The African National Congress has misled the nation on the Oilgate scandal.
Documents in the possession of the Mail & Guardian make it clear that Imvume Management — the company that channelled R11-million in state oil money to the ANC before the 2004 election — was effectively a front for the ruling party.
The relationship between the ANC and Imvume is central to Oilgate.
When the M&G broke the Oilgate story two months ago, ANC spokesperson Smuts Ngonyama claimed Imvume was an independent firm from which the ANC was perfectly entitled to accept donations.
”We do not ask donors where their money comes from,” he said. The point was echoed by ANC secretary general Kgalema Motlanthe, who said: ”A distinction should be made between the ANC and private companies.”
Both officials suggested the transaction was an arm’s-length donation from an ordinary private concern — which meant the ANC could not have known that the R11-million came from the parastatal PetroSA, which had prepaid Imvume for part of a supply contract.
But the documents, some marked ”Top Secret” and which the M&G gathered over three years, make a mockery of that defence. Instead, they show how close the ANC and Imvume really were.
They show that as early as 2001 Motlanthe and, to an extent, party treasurer Mendi Msimang were intimately entangled with Imvume boss Sandi Majali.
The evidence suggests that together they hatched an ambitious project to raise millions of rands for the ANC by obtaining lucrative oil allocations from Saddam Hussein’s regime under the United Nations Oil for Food (OFF) programme.
OFF was an exception to UN sanctions that allowed Iraq to export oil to pay for humanitarian needs.
In turn Motlanthe and Majali, on behalf of the ANC, would extend politiÂÂcal solidarity to the Iraqi dictator and campaign for the lifting of sanctions.
Oilgate timeline
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How events unfolded |
The cast
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The people involved |
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The documents include a letter from Motlanthe to the Iraqis, confirming Majali as the ANC’s designated representative for this project.
Lawyers acting for the ANC and its officials have declined to comment and warned of further legal steps against this newspaper. The ANC sued the M&G for defamation after an initial exposé in February last year, but has not pursued the matter actively.
Lawyers acting for Imvume and Majali warned the M&G that it was drawing on secret and private information and described the inferences drawn as ”a distortion of the facts”.
The information obtained by the M&G carries implications for the government as well. It shows that senior representatives from the Ministry and the Department of Minerals and Energy, as well as the state-owned Strategic Fuel Fund (SFF), participated in this project — to an extent that suggests their boss, former minister Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, must have been aware of the plan.
Mlambo-Ngcuka and her officials have denied any such collusion, but have declined to comment on the allegation that Majali was effectively an agent for the ANC.
The full evidence is carried below — see ”Trading principle for profit” — but even in summary it is damning.
When Majali travelled to Iraq for talks with Hussein’s government in 2001, he was accompanied by a top-level delegation, including the Director General of Minerals and Energy, Sandile Nogxina, and Mlambo-ÂÂNgcuka’s chief of staff, Ayanda Nkuhlu. The minister personally authorised their trip.
Also with them was Riaz Jawoodeen, a director of the SFF, the state body responsible for maintaining South Africa’s strategic fuel stocks. The SFF was also answerable to Mlambo-Ngcuka.
The deal proposed to the Iraqis was startling in its simplicity. The ANC — and, by implication, its officials in government — would support Hussein’s beleaguered regime in exchange for the allocation of oil. The oil trade between Iraq and the South African authorities would be handled by Majali, who was introduced as the ANC’s agent. Some of Majali’s profits would go to an ANC funding front, controlled by him.
Imvume’s first deal was a R1-billion contract to restock the state oil reserves held by the SFF with Iraqi crude. Imvume won a controversial tender in which Jawoodeen, the SFF director, played a central role.
But the oil allocations were not on the scale originally envisaged and proved to be far less profitable.
Soon war loomed and any future extension of the scheme was scuppered by the United States-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.
By that time, however, Imvume had already scooped its next state deal in South Africa. In October 2002 it won a R750-million tender to supply paraÂÂstatal PetroSA with oil condensate.
As reported by the M&G two months ago, it was this contract from which Imvume diverted R11-million to the ANC.
