The most obvious and sensible solution to the ANC’s deepening crisis is to appoint Kgalema Motlanthe permanently as president of the country.
The only way to prevent the implosion of the ANC is to retire the equally divisive Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma. By forcing out Mbeki so vindictively the ANC leadership may now be forced to sacrifice Zuma to prevent a backlash that could break up the party before it reaches its century in four year’s time.
It is better to appoint a new leader with the necessary political gravitas, who is above both the Mbeki and Zuma political divisions but who can rally significant groups in both. The only ANC leaders able to do this are Motlanthe and ANC treasurer Mathews Phosa.
More reasonable left-wing members of the ANC have embraced Zuma for fear that younger ANC leaders might do as Mbeki did and marginalise the left and the pressing issues of poverty.
The marginalisation of the problems of the poor and the loss of talented South Africans, whatever their ideology or colour, are the real issues that must be addressed. This can be done only after a clean break from the Mbeki and Zuma factions paralysing the ANC and government.
Some ANC leaders have said they will form their own party to challenge a Zuma-led ANC in next year’s general election. Other ANC members are now planning mass action across the country to protest against Mbeki’s removal.
Zuma might be popular with a loud and militant support base that is prepared to “die” to have him president, but a large proportion of ANC members disapprove of him with equal enthusiasm. They are unlikely to vote for the ANC if he is presidential candidate. Such is the strength of the opposition to Zuma within the ANC that his administration is likely to be paralysed.
Although Mbeki failed woefully on a whole range of policies, this is not what motivated those who pushed him out. In the end it was all personal, it was simply revenge. Those who fell under Mbeki’s sword saw an opening for retribution. They wanted to humble Mbeki, as they thought the president humiliated them.
But they also wanted to launch a pre-emptive strike, fearing that in his last days in office Mbeki would unleash one last all-destroying missile to crush his enemies in the vindictive style that has become associated with him. They also feared he would set up a commission investigating corruption related to the controversial arms deal, in which Zuma is implicated.
Zuma might still face those corruption charges, is an appalling sexist, an economic populist and has shown the same disregard for democratic institutions, if they work against him, that he accused Mbeki of showing.
Judge Chris Nicholson, who cleared Zuma on procedural grounds, emphasised that he could not give a verdict on the charges. The prosecutors in that case have been under such attack from Zuma militants that now their credibility might depend on re-charging him. In any event, they know that if he comes to power the prosecuting unit might be broken up, with members redeployed elsewhere or put under pressure to resign. Even if the prosecutors do bow to the pressure and do not prosecute, a number of private prosecutions against Zuma have been lined up. It is difficult to see how he is going to extricate himself.
Until earlier this week the Zuma camp in the ANC planned to appoint parliamentary speaker Baleka Mbete as interim president to smooth the way for Zuma. But Motlanthe’s elevation as interim president shows that divisions with Zuma’s coalition are now deepening following Mbeki’s ousting.
The Zuma coalition consisted of five different groups, which were all opposed to Mbeki and have now lost the glue that held them together.
Those set on securing the South African presidency for Zuma include the ANC Youth League, pro-Zuma black economic empowerment business oligarchs who are all hoping to secure patronage; the Communist Party; trade unionists who have no alternative presidential candidate of their own and think they can manipulate Zuma; and those ANC leaders under investigation for corruption who hope that if Zuma’s case is quashed theirs will be too.
Opposing those who want Zuma to become president at all costs are those who want a unifying ANC leader who will protect the interests of the poor. These include the more serious elements of Cosatu and the SACP.
Zuma is not entirely in control of his own coalition. He opposed efforts to oust Mbeki because he feared inheriting a divided party ahead of a general election. But, he was rudely overruled by his own militants.
In the week when Mbeki’s detractors moved to oust him, all his old presidential rivals — Cyril Ramaphosa, Phosa and Tokyo Sexwale — again took centre stage within the ANC. They dwarfed Zuma, almost as they did a decade ago.
Motlanthe was the choice of those who are more interested in keeping the ANC united and securing a pro-poor government focus rather then putting Zuma into the presidency. They have long seen him as an alternative candidate for the presidency if Zuma stumbles over his legal hurdles.
This crisis might provide an opening for other Young Turks of Motlanthe’s generation. To contain these contenders — Motlanthe, Phosa, Sexwale and Ramaphosa — Zuma promised to stay as president for only one term and then allow a competitive election for the leadership.
But Motlanthe obviously now has the inside track because he is already an MP: the others, including Zuma, are not. He will be presiding president for six months, which is enough to show his credentials not only as a unifying figure but as a source of new ideas, energy and principle, and to contrast this to the divisive potential of the populist Zuma.
It will sad if the destructive process under way does not bring the ANC to its senses so that it appoints Motlanthe or one of the other, younger candidates. It is an obvious solution to unite the ANC and the country again and one which should have been undertaken a long time ago.
WM Gumede is author of Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC