Would the ANC have accepted a so obviously crooked election outcome in 1994? ask Greg Mills and Tim Hughes
Foreign policy presidents require, by definition, foreign policy successes. Has the outcome of the Zimbabwe election marked such a success for President Thabo Mbeki? And will it get the Zimbabwe economy out of jail?
One mooted solution gaining currency is that a government of national unity (GNU) will be created in Harare. A quid pro quo for the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) accepting an obviously flawed election process would presumably have to involve constitutional change, with Robert Mugabe’s departure at least to a non-executive presidency and their participation in this government. For Pretoria this is a “win-win” solution, one that leaves regional liberation ally Zanu-PF in power, no challenger to South Africa’s hitherto unbridled status as continental leader and, apparently, the hope of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad) intact.
A GNU is undoubtedly preferable to conflict and chaos in Zimbabwe, but by no means guarantees peace. It means different things to different parties it is one thing if it is proposed by the MDC, another if it is used to legitimise the election outcome.
If Zanu-PF remains in power at the core of a GNU, it is unlikely to be sufficient to restore trust in the Zimbabwean political economy. It is certainly a second prize to democracy being allowed to run its course. And it is unclear whether a shotgun GNU passes the Nepad governance test.
An outright Mugabe victory is the worst-case scenario for the region. With this, there is little or no hope of Zimbabwe’s economic recovery and every prospect of continued and rapid economic decline and increasingly widespread political violence. Victory by Morgan Tsvangirai offered much more: the likelihood of foreign economic assistance and a political and social compact enjoying majority support. Importantly, an MDC victory would have not only kept alive but advanced the Nepad vision of prosperity through democracy and good governance.
But the MDC has also posed a challenge to regional leadership. Tsvangirai has come through the union ranks, not through the party hierarchy. His party’s multiracial character and opposition to the seizure of white farmland but importantly not the need for land redistribution is a challenge to those intent on perpetuating racial schisms for political ends. He and his party were increasingly becoming the darlings of the West, a role previously occupied virtually unchallenged HIV/Aids controversies apart by the South African presidency.
Pretoria has apparently favoured a GNU on the basis of the utility of this approach in its own context in 1994. But the contexts are radically different, and it is also not entirely clear whether South Africa’s GNU was a success. It has been more than 20 years after Zimbabwe adopted its own GNU in its transition from white rule. This collapsed in 1983, as did the Zanu-Zapu GNU in 1987. Moreover, this poll was supposedly a competitive democratic process, about a potential change of government rather than liberation from colonial rule.
The GNU has explicit short-term advantages in negating claims of electoral fraud and preventing widespread violence. In weighing up the options, Tsvangirai would presumably not want to be labelled as a spoiler who refused to participate in a GNU and in so doing saw his country collapse amid internecine, inter-party, inter-regional fighting.
Most of the advantages of a GNU accrue, however, to Zanu-PF, at least temporarily keeping them in power and civil strife in check, and ending the political stalemate. But vibrant opposition politics has explicit advantages for the MDC, particularly in terms of keeping their distance from Zanu-PF and Mugabe, both of which appear intent on self-destruction.
A GNU has more value as a bridge to a new political dispensation, but its merit hinges on the support offered by the international community. This is, in turn, dependent on clear signposts and interim objectives in meeting a destination of democratic governance.
Zimbabwe’s election was not simply an event, but the culmination of a much longer process. This process would frankly not have been acceptable to South African voters, particularly the government’s control of the media, the selective exclusion of foreign observers and election training teams, the lack of oversight facilities at all stages and the failure to provide sufficient opportunity for Zimbabweans to cast their votes. It is doubtful, as in South Africa in 1994, that those Zimbabweans who queued for days to make their mark would have been voting for a continuation of the status quo and not for change.
Why then should South Africa and others have a different expectation of the value and process of democracy north as opposed to south of the Limpopo? Would the African National Congress have accepted a so obviously crooked election outcome in 1994?
Political expediency might ultimately win the day in Zimbabwe at least for a while in the form of a GNU with South Africa acting as the midwife. Even so, democracy, the Zimbabwean populace and their economy, the image of South African leadership and the hope of African recovery through Nepad have all been losers.
Dr Greg Mills and Tim Hughes are the national director and parliamentary research fellow respectively at the South African Institute of International Affairs