The United Nations Security Council on Friday set about weighing the fate of about 600 000 Saharawi nomads who have been living in exile or under Moroccan occupation since 1975 in what was once called Spanish Sahara.
It is a dangerous time for the UN because it has already adopted a peace plan for Africa’s last colonial issue. After 11 years of the Security Council meeting every six months to consider the issue, Morocco eventually admitted it never intended to play along with this plan, which calls for a referendum on the future of the disputed former Spanish colony.
Realising it could neither rig nor win a referendum, Morocco showed the UN the finger. Morocco’s strategy has been to string out the status quo.
As long as Morocco’s King Mohammed VI has his army tied up in the Sahara he is spared the coup attempts that his father Hassan II had to put down. But the delay of three decades makes a nonsense of UN enforcement of Security Council resolutions.
How did the world organisation allow itself to get into this fix?
The answer lies in Morocco’s stunts and delaying tactics. Whenever its argument that ”a solution is just around the corner” has worn thin around the time the Security Council is due to discuss the issue, it has pulled a stunt.
When Hassan II sought to sway Libya’s support away from the Saharawis, he had a plane-load of Libyan dissidents, then training in Morocco, flown back to Tripoli for the Brother Leader to deal with.
Since September 11 last year his son has hauled in Muslim fundamentalists and delivered them to the United States as a contribution to the war on terrorism.
Last week Morocco invaded the Spanish island of Parsely. The bid to drive a wedge between Spain and Morocco’s chief defenders — France and the US — failed. The Moroccans were driven off.
Nevertheless, Rabat believes that the smoke will linger at the Security Council meeting. When absolutely necessary, Morocco plays the African card. Its occupation of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic remains among the most divisive issues on the continent.
Anticipating Saharawi successes at the inaugural African Union (AU) summit in Durban two weeks ago, before this week’s Security Council talks, Rabat organised a rival mini African conference of its own.
But the meeting in Morocco could not obscure the election of Saharawi President Mohamed Abdelaziz to the first secretariat of the AU.
Two weeks before the summit, Morocco crowed that it had ensured that the Organisation of the Islamic Conference would have nothing to do with the AU. This seemed scarcely likely to endear Morocco to South Africa, the AU’s first chair. Nevertheless, the African National Congress government persists in siding in the Saharawi dispute with Morocco, which declines to be an AU member and was a strong supporter of the apartheid regime. In doing so, South Africa is ganging up against a fellow member of the AU executive.
This does not help South Africa’s relations with oil-rich Algeria, its most important economic, trade and political partner in North Africa. Algeria is a co-pilot of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, has become South Africa’s largest market for military hardware and is one of South Africa’s major investment partners on the continent. Moreover, Algeria is also a strong supporter of the Saharawi Republic and shelters many of its refugees.
South Africa has been lobbied by the US to support what amounts to continued Moroccan occupation of the Saharawi Republic. But State Department specialists admit US President George W Bush would lose no sleep if South Africa kept its repeated promise to recognise the Saharawi Republic.
France, however, takes the matter more seriously. A number of times over the past year President Jacques Chirac has urged President Thabo Mbeki not to keep his promise to the Saharawis. Similar requests have been made by the Arab Kingdoms.
The ANC government has a record of fearless diplomacy. Establishing relations with Iraq would have angered every one of them. But South Africa insisted it was doing the right thing as chairperson-elect of the Non-Aligned Movement. South Africa also felt able to get closer to Libya, Cuba and Iran.
Why not, then, in the case of the Saharawis? Don’t try to understand this failure by asking our foreign affairs specialists — or even Minister of Foreign Affairs Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma herself. If she had her way, South Africa would have tied the knot with the Saharawis last May.
The Saharawi issue has become a presidential prerogative. Mbeki alone will take the decision on whether to keep the promise his government has made to these brave nomads.