Two weeks ago, many Western commentators scrambling to interpret the protests in Lhasa found that they did not need to work especially hard. Surely the Tibetans are the latest of many brave peoples to rebel against communist totalitarianism? The rhetorical templates of the Cold War are still close at hand, shaping Western discussions of Islam or Asia.
Dusting off the hoary oppositions between the free and unfree worlds, the Wall Street Journal declared that religious freedom was the main issue. “On the streets of Lhasa, China has again had a vivid demonstration of the power of conscience to move people to action against a soulless, and brittle, state.”
This is stirring stuff. Never mind that the rioters in Lhasa were attacking Han Chinese immigrants rather than the Chinese state, or that the Chinese authorities have been relatively restrained so far, one cautious step behind middle-class public opinion — which I sensed in China to be overwhelmingly against the Tibetan ethnic minority.
As for religious freedom, the Tibetans have had more of it in recent years than at any time since the cultural revolution. Eager to draw tourists to Tibet, Chinese authorities have helped to rebuild many of the monasteries destroyed by Red Guards in the 1960s and 1970s, turning them into Disneylands of Buddhism. Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism have even inspired a counterculture among Chinese jaded by their new affluence.
Indeed, Tibet’s economy has surpassed China’s average growth rate, helped by generous subsidies from Beijing and more than a million tourists a year. The vast rural hinterland shows few signs of this growth, but Lhasa, with its shopping malls, glass-and-steel office buildings, massage parlours and hair saloons, resembles a Chinese provincial city on the make.
Beijing hopes that the new rail link to Lhasa, which makes possible the cheap extraction of Tibet’s uranium and copper, will bring about kuayueshi fazhan (“leapfrog development”) — economic, social and cultural.
Tibet has been enlisted into what is the biggest and swiftest modernisation in history: China’s development on the model of consumer capitalism, which has been cheer-led by the Wall Street Journal and other Western financial media that found in China the corporate holy grail of low-priced goods and high profits. Tibetans — whose biggest problem, according to Rupert Murdoch, is believing that the Dalai Lama “is the son of God” — have the chance to be on the right side of history; they could discard their superstitions and embrace, like Murdoch, China’s brave new world. So why do they want independence? How is it that, as the Economist put it, “years of rapid economic growth, which China had hoped would dampen separatist demands, have achieved the opposite”?
For one, the Chinese failed to consult Tibetans about the kind of economic growth they wanted. In this sense, at least, Tibetans are not much more politically impotent than the hundreds of millions of hapless Chinese uprooted by China’s Faustian pact with consumer capitalism. The Tibetans share their frustration with farmers and tribal peoples in the Indian states of West Bengal and Orissa, who, though apparently inhabiting the world’s largest democracy, confront a murderous axis of politicians, businessmen, and militias determined to corral their ancestral lands into a global network of profit.
However, Tibet’s ordeal has been in the making for some time. Before the railway line speeded up Han Chinese immigration, China’s floating population of migrant workers, criminals, carpetbaggers and prostitutes conspicuously dominated Tibetan cities such as Lhasa, Gyantse and Shigatse. Half of Lhasa’s population is Han Chinese, who own most of the city’s shops and businesses.
Chinese-style development, which heavily favours urban areas over rural ones, could only exacerbate economic inequality and threaten traditions, such as nomadic lifestyles. Not surprisingly, Deng Xiaoping’s post-Tiananmen gamble — that people intoxicated with prosperity will not demand political change — failed in Tibet. Like predominantly rural ethnic minorities elsewhere, Tibetans lack the temperament or training needed for a fervent belief in the utopia of modernity — a consumer life-style in urban centres — promised by China.
Far from losing his aura during his long exile, the Dalai Lama has come to symbolise more urgently than ever to Tibetans their cherished and threatened identity. It has also become clear to Tibetans that they pay a high price for other people’s enhanced lifestyles. Global warming has caused the glaciers of the Tibetan plateau, which regulate the water supply to the Ganges, Indus, Brahmaputra, Mekong, Thanlwin, Yangtze and Yellow rivers, to melt at an alarming rate, threatening the livelihoods of hundreds of millions in Asia.
Woeser, a Tibetan poet and essayist, told me that not even the cultural revolution undermined Tibet as much as the feckless modernisation of recent years. The rail link to Lhasa has further deepened the Tibetan sense of siege. No Tibetan I met last year in Lhasa had any doubt that the railway was devised by and for the Han Chinese, thousands of whom had already begun to pour into the city every day, monopolising jobs and causing severe inflation.
In the past two decades new railways have economically integrated China’s remote provinces of Qinghai and Xinjiang, making them available for large-scale resettlement by the surplus population. China, its leaders insist, will rise “peacefully”; and they may be right in so far as China refrains from the invasions and occupations that Japan resorted to in its attempt to modernise and catch up with Western imperial powers. But it is not hard to see that China has employed in Xinjiang and now Tibet some of the same means of internal colonialism that the United States used during its own westward expansion.
Propelled by an insatiable global thirst for consumer markets and natural resources, China has done little to allay the fear that Tibetans could soon resemble the Native Americans languishing in reservations — reduced, in the words of the Tibetan novelist Jamyang Norbu, to a “sort of broken third-rate people”, who in some years from now will be reduced to “begging from tourists”.
The most surprising thing about the eruption of Tibetan rage is that it didn’t occur sooner. Televised images of Tibetans assaulting Han Chinese immigrants now stoke a middle-class nationalism in the rich cities on the Chinese coast. Well-off Chinese supporting harsh suppression of the “ingrate” Tibetans echo the middle-class media commentators in Delhi and Mumbai who egg on the police to “crush” those daring to resist their dispossession. But then corporate globalisation has rarely been more successful in inculcating a culture of greed and brutality among its most educated beneficiaries.
Western commentators may continue to tilt at the straw man of communism in China. Tibetans, however, seem to have sensed that they confront a capitalist modernity more destructive of tradition, and more ruthlessly exploitative of the sacred land they walk on, than any adversary they have known in their tormented history. — Â