Minister of Finance Trevor Manuel has said with regard to Zimbabwe: ”They say quiet diplomacy has failed. Should we act like Ariel Sharon? Should we? Should we just go in there; kick butt; blow them up; drive over their cars; should we send in our tanks? If there are alternative solutions, let’s hear what they are.” The minister’s rhetorical flourish on what is the purview of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the presidency is something of a surprise. It is hard to imagine Britain’s Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown, for example, lamenting British foreign policy thus.
His statement comes at a critical moment, on the back of news that ruling Zanu-PF is ratcheting up the pressure on Zimbabwe’s independent media, of critical food shortages and continuing land appropriations and invasions, and of the recent breakdown in the talks between Zanu-PF and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).
The South African government has, quite understandably, attempted to avoid the portrayal of its actions over the Zimbabwe crisis as a test of the will of African governments to self-sanction the behaviour of fellow leaders, the core tenet of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad). But in reality, it is.
A key question remains unanswered in this regard: why did President Thabo Mbeki not seek a different course to quiet diplomacy over Zimbabwe when he was aware — as admitted publicly — that it did not work in the face of President Robert Mugabe’s obduracy, and he was aware of the high potential costs to Nepad?
While some may ask a similar question over his HIV/Aids policy, this comparison is not only a cheap shot, but does not offer any insight. Was it because Pretoria had no option but to engage Zimbabwe? Was President Mbeki outwitted by Mr Mugabe? Or did he go along with what the Zimbabwean leader was doing? Was quiet diplomacy adhered to precisely because the West expected a different course — a sensitivity exacerbated arguably by Britain’s Minister for Europe Peter Hain’s less than helpful (if honest) diplomatic interventions? Was it because the MDC was seen early on to be cosying up to South Africa’s Democratic Alliance? Or did President Mbeki fear the regional contagion of the effect of sanctions, with large-scale refugee flows and evictions into South Africa, Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana? Or was the explanation for Mbeki’s policy an awareness that African support for Nepad was contingent on not taking a tougher line with Harare — because other African states would not support the development initiative if what could be done to Harare today might be done to them tomorrow?
Mr Manuel’s comment is as encouraging as it is disingenuous. For more than two years alternatives to South Africa’s policy of quiet diplomacy have been offered, but never in the stark, radical terms that he asserts. Intervention and engagement are not a case of black or white, of invasion, as he suggests, or of hand-wringing, as we have now. But leaving that aside, in responding to the minister’s more positive invitation, what are the alternatives and the possible outcomes?
There are three core strategies to try to solve the Zimbabwe crisis. The first of these is to keep talking: to try to create a transitional unity government incorporating the MDC and Zanu-PF as a means to reduce the levels of violence and normalise the political and economic environment. The success of this attempt will, in the short term, hinge on the participation and commitment of both parties; in the longer term it is dependent on the conditions attached to such an arrangement. It is unlikely, in this regard, that the MDC will agree to a pact that will see it swallowed by Mugabe’s party. And Zanu-PF is unlikely to enter into an arrangement that will lead to a free election that, if the results of the last one were anything to go by, could see it out of office.
The second option is simply to allow the situation in Zimbabwe to run its course, allowing the political situation to evolve ”naturally”, free from outside intervention. The costs of this are great, however, not only in terms of the number of lives lost or destroyed in Zimbabwe itself, but also to the image of South Africa and its Nepad partners as responsible states concerned with good governance, human rights, the rule of law and democracy. Were South Africa to engage the principle of enlightened self-interest, it would surely conclude that quiet diplomacy is no longer in this country’s, or indeed the region’s, best interest. No reason other than the spectre of a regional famine of catastrophic proportions should be required to force Pretoria into a more engaged role in the Zimbabwean crisis.
The third option is thus to become more involved, rather than simply to delegate the task to special envoys or other institutions, such as the Commonwealth, where South Africa’s influence is diluted even though its political vulnerability is lessened. What form could this take? There are a range of choices between invasion and quiet diplomacy: strongly worded demarches; tough presidential statements; a more open cultivation of ties with the MDC and its leadership; working more closely with those international partners tougher on Zimbabwe (such as the United States); motivating for Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Southern African Development Community; tighter border controls; initiating public debate on sanctions; military manoeuvres near the border; targeted sanctions on Zanu-PF’s elite, including a ban on airflights and a freeze of personal assets; and finally oil and electricity sanctions. This does not, as the finance minister dismissively suggested, have to involve immediately the use of tanks or attacks on civilians. Rather, it entails the legitimate use of pressure on an increasingly out-of-control government that is apparently immune to carrots and sweet-talking.
But Mr Manuel is right to look for alternatives. Zimbabwe is sliding fast down the slope towards ungovernability and economic collapse, with what from the vantage of most election observers is likely an illegal government at the helm. If South Africa does nothing now, it is more likely to have to send the tanks in later. Moreover, South Africa’s role in Zimbabwe has to do with the ”saleability” of Nepad as a concept of African self-governance and regulation, whether Pretoria likes this or not. After all, if not Zimbabwe, what other state, when and how?
Dr Greg Mills is the national director of the South African Institute of International Affairs