The Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) 2007 mandate to South Africa to broker an agreement between Zanu-PF and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) should be viewed as an extension of the “quiet diplomacy” that has been the hallmark of the South African and SADC approach to the Zimbabwe crisis since 2000.
To a great extent, the push for immediate action was prompted by the highly publicised arrests and assault of opposition and civic leaders and the widespread attack on the MDC’s structures in March last year.
The combination of international pressure and the obligation on SADC to be seen to be taking action following those incidents led to the SADC heads of state to convene an extraordinary summit in Tanzania at the end of March 2007, at which South Africa was given the mandate to facilitate talks on the crisis in Zimbabwe.
Although there was widespread cynicism inside and outside Zimbabwe about the prospects of success of such an intervention — especially given the history of SADC’s supine position on Mugabe’s authoritarian regime — it nonetheless gave national, regional and international forces an opportunity to navigate a common approach out of the Zimbabwean debacle.
For the MDC, weakened by its split into two factions in 2005, there was little alternative to talks, as other methods of confronting Mugabe’s regime were regularly met with characteristic intolerance and repression.
Mugabe, under intense pressure from SADC to engage in dialogue, had little option but to appear at least appear willing to talk to the opposition. South Africa, always keen not to intervene in Zimbabwe without regional support, saw the SADC mandate as an opportunity to push its “quiet diplomacy” agenda, in the hopes that it would culminate in a free and fair election that would result in the formation of a government of national unity led by a reformed Zanu-PF.
The European Union and the United States, long frustrated by Mugabe’s intransigence and the regional and continental solidarity he continues to enjoy, could do little else but allow the official “point man”, Thabo Mbeki, time to play his hand.
Mbeki approached the dialogue between Zanu-PF and the MDC with three objectives in mind.
Firstly, both parties should agree to hold parliamentary elections in 2008. Secondly, they should agree on the steps to be taken to ensure that all concerned accept the outcome of the elections as representing the “will” of the people of Zimbabwe. Thirdly, that there should be agreement by all political parties and “other social forces” on the measures that should be implemented and respected in order to facilitate a legitimate election.
Towards the end of last year the talks had, in the words of the MDC, reached “significant, but not full consensus” on a number of areas, including political violence and the abuse of traditional leaders and food aid in elections, as well as land reform and sanctions.
The dialogue provided the divided MDC an opportunity to work together as joint negotiating partners, even as attempts to reunite the two formations were continuing parallel to the SADC process. Negotiations also added to the urgency of the two MDCs, at least in working towards an election pact that would enable them to contest the 2008 elections together. Moreover, it was clear to the MDC negotiators that if the talks were to break down, the collapse had to be seen to be Zanu-PF’s fault, not that of the opposition.
Although it looked for some time as though real progress was being made, it was Zanu-PF’s unwillingness to relax political restrictions that ultimately led to an impasse at the end of last year. Notwithstanding small changes to the media and public order laws, the ruling party made no substantive concessions on the issues that would affect the political arrangements in place prior to the 2008 elections.
At the centre of the political deadlock that emerged in December 2007 were three things: the date of the election, the timetable for implementing the agreed reforms and the process and modality of elaborating and adopting a new constitution. Then Mugabe’s unilateral proclamation of the election date in March, before an agreement was reached on these key issues, effectively put an end to the SADC talks.
SADC’s announcement in February that Mbeki’s mediation had resulted in the two political parties reaching an “agreement on all substantive matters relating to the political situation in Zimbabwe” and that the outstanding matters were merely procedural was the worst kind of political dishonesty.
Mbeki’s personal reiteration of this success meant that what could have been a principled stand by an outgoing president was to amount to little more than another disgraceful endorsement of the politics of a repressive regime.
In its handling of the Zimbabwe talks, SADC has, once again, demonstrated that it is unwilling to make a choice between Africa’s anxieties about imperialist interventions and its obligation to uphold the democratic and human rights of its citizens. Grubby solidarity with Mugabe has transformed a lofty pan-Africanist discourse into a spurious attempt to legitimise an authoritarian political project.
Instead, SADC has missed the opportunity to send a clear message to Mugabe that unless he establishes the conditions for a broadly acceptable, free and fair election, he can no longer rely on SADC solidarity.
Such a message could have changed the dynamic of Zimbabwean politics by depriving Mugabe of one of the pillars of his support. That SADC once again took the path of least resistance demonstrates its lack of commitment to democratic principles and its priority of protecting liberation leaders who have long failed their citizens.
Brian Raftopoulos is the director of research at the Solidarity Peace Trust