Paul Kirk has been led astray. He writes that “12 Hawks will cost the country an estimated minimum of US$1-billion”.
The actual contract price for 24 Hawks is 323,83-million plus R634,68-million for South African sub-systems. Translating that into United States dollars at the present exchange rates comes to about US$540,48-million for 24 Hawks, not US$1 000-million for 12 Hawks. That does not seem to be very costly compared with the figure of US$260-million that he mentions in respect of the Aermacchi MB339, assuming that it was also for 12 aircraft. In fact, given the Hawk’s superior performance and lower fuel consumption, the Hawk would by comparison seem cheap at the price.
Most comments on the arms packages, and the Hawk selection in particular, overlook that the government had a wide set of priorities against which it evaluated the offers. The highest priority was to establish long-term strategic alliances with our major European trading partners. The second priority was to develop alliances for our defence industry with internationally successful defence groups. The third was the industrial participation aspect. Only then did the purely military cost/benefit analysis come into play.
The lead-in fighter-trainer shortlist that went to the Cabinet comprised the Hawk from Britain’s BAE Systems, the MB339 from Italy’s Aermacchi, the L139 from the Czech Republic’s Aero Vodochody, and the Italian/Russian Yak 130 joint venture project. Evaluating that list against the government’s priorities leads to the Hawk, its only downside being its initial acquisition cost.
The other selections also match those priorities, with the value of the orders going to each of the winning countries being broadly in line with their importance to South Africa as trading partners. The two exceptions were Sweden and France. Sweden got lucky because, through its links with Britain’s BAE systems, it could offer the only new generation fighter that the South African Air Force could afford. France was unlucky; the tank deal would probably have gone its way, had that not been dropped when the overall package set was cut after the affordability study. France did win the contract for the patrol corvette mission suite, and is likely to be awarded some other contract in the next round of re-equipment.
Going on published figures, the Hawk uses roughly 25% less fuel than the MB339, suggesting that its operating cost should not be much higher, despite its higher performance. That higher performance 20% better power:weight ratio, 50% better rate of climb, 44% better endurance, 12% higher top speed and 8% higher cruise speed) taken with its handling advantages, make it reasonable to assume that fewer hours in the Hawk will be required to prepare a new fighter pilot for the Gripen than in the MB339. Combining that with the lower fuel burn seems to suggest roughly similar or even lower overall operating cost.
Australia’s, Canada’s and the US’s navies’ selection of the Hawk also suggests it will meet the lead-in trainer requirement for some time. Helmoed-Rmer Heitman, Camps Bay