The Mail & Guardian publishes the text of Joel Netshitenzhe’s stunningly frank assessment of the deep rifts that have opened up in the ruling party, presented at last weekend’s national executive committee meeting.
This is the last meeting of the NEC before national conference. The meeting should therefore afford us the opportunity to reflect on our own role as the national leadership in fulfilling the mandate of the last conference.
Some of the issues raised might be uncomfortable to entertain but, as the most senior structure between conferences, we cannot avoid dealing with them. At the same time a failure on our part to develop a broad approach on these issues will result in a situation in which they arise spontaneously at conference and the NEC will be unable to give leadership.
Transformation of society
We can say with confidence that, in the past five years, which included the 10th anniversary of our freedom, the ANC has developed a keener understanding of the tasks at hand and what needs to be done to ensure faster transformation of South African society.
There is developing a welcome consensus across the democratic movement on these issues. Among others we have in much more detail than before defined the:
- Character of our long-term objective, a national democratic society;
- Attributes of a state that should promote movement towards, and manage, such a society;
- Changing nature of the motive forces and the balance of forces; and
- Character of the ANC as leader of the forces of change and the systems and structures it needs to put in place to play this role.
The position and role of South Africa in the global environment are more clearly appreciated. This is informed first and foremost by the need to pursue a progressive African agenda, to strengthen relations with — and the voice of — developing countries and to promote South Africa’s varied interests across the globe. At the same time we have to deal with challenges of unilateralism, militarism, environmental degradation and promotion of self-interest in trade and other multilateral engagements.
We have not, however, clearly defined the strategic role that the ANC needs to play in pursuit of this progressive global agenda in terms of inter-party relations and interaction with civil society.
There has been a general improvement in the conditions of life of all South Africans, including the poor. The Ten-Year and Mid-Term Reviews conducted by government, as well as the recent Community Survey released by Stats SA, point to this reality. The fact of the reduction in both extent and depth of income poverty (let alone services and assets) especially since 2001 is elaborated in these documents and by independent research. Government expenditure has facilitated this trend.
Under this NEC’s watch, South Africa has entered a period of higher economic growth. While between 1994 and 2004 average growth was at about 3%, this has gone up to about 5% since 2004. In the same period employment creation accelerated, creating the possibility to meet the bold targets we have set ourselves to halve unemployment and poverty by 2014.
The programmes to provide social services continue apace; and the Community Survey identifies the steady decline in the number of households without access to potable water, electricity, sanitation and so on. This should be measured against the replication of households, worsened by migration, with more single- and two-member households across the country. There are continuing improvements in housing, health and education.
Challenges that need to be addressed include:
- Income inequality has worsened and the share of workers’ income as a proportion of national income has declined;
- Problems of restructuring of the labour market persist;
- There remain large backlogs in service delivery;
- Macroeconomic challenges such as high inflation and current account deficit do raise important questions about the overall capacity of the economy to grow at higher rates without occasioning serious imbalances;
- Large numbers of South Africans remain mired in poverty and it is precisely these sections of the population that are least able to take advantage of the opportunities that exist;
- The HIV/Aids pandemic is still exacting a devastating impact on society; and
- The scourges of crime and corruption continue to chip at the fabric of society and undermine individual and community safety.
While much progress has been made in terms of increasing numbers of young people acquiring skills and moving into professions previously denied the black majority, the pace is woefully slow. This applies equally to issues of ownership of wealth and distribution of income. It is in these areas that the legacy of colonialism remains gravely stubborn. The challenge of gender inequality manifests itself acutely in the socio-economic arena.
Progress has been made in transforming the state in terms of demographics, doctrines that underpin its operations, capacity to exercise leadership on socio-economic issues and as a force of social cohesion. However, problems of crime and corruption, some weaknesses in delivery, conflicts in the party political arena and with or within civil society have conspired to generate conduct that can have the effect of subtracting from the state’s legitimacy in the eyes of society.
Hegemony and social cohesion
A critical question in this regard is the role that the ANC has played, beyond its tasks in government, to mobilise society and ensure hegemony of the ideas of change. The energy, efficiency and effectiveness of ANC election campaigns do point to our capacity in this regard. In turn the outcome of elections in 2004 and 2006 point to improved confidence of broader society, especially the poor, in the ANC as the custodian of the nation’s aspirations. Yet there has been a trend of declining participation particularly in national and provincial elections and weaker engagement on the part of young people: we have not fully grasped this issue and developed appropriate responses.
Except during elections the ANC’s engagement with the mass terrain is woeful. This relates to such issues as workers’ rights, consumer issues, hurdles faced by SMMEs, anti-crime and anti-corruption campaigns and so on.
