Since 2002, the Zimbabwean military has consistently threatened to veto any poll that goes against its preferred candidate. So what can voters do? How should the region react to an incumbent ruler who portrays the election campaign as little more than an attempt to reverse the gains of the liberation struggle?
History can help. Zimbabwe’s situation today has something in common with the Rhodesian government’s predicament in 1979. Its rulers are isolated, ostracised and under sanctions from the international community. The use of force to crush opposition has become routine, but dissenting voices cannot be silenced. While the formal economy has collapsed, the government continues to spend heavily on internal troop deployments.
The securocrats appear undeterred — at least in public. Defence forces Chief General Constantine Chiwenga has signalled his readiness to set aside the Constitution should Robert Mugabe be defeated at the polls: “The army will not support or salute sell-outs and agents of the West before, during or after the elections,” he said recently.
Chiwenga’s statement followed similar comments from the Commissioner of Prisons, Major General Paradzayi Zimonti, who publicly ordered his officers to vote for Mugabe. Such statements recall the infamous “strait-jacket” declaration by Zimbabwe’s top brass which preceded the 2002 presidential election. Then generals appeared on television to warn viewers that “anyone without liberation credentials would not be allowed to take office, even if they won the vote.”
The deterioration in Zimbabwe since the last presidential election has substantially altered the role of the military. The entire country is now under some form of military control.
The political and administrative role of the joint operational command has been expanded and entrenched, as high-ranking officers have been deployed to run railways, industry and parastatals in the country’s 10 provinces.
Much analysis and debate that portrays the upcoming election as an opportunity for political parties and candidates misses the point. In reality, the regime in Harare is fighting a different kind of war. In its view, the ruling party is constrained by a partisan international community whose “proxies”, including Dr Simba Makoni, enjoy freedom.
This mentality is entrenched — and will persist beyond election day. Even if Mugabe is re-elected, hardÂliners in the military will be unlikely to change their attitude. They will continue to favour disengagement from the international community and international institutions. National reconciliation is not a priority. For many, the upcoming “election” is a non-event.
Accordingly, the onus for change has shifted beyond Zimbabwe’s borders. As in 1979, when all-party talks at Lancaster House ushered in a transitional coalition government, the initiative for reform will not come from military leaders embroiled in war talk. Theirs is a battle for survival, by fair means or foul.
Dr Martin Rupiya is a programme director at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria. He previously served as a lieutenant colonel in the Zimbabwe National Army