Trading principle for profit: Full background story
Stefaans Brümmer and Sam Sole investigate the events that led to the ruling party funding scandal
This is the story of how South Africa’s ruling party offered solidarity to Saddam Hussein in exchange for crude oil — and how state resources were used to help the party in this ambitious fundraising project.
Two years of effort resulted in little, if any, financial gain for the African National Congress. But the story is important for it reveals not only how the party subordinated principle to profit, but also how it engaged in business through what was effectively a front company.
On September 11 2001 terror visited New York, giving United States President George Bush an excuse to invade Iraq.
That same day, a small group of South Africans set off on Emirates flight EK464, Johannesburg to Dubai, travel records show. Dubai, and then Amman, was the standard route to Baghdad.
The group included Sandi Majali, chief executive of the newly formed company Imvume Management; Sandile Nogxina, Director General of the Department of Minerals and Energy; and Riaz Jawoodeen, a director of the Strategic Fuel Fund Association (SFF), the state agency that managed South Africa’s strategic crude reserves.
Four days before they left Johannesburg the then minerals and energy minister, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, approved her director general’s travels. The motivation she signed, and a subsequent expense claim, show that her chief of staff, Ayanda Nkuhlu, went on part of the trip.
Although Nogxina denied last week that he, Jawoodeen and Nkuhlu had travelled for the same reason as Majali, all indications are that the men had a single purpose — to ask Iraq to allocate crude oil for sale to Majali’s company, so that he could sell it on to the SFF to replenish South Africa’s strategic reserves.
Less than three months later, the SFF would issue a tender for the supply of four million barrels of Basrah Light, an Iraqi crude oil.
The SFF answered to Mlambo-Ngcuka and her department. Jawoodeen, as SFF director, would play a central role in the tender adjudication. And Majali’s Imvume Management would win the tender.
According to Nogxina, it was pure chance that Majali joined him, Nkuhlu and Jawoodeen on the September 11 trip to Iraq.
The government delegation, he said, had gone inter alia ”to explore the possibility of a government-to-government deal for the supply of oil for our strategic stocks”.
Majali joined them after he had been ”advised by the Iraqi ambassador of our intention to travel to Iraq” and ”wanted to take advantage of our presence in Iraq to finalise his [own] oil deal”.
But Majali had been negotiating with the SFF for some time to sell it Iraqi crude. It is highly unlikely that Nogxina’s plan to negotiate Iraqi crude for the South African state, and Majali’s plan to be the middleman in such a deal, were unconnected.
First contact
Majali’s efforts went back some time. In December 2000 he and two business partners, auctioneer Rodney Hemphill and Iraqi-American Shakir Alkhafaji, travelled to Baghdad to finalise a contract for their company, Montega Trading, to buy two million barrels of Basrah Light.
They were accompanied by the ANC’s secretary general, Kgalema Motlanthe, and treasurer general, Mendi Msimang. It is unclear why the ANC officials accompanied them. The Mail & Guardian has been unable to confirm allegations that Majali’s Iraqi oil business at that time already was aimed at funding the party.
Montega Trading lifted its two-ÂÂmillion-barrel cargo at Iraq’s Minah al Bakr oil terminal on February 2 2001. It was sold to Sopak, an associate company of Glencore International, a Swiss trading major.
At about the same time, Nogxina arrived in Baghdad. He said last week that this was to develop trade relations under the United Nations Oil for Food (OFF) programme.
OFF was the exception to United Nations sanctions imposed on Iraq after it invaded Kuwait in 1990. Under the programme, Iraq could sell crude oil, but the UN held the proceeds in trust and released them only for approved humanitarian imports.
On April 5, the SFF wrote to Montega and Majali, telling them it would ”like to pursue discussions with yourselves” for the supply of 9,5-million barrels of Iraqi Basrah Light for South Africa’s strategic stocks. At that stage already, Majali and the state were talking about him supplying strategic stocks.