Further, the ANC does interact with all the real and potential motive forces of the national democratic revolution (NDR) through its branches across the length and breadth of the country. However, we have not developed the necessary organisational mechanisms to ensure that such interaction finds expression consistently through civil society formations: trade unions, single-issue campaigns, business groups, religious community, student, women’s and other organisations.
Production relations of the system in which we operate encourage atomisation of individuals and households and the undermining of social cohesion. If the ANC has to continue acting as the glue that holds South Africa together, it needs to raise its visibility and improve its self-assertion in encouraging the rise of a new value system based on the morality of caring and social solidarity.
The capacity that the movement has for political education, ideological discourse and narrow communication tasks is way below what the task of transformation requires. If this is not corrected, the NDR will gradually lose its fulcrum and frame of reference, ideas inimical to fundamental change will become dominant and the ANC itself will get transformed by the very system it seeks to change.
The ANC’s preeminent role in uniting South African society means that we must be, in theory and in practice, the repository of principles of non-racialism and unity across language, ethnic, age, gender and other differences. How have we, as a leadership, managed issues of race at national level and in provinces, such as the Western Cape, where they find acute expression? How have we managed issues of ethnicity, especially in relation to leadership contestation?
The ANC is the leader of the core of organised forces meant to drive transformation, represented by the tripartite alliance. The ANC in particular, and the alliance in general, are meant to be the societal fountain from which issue the ideas, the strategies, the programmes, the conduct and the demeanour that should inform the project of fundamental change. A review of the alliance summit(s) held since 2002 shows that there is broad agreement on the character of the NDR.
However, cracks had already started to appear at the level of strategic conceptualisation, especially in public discourse, with analyses and public statements that suggest different expectations of the NDR, conflicting reading of balance of forces, divergent interpretations of the role of a progressive trade union movement and of a Communist Party in the middle of the NDR.
Especially in public communication, the tone and content of pronouncements emanating from leaders and gatherings of Cosatu and the SACP suggest that the alliance is a house divided. This has been worsened by approaches towards the question of leadership in the ANC.
The profound lesson that has emerged from this, for all components of the tripartite alliance, is that divisive issues within any of our organisations, and divisive conduct on the part of senior leaders of the allies are bound to rend apart not one, but each of the partners. In turn, such conduct will divide the motive forces and society at large.
Similarly, public pronouncements by and the conduct of the ANC Youth League create the impression of a serious disjuncture within the ANC itself. This relates to matters of leadership contestation, in which, besides the tone of discourse, statements and conduct that purport to be in support of particular candidates, have evolved into attacks against other leaders of the movement. This is linked to rabid campaigns against specific state organs, which have the effect of weakening the legitimacy of the emergent democratic state.
Social cohesion also depends on how the ANC handles matters pertaining to the relationship between the state and the party, especially where the interests of an individual or a group within the ANC seem to come into conflict with imperatives of governance. In instances where members or even leaders of the movement come into conflict with the law, how do we ensure that presumption of innocence and solidarity do not cross the line to manifest as undermining the integrity of the very state led by the movement?
The last critical matter on social cohesion relates to our experiences of the manifestation of counter-revolution. In the recent period, we had been drifting towards the conclusion that there was no serious organised counter-revolution in our society, save for weak extremist groupings, such as the Boeremag. Yet in the past 18 months or so, things have happened which demonstrate the existence of organised groupings that seek to initiate, foment, encourage and aggravate difficulties that the movement faces.
Strategic organisational issues
The NEC needs to pose to itself the question whether there are outstanding strategic policy issues pertaining to the organisation on which we need to develop approaches that will help guide the conference. A few such issues come to mind:
- Having assessed such matters as the load of work, as well as gender, racial, class and other considerations, the NEC might wish to develop a collective view on the expansion of this body and the specific number we might consider;
- Given that the national conference resolves the leadership question only in relation to the ANC as an organisation, it will be critical that there is clarity about how and when the issue of the leading candidate in the 2009 elections will be selected: by mid-2008 we will be starting with elements of the election campaign, including research, and it will therefore be necessary that a special national list conference (or process) is conducted during the first half of 2008; and
- The period of contestation for leadership positions, particularly the presidency, has resulted in a situation in which movement precepts are observed in the breach: for the ANC to retain its organisational integrity it will need either to institute disciplinary action or adapt these precepts to current reality with clear guidelines on how such campaigns are conducted — this can be delegated to the incoming NEC and the next NGC to resolve.
In addition, the NEC needs to reflect on issues that may or may not require resolution at national conference — issues that have profound implications for the future of the movement. Some of these may have been canvassed in the Organisational Review, but we do not have sufficient certainty as a leadership about how these will be resolved;
- Party political funding: current formulations refer to a regulatory architecture to enhance accountability and transparency on private funding, increase public funding and improve mechanisms of self-financing — the question is whether this is adequate; and
- Floor-crossing: the matter was not resolved at the national policy conference and the NEC may want to give leadership — for instance, identify a ”middle option” to increase the threshold to accommodate major shifts in the political environment, remove the window period and allow the retention of seats only for proportional (and not constituency) representatives.
