Three weeks ago, when the trial of former Liberian president Charles Taylor opened in The Hague, the accused made headlines for failing to appear in court.
In his former capacity as the president of Liberia, Taylor is accused of having presided over a criminal network of armed combatants, whose crimes in Sierra Leone between 1996 and 2002 amounted to violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.
Specifically, Taylor is accused of being the chief sponsor of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a notorious Sierra Leonean rebel group known for its gruesome tactics of amputations, rape and torture of innocent civilians.
In 2000 the Sierra Leonean government sought United Nations assistance to establish a ”hybrid” international tribunal, with a mandate to prosecute ”individuals who bear the greatest responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity” in Sierra Leone. Given these broad powers, Taylor’s indictment, therefore, came as little surprise to many. His ties to, and active support of, the RUF during the 1990s was an open secret in West Africa and beyond.
As the UN Special Court on Sierra Leone reconvenes in The Hague next week, the question remains whether Taylor will show up this time. If he chooses to boycott the trial for the second time, what should we make of it? More importantly, what would that mean for the court’s credibility?
For answers to these questions it is crucial to move beyond the headlines and unpack the issues behind Taylor’s refusal to appear in court on June 4, as scheduled.
Beyond the dramatic exchanges that took place between Taylor’s court-appointed defence counsel, Karim Khan, and the presiding Judge, Julia Sebutinde, lie some fundamental issues which, unless they are addressed, could undermine the outcome of the entire process. At the core is one major issue: the right of the accused to a fair trial.
In his letter to the court stating the reasons for his absence, Taylor complained that he was denied the right to meet the court’s principal defender, whose job it is to support the defence. In addition, his counsel, Khan — who subsequently walked out of the trial — complained that, compared with the prosecution, the defence team had inadequate financial and logistical resources.
Because Taylor — and other accused — are ”partially indigent”, it is the responsibility of the court, through the office of the principal defender, to ensure that they are provided with adequate legal resources to defend themselves.
The transcript of the proceedings discloses that the actions of the registry, the administrative arm of the special court prior to June 4, if not corrected, could undermine this cardinal principle, because it failed to ensure that proper consultations took place between the principal defender and the accused before the opening of the trial.
Numerous requests for a meeting by the principal defender, who was not authorised to travel to The Hague for the opening of the trial, and the accused were turned down. When confronted by the judge for an explanation, the acting registrar could offer only a lame excuse, arguing that a junior counsel had been assigned as ”duty officer” to represent the office of principal defender at the trial in The Hague.
A clearly unimpressed Judge Sebutinde rejected that explanation, stating that the ”duty officer” did not have the standing to address some of the serious issues raised by the accused regarding his defence.
Sebutinde also partly blamed Taylor’s failure to appear in court on the sloppiness of the registry and issued a specific directive to the registrar, ordering him to ensure that a meeting was facilitated between the principal defender and the accused prior to the June 25 court date.
If her directive is obeyed by the registry and Taylor is granted his right to meet the principal defender, it is hoped that one of the major obstacles to a fair trial will have been removed. But it will become clear only on Monday, when the court reconvenes, whether the meeting was allowed to take place.
The special court has been marred by numerous controversies since it came into being in 2002. The last thing it needs, particularly at a time when many still question its relevance and contribution to lasting peace in Sierra Leone, is another credibility crisis in the Taylor case.
Sensing the danger, Sebutinde could not have summed it up better when she stated during her admonishment of the registrar: ”If we are to pretend that this trial is going to be fair, as we hope it will be, then there’s got to be some kind of equality of arms.”
Dr Abdul Lamin teaches in the department of international relations at the University of the Witwatersrand