In May 2001 Majali registered Imvume Management, leaving behind Hemphill and Alkhafaji. But the plan remained the same. At the end of July, he signed a fax offering six million barrels of Basrah Light to the SFF; alternatively to ”facilitate” a direct purchase between the SFF and Iraq. Either way, he would be an intermediary between Iraq and the South African state.
Intimates
By the time of the September 11 trip, there is no doubt that Majali and Imvume were intimately entangled with the ANC. A day before the deleÂÂgation departed, the ANC’s Motlanthe signed a letter to Khalid Tabra, a businessman-member of Hussein’s Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party. Tabra led the Iraq Friendship Association, seemingly a Ba’ath front. Motlanthe’s letter conveyed ”the ANC’s approval of Sandi Majali as a designated person to lead the implementation process arising out of our economic development programmes”.
Majali was to report to Motlanthe’s office ”at regular intervals”.
Motlanthe also referred to a letter from party treasurer Msimang to Iraq’s then influential deputy prime minister, Tariq Aziz. A draft version of a letter prepared for Msimang promised solidarity to the Iraqis: ”Both the ANC and the South African government are unequivocally committed to advancing the cause of the people of Iraq.”
And it endorsed Majali as middleÂÂman between the Iraqis and the South African state: ”The relationship being forged between our government Department of Minerals and Energy and your Ministry of Oil, facilitated and managed by Imvume Management (Pty) Ltd led by Sandi Majali, has our blessing and support.”
In any event, Majali portrayed himself as the ANC’s agent. In a letter he signed before leaving for Baghdad he called himself the ”head of implementation of ANC economic transformation programmes”.
The letter, addressed like Motlanthe’s to Tabra’s friendship association, reinforces the idea that the government officials and Majali went with the same purpose. In fact, Majali claimed to be ”leader of the delegation”.
Majali’s letter set out a programme which included him presenting ”a message from the leadership of the ANC” to Aziz and him meeting Tabra’s friendship association to ”discuss possible friendship with the ANC”. There would be discussions towards the finalisation of an Iraqi-South African Friendship Association; a body to join Tabra’s Iraqi association and a similar one in South Africa.
Nogxina has confirmed that the government delegation took part in a meeting with Tabra’s association — seemingly the same where party-to-party relations were on the agenda.
Majali’s proposed programme also included a meeting between Nogxina and his Iraqi Oil Ministry counterpart ”regarding government-to-government relations in relation to oil trade”.
But, just like the South African government officials were included in the friendship talks, Majali participated in the oil discussions.
After his return to Johannesburg he wrote to Iraqi deputy oil minister Saddam Hassan, whom the South Africans had met in Baghdad. Referring to a presentation he had made to Hassan, he said he was asking for an initial 12-million barrels of Basrah Light, to be lifted by Imvume starting in December. ”Please note that this order is required by the South African government for its strategic reserves.”
On the same day, September 20, Majali also wrote to the Iraq State Oil Marketing Organisation (Somo), the powerful body that administered the oil allocations. He repeated the request for 12-million barrels, but also referred to longer-term ambitions: ”Our total requirement is 25-million barrels per annum.”
In a third letter on that day, to a senior Ba’ath official, Majali alluded to his political backers and suggested President Thabo Mbeki would also be in the loop. He wrote: ”I have already briefed the leadership of the ANC, through the secretary general and the treasurer general, regarding our visit to Baghdad … They, in turn, have undertaken to provide a full briefing to the president of the ANC.”
Majali reaffirmed ”our commitment to support the people of Iraq in their struggle against the economic sanctions”, adding that the ANC welcomed an invitation to attend an anti-sanctions conference in Baghdad on November 12 that year.
The UN sanctions had dealt a massive blow to Iraq’s economy and autonomy. They were a large part of the reason Hussein’s regime craved friendship of the kind Majali offered; it needed international support against sanctions.
Travel records show that Majali and Motlanthe boarded the same flight, EK464 Johannesburg to Dubai, on November 9 2001, in time for the conference in Baghdad.
Hat trick
During the September 2001 meetings in Baghdad, Majali wore two hats — of the ANC extending solidarity to Hussein, and of Imvume, the company that would trade Hussein’s oil. Or did it amount to the same hat? Was Imvume fronting for the ANC?
