Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke chairs the Commission on the Remuneration of Public Office Bearers. He spoke to Nic Dawes about rethinking state sector pay scales
There has been a certain amount of controversy over some of the percentage increases the commission proposes. What was the basis for such a substantial recalibration of pay scales?
Before 1994, there was no transparency, and no commitment to have salaries determined at arm’s length. After 1994, there was a commitment to reverse the arrangements of the past where Parliament simply made laws [to determine pay rates].
The Constitution interposes a commission to propose equitable remuneration.
Previous commissions saw fit simply to give an annual inflation-related increase. It was quite plain that they were carrying over the baggage of the past.
We asked, what methodology do you use to arrive at an equitable Âsituation? The first step was to profile the jobs, to ask: What does a judge do? What does the president do? The next step was to determine the relative ranking of the jobs.
Deloitte and Touche assisted and we graded initially — to see how people in the private sector [would compare]. Then we made adjustments to answer the peculiarities of the public service.
The third step was to benchmark each job, and then finally we put money in each box.
That is where it showed us that people sitting in the middle to lower ranks were reasonably paid.
If MPs left and went to the private sector they would struggle to earn the same [as they do in Parliament], whereas at the top, they are substantially underpaid.
At just under R2-million the president comes close to the head of a grade E company that has 500 employees. So people like Thabo Mbeki at the top are hopelessly underpaid, whereas people at the bottom are not.
There have been quite substantial increases at the top of the legislature and the judiciary too.
The Constitution requires that the three arms of government have to be seen as having equal importance. Without a proper legislature, you can’t get good laws or proper oversight, and without that the executive would run off. That is one of the reasons we increased the pay of the speaker. We were trying to assert a very important principle.
Isn’t it a problem that you make an assessment based on ideal or abstract job requirements, but it is real people, who may be underperforming, who get the increases?
That is quite right, these are some of the challenges, but for us to develop a rational methodology we had to look at the job as it is. There is no performance component.
If you decide to pay minister A less than you pay minister B, if you say I’ll pay Ngconde Balfour less than Trevor Manuel, you need to have a rational basis for doing it.
Similarly, at the moment, how do you assess the performance of a judge? It must be rational, it must be easily implementable.
MPs have already indicated their unhappiness, and last year there was a clash between the commission and the portfolio committee on justice over magistrates’ benefits — what happens if they reject your proposals?
We recommend, commissions in other countries determine. We recommend the president’s salary to Parliament, and they by resolution determine it, they will have to meet to debate it. The president in turn determines the salaries of Parliament [taking into account our recommendations] and the president determines judges’ salaries together with Parliament. In relation to provinces, we set the upper limits, and the provincial legislatures vote a number within the range. Usually, sadly, they vote the upper limit, but by and large they follow the recommendations.
You have spoken about the need for better salaries to retain skills and contain corruption. Is that really possible, or do you need somehow to account for the non-financial rewards of public office?
Our need is for a remuneration scheme that helps us achieve democracy, an open and transparent society, and social justice. That people no longer go hungry is an important constitutional imperative.
The biggest challenge is attracting the kind of talent that will deepen and sustain our democracy. Parliament has haemorrhaged quite significantly: if you perform well you get attracted to the executive. Everyone who was capable [in the legislature] is now a minister or deputy minister. Think of the Parliament of 1994 when you had people like Joe Slovo, Cyril Ramaphosa and Saki Macozoma.
We are concerned about it. Salary is just one element. One would hope that people come and serve. Currently, we are not attracting the people we need to be attracting, also to the bench.
Indeed, quite a few senior black advocates argue that it is unfair to expect them to take up judicial appointments when they are finally beginning to get some good briefs and make a bit a of money.
One must find the balance between the sanctity of public duty and private reward.
In the past senior counsel would rise gradually, and there was no shortage of people ready for appointment. The idea was that ultimately you would be rewarded with a place on the bench, but it happened slowly, so people would pay off the mortgage, and the school fees. Now it is happening sooner, and you need more judges.
Maybe [black counsel] are doing well to stay out now, when their children have gone through school they can come and serve.
I would hope that at some point talented people would do what they do, and then put themselves forward.
We might have to change our electoral system to address that. Currently, you cannot run for a constituency on your own merits, you have to join a party. That may be a blockage, some people may not want to join a party.