The United States Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, has declared that the US-United Kingdom coalition has enough firepower in the Gulf region to begin an invasion whenever President George W Bush and Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair might order it.
Yet it is clear that the US and Britain do not yet have all their forces in place, and that there are serious downsides to beginning the invasion at such a premature point. So what are the options, and the pros and cons of each?
An immediate start
Why not surprise Saddam Hussein? Beginning a war while United Nations inspectors continue their work and the UN continues to look for a peaceful outcome would have huge diplomatic costs, but it would have military appeal if it caught elite Iraqi forces and the regime napping.
Coalition forces already have nearly 1 000 combat aircraft in the theatre. That is not as many as in Desert Storm, but today’s aircraft are much better equipped with precision weaponry and thus more effective.
Available ground forces are also substantial. They include a major US heavy division (the 3rd Mechanised Infantry Division, located in Kuwait) as well as a major US marine division and large elements of a British division.
But this approach seems unlikely. In addition to its political undesirability, forces now in the combat theatre are too small for the mission ahead, which must include not only defeating half a dozen republican guard/special republican guard divisions in battle, but also protecting oilfields, finding and confiscating weapons of mass destruction, and providing humanitarian relief and medical care to the Iraqi population.
Starting March 7 to 10
By this point, elements of the 4th Mechanised Infantry Division and 101st Air Assault Division would also be in place, in Kuwait and possibly Turkey; British forces would also be closer to nearing their projected maximum strength of about 40 000. Total coalition strength would approach 200 000 troops, in contrast to current levels of just more than 150 000.
This timing for war would also precede the full moon, meaning that in the early morning hours, night attacks could profit from true darkness in most of Iraq (assuming Iraq’s main electricity grids were first taken down).
Finally, temperatures would probably still be about 21°C even at midday, easing the strain on infantry troops in particular.
But this plan has two big problems. Firstly, it may not be consistent with the emerging Blair-Bush diplomatic strategy of giving diplomacy a few more weeks. Secondly, in military terms the abovementioned 4th Mechanised Infantry and 101st Air Assault divisions, as well as relevant British units, would not be up to full strength. Nor would a good deal of combat support capabilities be in place; reservists are still being trained in the US to provide backup to troops and to prepare for the stabilisation that will surely follow war.
In mid- or late March
By this point, nearly all coalition forces might have reached the combat theatre (though traffic jams in Kuwait City harbour and other logistical practicalities could mean that certain unloading operations would still be under way). But coalition forces would be approaching 250 000, roughly the size that has been discussed in recent months as appropriate.
Blair and Bush would also have had time to play out their diplomatic strategy at the UN, allowing, for example, the inspectors to determine if Iraq eliminates its new medium-range missiles as Hans Blix has demanded.
Mid- to late March is also still a relatively cool time in Baghdad, with high temperatures approaching 27°C, but generally no higher. Mid-March is the time of the full moon. But that may not pose a big problem if the early days of war emphasised high-altitude bombing and ground-force operations in open terrain, where US-UK forces have enormous advantages regardless of the light.
War in April
The advantages of a late start are primarily diplomatic, though waiting until this point would allow for the complete military deployment to be finished and all troops to train and prepare for battle.
Baghdad daytime temperatures would often surpass 27°C, but the night would still be cool, allowing soldiers in chemical gear to operate effectively.
War in September
It seems the furthest thing from the minds of Blair and Bush, but should diplomatic concerns seem to argue for it, and should there be a real purpose to significantly delay, troops could spend summer in the Gulf and fight in the autumn.
My money is on the middle option: a war beginning perhaps about St Patrick’s Day, March 17. Initial operations would then be focused on high-altitude bombing and desert manoeuvres by ground forces.
The battle for Baghdad would presumably then be in early April, the time of the next new moon and before the heat really becomes unbearable.
But there are several options. That means diplomatic and strategic arguments can be allowed to carry the day in deciding when war should start, just as they should. — Â