Politicians dust off the “community safety” concept whenever they need a shiny new policy. But, ask Glenn Hollands and Len Khalane, is there real commitment to the concept?
Crime-wise and on the safety front, what can South Africans expect after the soccer fans have gone home, hopefully relieved of their money by commerce rather than crime? Although visible policing may peak during the World Cup, don’t count on this being sustained over the next three years. The 10% increase in deployed officers may help, but it’s not going to inspire you to waltz through Hillbrow at midnight.
The extra cops will, however, be fitter, better shots and more disciplined, promises the minister — and they’ll have impressive military-type ranks such as “sergeant” rather than lame civilian designations such as “inspector”.
Never mind that policy-makers had sound historical and political reasons for demilitarising police ranking systems just a few years ago. The new tough-sounding ranks will apparently “ensure clear lines of command and control while instilling a sense of discipline —” Obviously the minister did not have Lindiwe Sisulu’s soldiers in mind when equating military rank with discipline.
Our police will operate on the understanding that poverty fuels crime – so shooting pickpockets is out. On the community front the minister has urged a “people’s war against crime”, but those who thought this meant stoning and burning local rapists and thugs (as frequently happens in the former Transkei) will be disappointed and the minister will have you locked up — if the local SAPS can get their act together to find you.
Whereas most citizens think that we already have a single national police force, the minister does not agree. Quite what the quest for “a single police service” implies is unclear, but early indications suggest that some of the metro police formations have not covered themselves in glory.
Yet further closure or downscaling of the more effective specialist and anti-corruption agencies is also likely. The closure of the Scorpions (directorate of special operations) remains a dodgy policy decision and many suspect that the replacement Hawks (directorate for priority crime investigations), will indeed prioritise their investigations to the extent that they avoid ruffling important political feathers. The minister did, however, mention the Hawks and “municipal fraud” in the same breath, so municipal politicians might be well advised to tread more carefully than their colleagues at provincial and national level.
Bad news for those entrepreneurial cops who supplemented their salaries by selling police dockets at knock-down bargain prices. The e-docket system has been introduced at 193 police stations around the country and more than 260 000 dockets have been scanned in. So, although the paperwork may be spirited out of the office, only a really stupid crook is going to pay for a docket that has an electronic back-up. Unfortunately many of our criminals are indeed quite thick, so this may take a while to catch on.
Do not loose sleep over the “shoot to kill” injunction and the warning that “We shall take no chances with the lives of police officers against criminals” — these are minor tactical adjustments to changing criminal behavior and do not signal a policy shift. Community partnership, effective use of intelligence and improved laws and policies are still the key strategic elements. Community policing is now talked about as “a programme” within general policing rather than a general principle for all policing, which may mean the concept is beginning to lose its lustre.
Where does this leave the key policy tenets of the last five years, such as community safety forums (CSFs)? Despite the supposed centrality of this model it received only a single brief mention in the minister’s budget vote speech to Parliament in May.
Politicians tend to dust off the CSF concept whenever they feel the need for a shiny new policy instrument in the fight against crime. In fact the concept was modeled in the Western Cape as early as 1998 by the NGO UMAC. By 2003 it was touted as a best practice and attracted the attention of the United Nations. But what have CSFs and other community safety models really achieved?
At inception, CSFs proposed that crime prevention was best tackled by involving affected community stakeholders and addressing crime through a set of coordinated interventions. Related government line departments such as justice and social development were to be co-ordinated by a local agency — optimistically, this task was assigned to the municipality.
Whereas community policing forums (CPFs) were neighborhood-based and created the basis for a working relationship between local citizens and the police, the CSFs were supposed to pick up the longer-term development and welfare challenges that would pre-empt spiralling crime.
Promising “integrated problem-solving at local level”, and “coordinated interdisciplinary approach to crime prevention”, the CSF rationale remained fairly abstract. Like many other policy frameworks it tried to elevate and embroider basic common sense; that is: severe poverty undermines crime prevention, it’s best to consult local people before trying to improve local policing and crime prevention — and government departments work best when they talk to each other.
In 2001 the pilot CSF project in the Western Cape was evaluated by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), which found limited operational interaction between the key departments. It took a CSF between 12 and 28 months to generate safety plans, and plans seldom resulted in useful action. Understanding of the concept had improved and local neighbourhoods were able to give input to the authorities and agree on community safety priorities. Overall, however, CSF functions had blurred with CPFs or other government agencies and there was a dearth of real action or detailed safety planning.
In 2004, the East London-based companies Mbumba Development Services, Safrika and NGO Afesis-corplan evaluated community safety structures, including CSFs for the provincial government. Although the pilot CSFs (Nelson Mandela Metro, Lukhanji and Mhlontlo) had facilitated some safety planning, apart from in Nelson Mandela Metro the CSFs were weakly established.
The CSF model did not adapt easily to metro, urban and rural settings and represented the public to a limited extent — especially business. Erratic departmental attendance at CSF meetings suggested that the forum was seen as an burden rather than an aid to government.
In rural municipalities, CSFs were poorly led and administered, and would need much help from outside agencies. The CSF nonetheless had great potential to analyse patterns of crime and community insecurity and to formulate municipality-wide plans and responses.
Anecdotal evidence from Cato Manor in KwaZulu-Natal suggests that safety initiatives modelled on the CSF concept are having some success, and safety auditing and planning has continued in several other areas. Safety plans are clearly best driven by a CSF or a similar structure and give the CSF a raison d’être — but the model needs to be pinned down.
Furthermore, the content, structure and functionality of such plans could greatly benefit from recent work on community-safety and crime-prevention indicators. Most of the components for more effective community policing are already out there — they just need to be pulled together and deployed with political and operational commitment.
Glenn Hollands and Len Khalane work for Mbumba Development Services