In the aftermath of the tripartite alliance economic summit, many conclusions have been drawn about the source of policies agreed upon, their ideological roots and thus their implications for the post-2009 period. This applies especially to issues of long-term planning and the structure of the Cabinet.
Among the observations in the Fifteen Year Review released by government about three weeks ago is the assertion that a democratic state should be adept at adjusting to changing conditions and utilising the wisdom of experience to improve its performance.
It is in this context that the notion of “continuity of change” has been posited: that government should not operate as a rigid colossus, tied to chapter and verse of programmes, even when new opportunities present themselves for faster progress.
As such, post-2004, comprehensive anti-poverty and social-security strategies are being developed. The Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (Asgisa) and the National Industrial Policy Framework were finalised and are now being implemented.
Similarly, reflections on long-term strategic planning and the configuration of the Cabinet have been brewing in government and the ANC for a few years now. In a sense, the ANC’s 52nd National Conference provided the platform for the consummation of such reflections. In broad terms, on these issues of substance, Polokwane happened on the cusp of a change of emphasis deriving from work that was already happening.
Take the issue of long-term strategic planning, for instance. In 2006, Cabinet delegated the policy unit in the presidency to investigate the desirability and feasibility of such an approach. At its January 2007 lekgotla, it examined country studies on Brazil, India, Malaysia, South Korea, Chile and Tunisia.
Cabinet noted that virtually all the six countries had a “strategic approach to national planning, with a long-term vision and medium-term programmes”. It was agreed that South Africa should move in the same direction because “modern societies face complex challenges which cannot be dealt with in an ad hoc manner; countries operate in a global environment with uncertainty and turbulence (and therefore need) a vision and plan to stay on track; (and the long lead times of social transformation) require a society that is mobilised and focussed, with leadership by a developmental state”.
Subsequent to the lekgotla, there have also been interactions with representatives of the Nigerian and Sudanese governments, and further research on the system in Botswana.
What are the gaps in South Africa?
Firstly, beyond the five-year medium-term strategic framework based on the electoral mandate, we do not have a long-term plan, based on a mobilising vision which can unite the nation in action. It can be argued that the constitutional aspiration to build a united, non-racial, non-sexist and prosperous society does constitute a broad vision. But in the context of strategic planning, the notion of a vision is invoked in relation to key development indicators that a nation should aim for — a storyline of the future organised around themes such as the structure of the economy and level of technological development, socio-economic quality of life, legitimacy and efficiency of the state, and the extent of social cohesion.
Secondly, virtually each government department, in some White Paper or strategy, does articulate a long-term objective; but these are not necessarily aligned. The same applies to integrated sector initiatives such as the strategy against HIV and Aids, revamp of the criminal justice system and industrial policy — all of which would have to form building blocks of a national strategic plan.
Thirdly, our inter-governmental system provides for autonomous spheres and it is not clear how a national vision and plan would find expression across the spheres. While this may relate to issues of powers and functions currently being reviewed, there is also the fundamental question about system and process: how do the provincial and local spheres contribute to the development of a national plan, which in turn would be binding on all. Structures such as the Presidential Coordination Council and Cabinet bi-annual makgotla in which premiers and the South African Local Government Association take part would need to be examined in this context.
Lastly, strategic planning requires a centre capacitated to give leadership, to monitor and evaluate, and to link resource allocation to strategic imperatives.
In other words, the need for planning and the form it should take had been in the mix of research and engagement which informed the Polokwane resolutions. At the January 2008 Cabinet lekgotla, the policy unit was tasked with developing an operational plan in this regard. Much work is being done both in government and the ANC to operationalise conference decisions; and in large measure the tripartite alliance summit was one such milestone. The 2009 January makgotla of both the ANC national executive committee (NEC) and Cabinet will take these matters forward.
The same applies to the question of whether the Cabinet is structured appropriately not only to meet the challenges of the moment; but also to lead in the development and implementation of a strategic plan.