Two versions of an oil trade proposal Majali prepared for the Iraqis are instructive. They show he intended making hundreds of millions of rands buying and selling Iraqi crude over a 10-year period, and that a key beneficiary was to have been the ANC.
An earlier, undated draft of the proposal clearly identified Majali’s company, as yet unformed, as controlled by and at least partly to beneÂÂfit the ANC.
It said: ”This proposal is made by Mr Sandi Majali acting under a power of attorney from Mr Kgalema Motlanthe on behalf of a company to be established, to the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr Tariq Aziz … The shares in the company will be held by a nominee on behalf of the beneficial shareholders who will be the following entities …”
The largest shareholder, with 35%, was Stalwarts Research Trust. The ANC formed Stalwarts in 2000 to raise funds for the party, in particular its policymaking functions. Its trustees were Motlanthe, Msimang and ANC policy head Jeff Radebe.
Another 25% was earmarked for an Iraqi-South African business consortium to be nominated by Motlanthe and Iraq’s Aziz, with a brief to ”facilitate and manage the development of political and socio-economic relations”.
The draft envisaged a staggering 100-million-barrel allocation of crude annually over 10 years, with a projected gross profit of R4,9-billion. Of this, R1,7-billion would go to the ANC’s Stalwarts trust.
The second version of the proposal, dated simply September 2001, appears to be what Majali took to Baghdad. It asked for a more realistic 25-million barrels of Basrah Light annually for 10 years and — apart from a ”top secret” cover letter, as will be seen — any direct reference to an ANC stake was removed.
Majali was introduced not as Motlanthe’s representative, but as an Imvume director. And the proposal correctly described Imvume’s formal shareholders as three supposedly charitable trusts. Not much is known about these trusts, but they were founded in August 2001 by Daniel Lengosane, a former member of the ANC underground who was head of security in the presidency at the time.
On the money
However, there is direct evidence that the oil trades envisaged in this new version of the proposal were still intended to fund the party. Apart from the trusts, it said, profits would be channelled to the Iraqi-South African Friendship Association and an entity called the South African Business Council for Economic Transformation (Sabcet).
Majali headed both Sabcet and the South African chapter of the friendship association.
As will be seen, the friendship association appears to have been intended as a cover behind which the ANC and the Ba’ath party could conduct relations.
And Sabcet was to fund the ANC. Majali’s ”top secret” cover letter on the oil proposal was blunt: ”[Sabcet] has the blessing of the South African leadership, with its brief being to facilitate and advance economic programmes that are geared towards supporting the ANC’s political programmes sourcing finance to fund such programmes.”
The cover letter emphasised the message of solidarity with the Iraqi regime and gave a ”commitment to advancing the cause of the people of Iraq”. It said the request to allocate Imvume 25-million barrels of crude a year for 10 years was ”an initial measure to foster such political relations”.
Oil was requested and friendship offered — oil for Majali to fund the ANC through Sabcet; friendship for the Iraqis through the friendship association. Oil for friendship.
Compliments returned
To consummate the relationship, a Ba’ath delegation paid a return visit to Johannesburg a month later, in mid-October 2001.
A draft programme listed talks hosted by Motlanthe and the adoption of a protocol to formalise the Iraqi-South African Friendship Association.
A speech prepared for Motlanthe set out the purpose of the friendship association and the wider scheme. It is not known whether Motlanthe delivered the speech, but its message is consistent with the other documentation.
It addressed the political — saying the ANC had an ”unwavering commitment” to oppose sanctions — but also commerce and party finance: ”Crude oil trade and other value-adding spin-offs from such trade are intended to build and strengthen financial and political capabilities of both parties to meet their social obligations.”
The speech said the friendship association would operate publicly; the ANC and Ba’ath hands behind it would remain hidden. ”Note should be taken that the association will function at arm’s-length level from the respective parties. Because of the hostile environment, this becomes necessary to protect the leadership and to shield them from attacks by the media and hostile opponents.”