- One of the weaknesses in the past five years has been how we have managed the issue of the prerogative of the government ”chief executives” across the spheres in instances where differences arise. Beyond mouthing the slogan of appreciating the principle of prerogative … the specific question that arises is: what conventions should we develop to ensure differences or career incidents in governmental executives do not reduce the movement into a circus?;
- If individuals in executive structures across all the spheres differ with the ”chief executive” should they resort to the courts or even dare him/her to initiate action?;
- Should we allow prerogative to play out while leaving space for policy and even personality contestation to take place behind closed doors within the party?;
- If an individual experiences real and serious personal difficulties that embarrass the movement, should he/she wait for the ”chief executive” to act or help the movement salvage its reputation?
Disturbing political dynamics
There is certainly a serious incongruity in the political dynamics that requires the attention of the NEC. To illustrate the seriousness of this matter, let us briefly paint a picture of the manifestation of some of these problems. The aim is not to apportion blame on any individuals or groups and the picture itself might be too colourful — this is aimed at teasing out the issues that the NEC needs to address.
So here goes:
- As we all know in the current nomination processes for the leadership two lists have emerged, punted quite openly by organised groupings within the movement — except for one individual (in different positions), the names for the officials are completely different;
- Although we have not received formal reports or complaints, some members have alleged that in many branches there has not been any serious political discussion, as provided for in the guidelines, before issues of nominations are discussed — such is the trench warfare afoot that comrades view this as a waste of time;
- There have been references to the possibility of money, some intimidation and promises of government positions being thrown into the electoral pot — besides physical clashes that have been reported in a handful of branches/regions; and
- The incident in the Capricorn Region of Limpopo has been interpreted variously as a reflection of the depth of desperation, or an ordinary and coincidental criminal act — this in itself shows the fissures within the movement.
We need again to emphasise that this might be a bit of an exaggeration. We also need to assert firmly that, even if some of these things might have happened, they are undercurrents to a process the technical integrity of which cannot be faulted. So we are not here raising issues about the legitimacy of the process as a reflection of members’ will; but more about the politics that should underpin ANC engagements of this kind.
In addition, in the recent period the public campaign to condemn some leaders within the movement and glorify others has intensified. It is quite possible that either of the groups involved in this can ratchet up examples to prove their point. That is not the central issue. The question is whether this reflects the kind of ANC we know and should have!
Now, all this is happening under the watch of this NEC: the highest decision-making body between conferences. What this means is that, quite clearly, this NEC has failed to resolve the divisive issues that have plagued the movement in the past two-and-half years.
This in part relates to matters that have steadily gained prominence in the ANC since 1994: deployment and redeployment of ANC cadres and leaders in and out of government; and the issue of ANC cadres and leaders who come into conflict with the law, attached to which are allegations of conspiracies which, though rejected by the NEC, continue to find currency in movement discourse and in court evidence.
In part, particularly within the alliance, this might reflect the divergences that are solidifying around the understanding of the NDR, reading of the balance of forces and so on. But such is the depth of the difficulties that the leadership of both Cosatu and the SACP have — explicitly or in a thinly veiled manner — waded into the ANC’s leadership debate.
In all this one thing is certain: forces of counter-revolution both within and outside the country have isolated these issues to exploit them to maximum effect in weakening the ANC and the tripartite alliance. They have embedded themselves into the terrain and use ”Stratcom”-type tactics to achieve their aims.
Leadership in dealing with the dynamics
It is not as if the NEC has not discussed these issues. We have on various occasions done so and emerged with collective views that we reckoned had united the leadership and would in turn help unite the membership. This includes the effort of the president and deputy president to dispel ”myths” around any divisions between them on issues of policy and at a personal level. But it would be to bury our heads in the sand not to acknowledge that the Mbeki/Zuma template has become part of the frame of reference beyond the media: indeed it is there within our branches and even among senior collectives.
[W]e all need to pursue unity. But should this be at all costs? In the dynamics that have emerged, isn’t there ”more right” and ”more wrong”? Though there might be no absolutes, there are fundamental mistakes that have been made and these need to be punished by the membership at conference. In other words, things should be left to conference to resolve — without collective NEC guidance — through discussion and through elections.
Having gone through the complex and debilitating experience of the past two-and-half years, are there lessons that we would want to impart to conference and the incoming NEC regarding management of the kind of challenges we have faced, so that divisions are not perpetuated going forward?
This is an edited version of The Notes for Political Overview presented by Joel Netshitenzhe to the ANC NEC meeting held from November 16 to 18