebels angrily left the conference, vowing to fight on.
The SADC meeting in Mauritius on September 16 entrenched Chiluba’s mediatory role, mandating him to travel the region to help negotiate a ceasefire. Chiluba visited Kigali on September 19, meeting Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu and Museveni. Back in Lusaka, Chiluba announced himself “partially satisfied” but refused to be drawn further. He is expected to travel to Harare, Luanda and Kinshasa soon.
Few expect much to come from all this. Already there are separate Central African ceasefire initiatives, but these suffer from the basic problem with Chiluba’s efforts that neither Kabila nor the rebels are interested in peace.
Kabila fears that if he starts talking, Zimbabwean and Angolan troops might depart, leaving him vulnerable to attack. The rebels’ Rwandan backers will not settle with Kabila because of his support for the interahamwe, while the rebels reckon if they just wait, sooner or later Angolan troops will be needed to fight Unita back home, and Zimbabwean troops will have to return too, once their government decides it can no longer afford to keep them in Congo.
Chiluba is unlikely to be too worried whichever way things turn out. Zambian businesspeople are supplying Kabila’s troops with food and other materials, which will reassure Kabila if he wins that Chiluba’s heart was in the right place all along. If he loses, the rebels cannot condemn Chiluba because of his mediation role.
Meanwhile, there are no resource- draining troops fighting in foreign climes, Chiluba is welcome all over the region, and donors and human rights groups are for once praising his good sense and moderation. For Chiluba and his government at least, this is turning out to be a good war.