‘India is a roaring capitalist success story.” So said a recent issue of Foreign Affairs; and earlier this year many business executives and politicians in India celebrated as Lakshmi Mittal, the fifth-richest man in the world, finally succeeded in his hostile takeover of the Luxembourgian steel company Arcelor. India’s leading business newspaper, The Economic Times, summed up the general euphoria over the event in its regular feature, The Global Indian Takeover: “For India, it is a harbinger of things to come — economic superstardom.”
This sounds persuasive as long as you don’t know that Mittal, who lives in Britain, announced his first investment in India only last year. He is as much an Indian success story as Sergey Brin, the Russian-born co-founder of Google, is proof of Russia’s imminent economic superstardom.
There is, however, no denying many Indians their conviction that the 21st century will be the Indian Century just as the 20th was American. The exuberant self-confidence of a tiny Indian elite now increasingly infects the news media and foreign policy establishment in the United States.
Encouraged by a powerful lobby of rich Indian-Americans who seek to expand their political influence within both their home and adopted countries, President George W Bush recently agreed to assist India’s nuclear programme, even at the risk of undermining his efforts to check the nuclear ambitions of Iran. As if on cue, special reports and covers hailing the rise of India in Time, Foreign Affairs and The Economist have appeared.
It was not so long ago that India appeared in the US press as a poor, backward and often violent nation, saddled with an inefficient bureaucracy and, though officially nonaligned, friendly to the Soviet Union. Suddenly the country seems to be not only a “roaring capitalist success story” but also, according to Foreign Affairs, an “emerging strategic partner of the US”. To what extent is this wishful thinking rather than an accurate estimate of India’s strengths?
Looking for new friends and partners in a rapidly changing world, the Bush administration clearly hopes that India, a fellow democracy, will be a reliable counterweight against China as well as Iran. But trade and cooperation between India and China is growing; and, though grateful for US generosity on the nuclear issue, India is too dependent on Iran for oil (it is also exploring developing a gas pipeline to Iran) to wholeheartedly support the US in its efforts to prevent the Islamic Republic from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
Nevertheless, there are much better reasons to expect that India will in fact vindicate the twin American ideals of free markets and democracy that neither Latin America nor post-communist countries — nor, indeed, Iraq — have fulfilled.
Since the early 1990s, when the Indian economy was liberalised, India has emerged as the world leader in IT and business outsourcing, with an average growth of about 6% a year. Growing foreign investment and easy credit have fuelled a consumer revolution in urban areas. With their Starbucks-style coffee bars, Blackberry-wielding young professionals, and shopping malls selling luxury brand names, large parts of Indian cities strive to resemble Manhattan. “India everywhere” was the slogan of the Indian business leaders at the World Economic Forum in Davos this year.
But the increasingly common, business-centric view of India suppresses more facts than it reveals. Recent accounts of the alleged rise of India barely mention the fact that the country’s $728 per capita GDP is just slightly higher than that of sub-Saharan Africa and that, as last year’s United Nations Human Development Report puts it, even if it sustains its current high growth rates, India will not catch up with high-income countries until 2106.
Nor is India rising very fast on the report’s human development index, where it ranks 127, just two rungs above Myanmar and more than 70 below Cuba and Mexico. Despite a recent reduction in poverty levels, nearly 380-million Indians still live on less than a dollar a day.
Malnutrition affects half of all children in India, and there is little sign that they are being helped by the country’s market reforms, which have focused on creating private wealth rather than expanding access to health care and education. Despite the country’s growing economy, 2,5-million Indian children die annually, accounting for one out of every five child deaths worldwide; and facilities for primary education have collapsed in large parts of the country (the official literacy rate of 61% includes many who can barely write their names). In the countryside, where 70% of India’s population lives, the government has reported that about 100 000 farmers committed suicide between 1993 and 2003.
Feeding on the resentment of those left behind by the urban-oriented economic growth, communist insurgencies have erupted in some of the most populous and poorest parts of north and central India. The Indian government no longer effectively controls many of the districts where communists battle landlords and police, imposing a harsh form of justice on a largely hapless rural population.
The potential for conflict — among castes as well as classes — also grows in urban areas, where India’s cruel social and economic disparities are as evident as its new prosperity. The main reason for this is that India’s economic growth has been largely jobless. Only 1,3-million out of a working population of 400-million are employed in the information technology and business processing industries that make up the so-called new economy.
No labour-intensive manufacturing boom of the kind that powered the economic growth of almost every developed and developing country in the world has yet occurred in India. Unlike China, India still imports more than it exports. This means that as 70-million more people enter the workforce in the next five years, most of them without the skills required for the new economy, unemployment and inequality could provoke even more social instability than they have already.
For decades now, India’s underprivileged have used elections to register their protests against joblessness, inequality and corruption. In the 2004 general elections, they voted out a central government that claimed that India was “shining”, bewildering not only most foreign journalists but also those in India who had predicted an easy victory for the ruling coalition.
Among the politicians whom voters rejected was Chandrababu Naidu, the technocratic chief minister of one of India’s poorest states, whose forward-sounding policies, such as providing internet access to villages, prompted Time magazine to declare him “South Asian of the year” and a “beacon of hope”.
But the anti-India insurgency in Kashmir, which has claimed some 80 000 lives in the past decade and a half, and the strength of violent communist militants across India, hint that regular elections may not be enough to contain the frustration and rage of millions of have-nots, or to shield them from the temptations of religious and ideological extremism.
Many serious problems confront India. They are unlikely to be solved as long as the wealthy, both inside and outside the country, choose to believe their own complacent myths. — Â