Civil society organisations (CSOs) that, in a post-apartheid setting, have been at pains to withhold criticism of the government, need to embrace a new brand of social activism informed by a philosophy of “direct” and “active” accountability. In terms of this philosophy, CSOs should seek to hold elected politicians and public officials directly accountable for the performance of their duties and responsibilities.
We should readily acknowledge the dividends of democracy for South Africa since 1994. We have seen the provision of electricity, water and houses to citizens who were deprived of these services and facilities under apartheid.
But as we move towards a decade of democracy in South Africa, civil society has to question whether South Africa’s new democratic institutions deliver public services in a way that meets citizens’ socio-economic rights. And are these rights being met in a way that represents the most efficient and effective use of available public resources? Because of their failure to redefine their relationship with the government, CSOs and social activists in South Africa have missed opportunities to ensure improvements in the delivery of socio-economic rights.
Under South Africa’s apartheid regime, NGOs, CSOs and trade union activists defined themselves, and their organisational activities, in terms of their opposition to the state. The apartheid state represented authoritarianism and the denial of human rights, while progressive civil society stood for democracy, equality and the achievement of basic rights.
After the adoption of the new Constitution in 1996, however, the new democratic state committed itself to uphold democratic values and to defend human rights. It also committed itself to the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights (such as health, housing, social welfare and access to water).
As a result of this changed political and social context, many progressive CSOs were uncertain about the kind of relationship they should pursue with the new democratic state. A considerable number of former civil society activists soon occupied influential positions within the new democratic state.
The government, receptive to the need to improve service delivery, sought to address its problems by involving civil society in the process of delivery. Many organisations involved in health, welfare and housing chose to enter into paid contracts with the government and became directly involved in the provision of public services. This clearly limited their capacity for critical engagement with the government.
Many social activists also argued that, given the continued influence of the apartheid legacy, it was inappropriate for social activists to publicly criticise their former colleagues in the government and that the government should be given a chance to “find its feet”.
As a result many social activists and progressive CSOs came to prioritise their personal links with members of the ruling party as the most effective means of influencing policy and legislative decisions. After all, the ruling party was overwhelmingly comprised of former social and political activists.
After 1994 a new approach to advocacy and engagement with the government was observed within the practice of many CSOs. This approach — premised on the withholding of public criticism — was popularly referred to as “being strategic”.
In the period between 1996 and 2000, what started out as an instance of informal “post-struggle etiquette” became progressively more crystalised into a political culture of withholding criticism of senior government officials and ruling party politicians. In effect, by 1999, “being strategic” had become a strategic end in itself for progressive civil society in South Africa.
The resulting political emphasis on personalised networking between social activists and government officials served to undermine the development of social relationships of accountability between the state and civil society. It also stunted the development of effective parliamentary accountability and oversight institutions within the state.
Those politicians, particularly within the ruling party, who were tempted to break out of this culture of non-criticism were confronted by two vital situational constraints: the risk of not being voted back on to the party list at the next election and the risk of losing their source of income.
Since 1999 there has been a visible decrease in internal political debate within civil society and within the African National Congress, South African Communist Party and Congress of South African Trade Unions tripartite alliance. At the same time, there has been a dual strengthening of centralised control over the state by an expanded president’s office, and over the ANC by the party’s executive committee. A climate of caution has emerged on the part of political analysts, and an ethos of sycophancy is fast becoming entrenched within parts of the ruling party and within many organs of state.
This climate has seen party loyalists toeing the line — of withholding criticism in favour of “quiet diplomacy” — on Zimbabwe. It has also led to party loyalists failing to object to corruption, maladministration and the selective enrichment of a few well-placed individuals during the course of large-scale government procurement deals — such as the 1999 arms deal.
Sadly, this has also resulted in many party loyalists uncritically adopting the president’s seemingly dissident views on HIV/Aids.
The interpretation of the significance of these developments, by social activists and civil society leaders, has been uneven and contradictory. Civil society advocacy organisations have swung between the poles of suggesting that civil society has “transcended its watchdog role over government policy” and asserting a more critical (and presumably more adversarial) role for civil society in securing socio-economic rights — particularly given the weak state of parliamentary oversight in the country.
When the issue of partnering or engaging with the government has been addressed, there has been no discussion of which of the two spheres of the government — the legislature or the executive — civil society could most effectively engage with. A partnership with the executive would effectively mean taking responsibility for the process of policy implementation. This translates into CSOs being involved in the delivery of public services while being incapable of taking any fundamental decisions involving policy priorities or the allocation of public resources. They end up with a limited capacity to criticise failures and weaknesses in the process, primarily because they share joint responsibility with the government for these service failures.
Civil society would be better served by entering into a relationship of mutual cooperation and information-sharing with the legislature and its oversight committees. They share a mutual interest in attempting to hold executive members and public servants accountable for their conduct and performance.
By carefully guarding their independence from government departments and the executive, CSOs can play a vital role in promoting accountability.
Civil society must engage actively, and directly, with the government on the basis of the principle of accountability. Advocacy organisations need to propagate the view that democratic accountability is an obligation, by elected political leaders and government officials, to answer to ordinary citizens for the performance of their duties and responsibilities. It is not a favour bestowed on ordinary citizens by those in public office.
Contrary to the view that there has been a consolidation of democracy in South Africa, it is critical to recognise that the state of development of our oversight institutions is weak and fragile. Institutions such as the public protector, the auditor general, the portfolio committees of Parliament and the standing committees of provincial legislatures are under constant pressure from an encroaching state executive.
It follows that advocacy organisations need to promote the principles of transparency and accountability in their strongest form. If these concepts are watered down in favour of preserving “personalised networks” or as a result of misplaced notions of “sophistication”, “nuance” or “political realism” this will prevent their popularisation. This, in turn, will inhibit the entrenchment and institutionalisation of democracy in South Africa.
A prerequisite for a healthy democracy is an active and informed civil society that is vigilant in its defence of parliamentary and constitutional oversight institutions.
Colm Allan is director of the Public Service Accountability Monitor, an independent monitoring unit dedicated to strengthening democracy and transparent and accountable governance