The association would be ”empowered to conduct business in the open market through appropriate vehicles and/or companies it sets up …”
Sabcet was such a vehicle. Reporting to Motlanthe, it would ”facilitate and advance economic programmes that are geared towards supporting the ANC’s political programmes sourcing finance to fund such programmes” —the same wording as in Majali’s secret cover letter a month earlier.
The speech concluded that the ANC, ”through the council [Sabcet]”, was behind the 25-million barrel-a-year oil request.
Friends
On October 20 2001, the Iraqi-South African Friendship Association was formalised in a protocol signed by Majali for the South Africans and Tabra for the Iraqis.
The protocol spoke of stronger relations and the injustice of sanctions. While the association’s main task was to boost ties, ”that shall not prevent it from facilitating and implementing commercial dealings in pursuance of the aims of this protocol”.
As a reminder that the true parties behind the association were South
Africa’s and Iraq’s ruling parties, the text referred to a further protocol between the ANC and the Ba’ath party and that formed ”the basis for this protocol”.
Did the formalisation of relations help secure the oil allocations Majali and his backers wanted? Judging by a draft letter dated shortly before the main
protocol was signed, it appeared so.
In this, Majali, wearing his Imvume hat, thanked deputy oil minister Hassan for his ”positive response” to the allocation request. The response, he said, had been conveyed by the Iraqi delegation then in South Africa.
Majali, it seemed, had his promise of oil. But why did it have to be achieved through to-and-fro visits involving government and party officials and promises of funding and friendship? Why could Majali, as an ordinary businessman, not have asked the Iraqis for oil, paid for it and traded it for his own profit?
There are clues in the motivation Mlambo-Ngcuka approved before her officials left for Iraq that September. It said: ”There is room for expansion for more trade by South Africa under the ‘Oil for Food’ programme … It is recommended that the right political atmosphere between Iraq and South Africa be created in order to win more business.”
Her department was aware that Iraq bestowed business according to its political likes and dislikes. This is consistent with what is now accepted fact: that the regime used oil allocations to influence international opinion against sanctions. The department was prepared to help boost relations with Hussein’s regime to win business — and in this case specifically for Majali.
But the travel motivation went further: ”A surcharge imposed by the Iraqis on their oil allocation makes it difficult for South African companies, especially black empowerment groups, to break into the market. This is one of the issues that needs to be addressed by both parties.”
Iraq demanded ”surcharges” — in reality kickbacks illegal under UN rules — from oil buyers as a way to make money outside the strictures of OFF. But why did Mlambo-Ngcuka’s officials have to help Majali overcome the kickback problem?
Indebted
Somo records say Majali’s earlier company, Montega Trading, was billed a ”surcharge” of $464 632 (then about R3,6-million) for its February 2001 cargo.
Even though Iraq tended to refuse further allocations to buyers who failed to comply, Montega did not pay.
This seems to have been because of a dispute between Montega and Sopak, the Glencore associate company that bought the cargo. Sopak did not pay the full price agreed and Montega grossed only about $406 000 for the entire transaction — not enough to cover the kickback.
Apparent confirmation that Majali was in trouble over the Montega debt, and that he thought political goodwill could help overcome it, is found in another letter he wrote after the September 11 trip.
Thanking Tabra for his hospitality, he confirmed that Somo had been formally approached for an initial allocation of 12-million barrels of Basrah Light.
Majali added: ”We would highly appreciate if you could facilitate this transaction, with particular attention to the competitive advantage pricing of this transaction for the benefit of both parties in order to build financial resources to support political programmes.”
Under OFF, Iraqi crude prices were set monthly and were not subject to negotiation. As Majali could not have been asking for a discount, it is more likely he wanted exemption from the ”surcharges”.
Progress -‒ and setbacks
In December 2001 the South African side of the plan started to come together. The SFF issued a tender on December 5 for the supply of four million barrels of Basrah Light, worth about R1-billion, to replenish South Africa’s strategic stocks.
A central figure on the tender evaluation committee was SFF director Jawoodeen, Majali’s fellow-traveller in Baghdad. And, although Imvume’s initial quotation was the highest of nine bidders who complied with basic tender conditions, it eventually won the right to supply the entire consignment.
