The Israeli government is facing a barrage of criticism over its handling of the war in Lebanon, with questions about the decision to attack Hizbullah, mounting military losses, strategy and tactics, continuing missile strikes and disquiet about Lebanese civilian casualties.
Fatalities on the scale of those in the south Lebanese town of Bint Jbeil on Wednesday are likely to bring pressure from both the army and the public for a change of tack. Even before this setback there was growing unease about a range of war-related issues in public comments by politicians, former officers and leading experts and pundits.
Despite broad support for hitting back at Hizbullah after its border raid and abduction of two soldiers, there is deep concern about the progress of the campaign two weeks since it began, and a lack of clarity about what will constitute a victory.
Moshe Arens, a hawkish former Likud defence minister, issued a stark warning that Hizbullah and its leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, could emerge from the conflict without being beaten. ”This will be a disaster for Israel,” he told the Ha’aretz newspaper. ”Nasrallah will be seen as someone who fired thousands of Katyushas at Israeli communities for weeks and came out unscathed.”
Experts say Israel’s much-vaunted intelligence services underestimated Hizbullah’s capabilities. The air force has come under scrutiny after losing three Apache helicopters and an F16 jet, with one helicopter presumed downed by friendly fire. Five soldiers have been killed by friendly fire.
Wall-to-wall TV and radio talk shows have wheeled out reserve or former officers highlighting the shortcomings of those running the show, bringing defensive responses from the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) general staff, sneers at ”armchair warriors” and accusations of disloyalty in wartime.
But Ze’ev Schiff, the highly respected doyen of Israeli military commentators, and author of the definitive history of the 1982 war, put it bluntly: ”Israel is far from a decisive victory and its main objectives have not been achieved.”
Another veteran correspondent, Eitan Haber, wrote in the mass- circulation Yediot Aharonot: ”This is neither the time nor the place in the middle of serious fighting, but when this is all over the IDF is going to have take a good look at itself.”
Others talk of a once legendary army gone soft, though its advantages lie in firepower and technology that is of limited use against highly motivated guerrillas. In recent years Israel’s main enemy has been lightly-armed Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, although suicide bombings and homemade rockets required new thinking. ”For years people just haven’t wanted to see that there are problems with the army,” said journalist Matti Golan.
The main worry is that Hizbullah is still able to launch 80 to 100 rockets a day despite thousands of air strikes on Lebanon. The Israeli port of Haifa and other northern areas were hit again on Wednesday. Israeli ground operations have inflicted losses on the guerrillas but none have been mounted in the Tyre area from where missiles are being launched at Haifa. Hizbullah has been damaged but is far from crippled. Supplies from Iran and Syria are getting through, despite Israel’s blockade.
The sub-text of much of the criticism is that Olmert and his Defence Minister, the Labour party leader Amir Peretz, have little military experience and none of the stature of the former prime minister Ariel Sharon. Many of their closest advisers are untried novices.
Commentators question whether key decisions were thought through in the context of an overall strategy: these include the swift response to the July 12 attack, the bombing of Beirut international airport despite warnings that this would trigger retaliation against Haifa, and the destruction of Hizbullah headquarters in southern Beirut. They say the government’s response has been to shift its goals and lower public expectations.
The original objective of ”breaking Hizbullah” has been watered down to ”weakening Hizbullah”. Olmert’s sudden agreement to the deployment of a multinational force on the border reflects reluctant recognition that Israel cannot itself disarm the Lebanese militia and needs a foreign buffer.
International focus on civilian deaths in Lebanon — roughly 10 times the number suffered by Israel — has damaged Israel’s case abroad, despite the unwavering support of the US.
”Even before we know who will win this campaign we can state with certainty that Israel has suffered a terrible propaganda defeat in Lebanon and the Arab world,” wrote the Ma’ariv columnist Jacky Hugi. ”One country cannot destroy another without explaining to the neighbour the logic behind its actions. From being our silent allies, the Lebanese have become the victims of our blind pounding.”
On top of all that there are complaints about poor conditions in air raid shelters, the failure to compensate those whose property has been damaged by enemy action and the confusion caused by a plethora of official spokespeople giving out conflicting messages. Some want a single ”war spokesperson” to be responsible for all government information, a concept which worked well in the 1991 Gulf war, when Iraqi Scud missiles hit Israel.
Nahum Barnea, the country’s leading political commentator, warned that the public had exaggerated expectations of what might emerge from this crisis. ”Israel is like the guy who promised to jump off the big top at the circus but freezes the moment he gets up there. ‘Why isn’t he jumping,’ the spectators ask. ‘No question of jumping,’ the guy replies. ‘The only question is how I can get down.”’ — Â