For Deputy President Jacob Zuma the conflict-ridden country of Burundi, which has seen more than 300 000 people die in a decade of civil war, has become a haven from his domestic political woes.
Whatever criticism is levelled against him as mediator in the Burundi strife pales by comparison with what he faces back home. His propensity for heavy-handedness notwithstanding, Zuma is generally credited with doing a solid job in bringing Burundi’s combatants together.
This week, however, Burundi also came apart for Zuma.
A summit of regional leaders in Dar es Salaam failed to reach an agreement on implementing a Burundi ceasefire signed there on December 2.
”Zuma comes away from that very severe setback to the peace process without any credit but also without any blame,” says Jan van Eck, a conflict analyst who specialises in Burundi.
”It appears that the regional leaders have taken matters away from Zuma.”
The regional leaders would not have gathered in the Tanzanian capital had they not been confident of an agreement.
But even as they were heading for Dar es Salaam, the signs of a collapse were evident.
President Domitien Ndayizeye walked out of talks with rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza saying his demands were outrageous.
Nkurunziza, who leads the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD), wants to become a second vice-president of Burundi and to have command of the country’s forces. He wants his Hutu rebels to comprise half of its armed forces.
Nkurunziza is demanding that a FDD speaker of Parliament preside over the Assembly, with 40% of the seats occupied by the FDD.
Ndayizeye’s Hutu Frodebu Party cannot live with this, nor can the Tutsi minority, which was guaranteed a share of the power by the Arusha Accord signed two years ago. ”What was supposed to be peace talks has become a simple power play by the FDD,” says Van Eck.
”They no longer want to talk about a ceasefire, but merely about the steps to taking over the country.”
Ndayizeye is desperately clinging to what he has. He knows that as the FDD grows in strength he will lose Frodebu members to the rebels.
He also knows that Nkurunziza is getting increasing support from other countries in the region, most notably Tanzania.
Nkurunziza is fighting on two fronts. Apart from toppling the Frodebu government, he is bent on wiping out the smaller, traditional Hutu rebel movement known as the National Liberation Front (FNL). The FNL has thus far rejected participation in the Arusha Accord.
Van Eck says the summit’s failure is devastating for public opinion in Burundi and the people have lost faith in Arusha.
Regional leaders had regarded that accord as sacrosanct because it represented the only concrete result of years of negotiation.
”Now we have to accept that Arusha was flawed from the start because it specifically excluded the FDD and the FNL,” says Van Eck.
”[It] must be revisited and probably reopened. Parts of it will have to be renegotiated to include the FDD and the FNL from the ground up.
”It never was feasible to come aboard late and be forced to accept a fait accompli.”
Zuma has been among the most stubborn proponents of Arusha’s inviolability.
He draws parallels between the tough tactics used to forge South Africa’s Convention for a Democratic South Africa agreements and the struggle to negotiate a Burundi settlement.
Many South Africans see Burundi in terms of a Hutu majority trying to wrest power from a privileged Tutsi minority.
It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that the South African template cannot be applied to Burundi.
If South Africa is to continue playing a mediation role in Burundi — with or without Zuma — it has to bite the bullet and get back to basics.