In this regard, as early as 2005, Cabinet instructed the Forum of SA Directors General (Fosad) to develop broad ideas on the issue. Among the matters canvassed were departmental permutations: should, for instance, education be sub-divided into a number of departments (primary and secondary levels, tertiary education, and skills development); and should the department of trade and industry similarly be decoupled, and in this context how do we ensure requisite attention to matters pertaining to small and micro-enterprises?
Further, appreciating the improvements in coordination that the cluster system had brought about since 1999, questions were posed about how the system could be improved. Arising from this is the challenge of ensuring that the responsibility of cluster coordinating ministers is underpinned by requisite authority to exercise oversight in relation to their Cabinet peers.
The Fifteen Year Review summarises this challenge thus: “Does this require a change in the architecture of the executive? Steps that have been broached in this regard include the introduction of two tiers within the executive. One option would see senior ministers exercising oversight of clusters of ministries — Correspondingly, chairs of directors general clusters, which make up the Fosad management committee, would oversee the work of their clusters.”
Further, we also have to ensure that coordination and integration find expression not only in planning, but also in joint project teams in implementation, monitoring and evaluation.
Why is this background necessary?
Because of the incomplete nature of the work, and the character of the platforms (Cabinet and ANC NEC sub-committees) where the ideas were being canvassed, it was not possible formally to communicate the details.
However, because the SACP, in its wisdom, raised these matters publicly, the impression was created in some media reports that an unthinking ANC had – hook, line and sinker – swallowed prescriptions from outside its ranks. Not that there would be anything wrong in appropriating good ideas, especially from an alliance partner. But in this instance, for the record, the essence of the processes unfolded within ANC and government structures.
The danger in such misrepresentation is that an ideological and even conflictual bent is incorrectly attributed to what is otherwise a logical approach to matters of state efficiency and leadership in the context of national development.
It would for instance be incorrect to characterise the setting up of strategic planning capacity as a fight against national treasury rather than an issue about strengthening alignment between strategy and resource allocation — which national treasury itself has called for. In fact, over the past few years, the medium-term strategic framework and its annual reviews have served as the frame of reference for medium-term expenditure plans as articulated in the medium-term budget policy statements of the minister of finance.
Lest we forget, strategic planning and ensuing budgeting processes have to do with weighing options and making hard choices. Given the competing demands on the fiscus, decisions will have to be made in each planning and budgeting cycle to defer some plans and phase in others differently. Even where strategies are agreed upon, business plans will still have to be provided. As such, we should be under no illusion that some of these decisions will be unpopular among some departments and ministries. It can safely be assumed that the final arbiter on these matters, wherever located, will attract some ill feeling.
A related question that has been the subject of much speculation is on the fate of the department of public enterprises. How does a developmental state leverage the capacities of state-owned enterprises to provide leadership to national economic development? Certainly, responsibility for strategic deployment of these capacities cannot be bunched together with policy and regulatory functions, simply because of profound conflicts of interests that would arise. It is better that policy departments deal with policy for the sector as a whole (such as the telecommunications and electricity industries); and where appropriate independent regulators will be required. In principle, shareholder strategic leveraging should locate elsewhere.
As all this work proceeds, the very definition of “a national plan” will need further interrogation: should this narrowly be a plan about government intentions or one that includes the programmes of the private sector and other social partners? Is the latter possible with a developed private sector and in a society with such varied and at times conflicting interests? What lessons does the 2003 Growth and Development Summit hold in this regard?
The principles have been agreed upon. But much more work needs to be done to put the operational issues to bed. In this regard, it is not accidental that on the structure of Cabinet for instance, the summit carefully referred to supporting “in principle the need to develop and consider proposals” rather than any final decisions.
Debate should continue and, hopefully, ongoing work will reach the public domain as such, rather than falsely as demands to which the ANC is imagined to accede. Thus the public will not be misled into reading ideological shifts where none exist.
Joel Netshitenzhe is head of the policy unit in the presidency and a member of the ANC NEC