On March 6 2002 Imvume signed a contract with the SFF to supply the first two million barrels. But on the Iraqi side things started to unravel. On the same day, Somo promised Majali a two-million barrel allocation, but it was finalised too late.
To meet his contract deadline Majali turned to Glencore, which in turn bought the required oil from a Russian company, Slavneft.
The extended supply chain slashed the expected profit. Hemmed in by its contract with the SFF, Imvume seems to have realised a margin of only two US cents a barrel, grossing it a paltry $37 681 (then about R424 000). Not an auspicious start to the millions Majali hoped to raise for the ANC from Iraqi crude.
Further problems arose over the additional two million barrels required by the SFF. Imvume still had its unused two-million-barrel allocation from Iraq, but it was never lifted.
There are two explanations for this. In April, Hussein temporarily stopped all crude exports to protest repression in Palestine. This may have interfered with Imvume’s lifting schedule.
But Somo may also still have held Majali liable for the $464 632 kickback Montega had failed to pay. Between May 5 and 10 2002, Majali was again in Baghdad — accompanied by Motlanthe. The M&G knows of an allegation that they met Aziz and discussed the outstanding ”surcharge”.
And so, to supply the SFF, Imvume again turned to Glencore, who bought from another Russian company, Machinoimport. The cargo was loaded at Minah al Bakr on May 24.
This cargo was definitely tainted by a kickback: Machinoimport, Somo records say, paid a ”surcharge” of about $500 000. And, because the margin was again shared between three companies, Imvume is unlikely to have profited much.
Friendship renewed
But this was not the end of the story. On July 2 2002 the Department of Foreign Affairs announced that Aziz would arrive in South Africa the following day as guest of then deputy president Jacob Zuma.
Sanctions were high on the agenda. The department said the South African government and Aziz would discuss ”the expected effect of the new sanctions regime for the people of Iraq, who have been subject to severe suffering by more than 10 years of stringent international sanctions”.
Zuma hosted a banquet for Aziz at King’s House in Durban, where he condemned sanctions and expressed ”our enthusiasm” for stronger relations. ”South Africa believes that solid economic relations can be the foundation of lasting friendship. I hope that this visit … will yield new economic possibilities that will be to the benefit of both South Africa and Iraq.”
A subsequent farewell dinner for Aziz would be hosted, according to the official programme of the foreign affairs department, by the ”ANC with members of the Iraq-South Africa Friendship Association and business community”.
The M&G has been told that Motlanthe was the main speaker at the event.
Imvume paid the bill of about R40 000 for Cabanga, the Johannesburg venue.
Aziz left South Africa on July 9, to be followed by Majali on July 20 and Motlanthe and Msimang six days later. The next day, July 27, Somo and Imvume concluded a contract giving the latter the right to buy another four million barrels of Basrah Light. Majali, Motlanthe and Msimang returned to South Africa together on August 2.
This time Imvume took the four million barrels, again in conjunction with Glencore, in two cargoes on October 17 and December 13. They appear to have been traded on the international market.
Since these were from Imvume’s own allocation — rather than bought from Russian companies — it may have made some profit at last.
But this may not have been substantial. By that time the UN had squeezed Iraqi prices upwards to decrease margins from which kickbacks could be paid. Ten US cents a barrel is a high estimate of what Imvume grossed — a total of no more than $400 000 (about R3,8-million) for both trades.
It unlikely that much, if any, of this reached the ANC as Imvume would have had its own expenses to cover.
There is evidence that Somo earmarked another three million barrels for Majali to buy from December 2002. But nothing came of it, perhaps because of the looming war.
The US-led invasion in March 2003 blew away two years’ groundwork by Majali and his backers in the ANC and the South African government.
The rest is history. Shattered was Majali’s dream of 25-million barrels of crude annually from Hussein’s regime, and untold millions for the ANC. But Imvume was still to use state oil procurement to fund the ANC. In December 2003, as revealed by the M&G two months ago, Imvume diverted R11-million from a PetroSA supply contract to the ruling party.