Buthelezi: The warlord who tried to conceal the blood on his hands

With the death of  Mangosuthu Buthelezi last weekend, we have had to deal with the hypocritical but entirely predictable rewriting of the history of this man, and of the political party synonymous with his name. Words like “elder statesman”,  and “peace maker” dominate the news of his passing, not only here, but abroad as well, with the BBC and The New York Times perpetuating an historically inaccurate version of who Buthelezi really was. This suppression and reconstruction of historical fact disgraces and insults the memories of the thousands of people who suffered as a result of the reign of terror which he unleashed, with the help of the apartheid state, in the 1980s and 1990s.  Authors and journalists have very publicly and bravely sought to set the record straight in the past and to remind us that Buthelezi’s carefully constructed public persona was a façade for a dangerous and violent man. This article attempts, again, to set the record straight. 

On 16 October 1986, Brigadiers Cor Van Niekerk and John More, officers from the South African Defence Force’s covert unit, the Directorate of Special Tasks (DST), met with Chief Minister Buthelezi. John More prepared a top-secret memorandum of the meeting, with the reference “UITERS GEHEIM ST/310/4/MARION 20 Oktober 1986” in which he noted: “The Chief Minister is concerned about his image and said that he recently attacked Gen Malan over certain statements he made but said ‘this was done tongue in cheek!'”.

For his part, Defence Minister Magnus Malan coached Buthelezi on building his anti-apartheid credentials.  At a meeting between Malan, Buthelezi and M Z Khumalo (IFP Secretary General) in Durban on 21 March 1988, Malan emphasized that Buthelezi must expand his influence locally and throughout the rest of Africa.  He instructed DST to set up visits for Buthelezi to African leaders such as Mobutu Sese Seko and Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Buthelezi thanked Malan for the visits that the SADF had already organised for him. Malan stressed to Buthelezi that “he should not couple himself to the South African government during visits abroad” (as recorded in a top-secret memo dated 23 March 1988 of the meeting prepared by Van Niekerk).  

These extracts sum up the duplicitous role of Buthelezi in South Africa’s history, aptly referred to in the title of Mzala’s 1988 book “Chief with a Double Agenda.”  What was manufactured for public consumption bore little resemblance to his actual role. Buthelezi’s carefully manipulated public persona was that of a man of peace tirelessly campaigning against apartheid. Indeed, he became the darling of liberals locally and globally who were enamoured with a moderate black leader who espoused non-violence as a means of change.  

In reality, Buthelezi was on the apartheid state’s payroll the moment he graduated from Fort Hare University, kicking off as a homeland clerk, while other notable graduates who stood up to the apartheid state were being harassed and detained. He remained on the state payroll throughout the apartheid-era, propping up the Bantustan system by heading up the KwaZulu self-governing territory. KwaZulu was a one-party homeland, and the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) was effectively reserved for the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The few dissenters who had the temerity to oppose Buthelezi in the KLA were quickly removed and even beaten up in the assembly chamber.  

From the M&G Archives: Buthelezi, the King’s Hand

A violent man

Beneath the veneer of non-violence, Buthelezi was a profoundly brutal man. Behind the scenes he collaborated with the worst of apartheid security organs, including the SA Police’s Security Branch and the SADF’s Military Intelligence, Special Forces and DST.  Stung by the rising tide of activism of youth and community organisations in the early 1980s, Buthelezi and the IFP’s Central Committee resolved in 1985 to turn the whole of KwaZulu and Natal into a “no go area” for the United Democratic Front (UDF), “regardless of the consequences” (State Security Council document: GEHEIM SSVR/535/7 Maart 1989).  

Together with Defence Minister Magnus Malan and senior military intelligence officers he orchestrated a well-oiled machinery of violence which was unleashed against his political enemies in the 1980s and 1990s.  He then called on senior South African Police (SAP) officers to cover up the crimes, who dutifully complied.  In November 1985, Buthelezi met with Gen Tienie Groenewald, Director of Military Intelligence and stated that “the ANC must realise that if it uses violence against KwaZulu, the Zulus are … also in position to take violent steps against the ANC”.  He added that he wanted the capacity to “take the struggle to Lusaka.”  

To this end Buthelezi requested Military Intelligence (MI) to provide him with a covert offensive paramilitary capacity “to act against the ANC”.  A MI document dated 19 December 1985 authored by Brig Cor van Niekerk for purposes of briefing Magnus Malan was blunt about the criminal nature of the support requested by the Chief Minister.  He warned that “indemnity from prosecution for steps taken against members of the ANC and UDF” would be required. Van Niekerk also warned of the danger of creating a ‘potential monster’ should Buthelezi’s attitude towards the government change. 

The subsequent report, in the form of an implementation plan dated 27 February 1986, drawn up by Army Chief, Gen Kat Liebenberg, that served before the State Security Council (SSC) outlined the support that was needed, which included the following capacities: Offensive, Defensive, VIP Protection and Contra-mobilisation.  The offensive capacity was described as: “a small full-time offensive element which could be covertly deployed against the UDF/ANC…”

Authorising a capacity to kill

The offensive element was a polite description of what it really was, a hit squad.  This alarmed at least two members of the SSC’s Inter-departmental committee, Dr Neil Barnard of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and Dr Van Wyk of the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, who objected to such support.  While they were overruled by the other members of the committee, they did extract a compromise that the support had to be authorised at the ‘highest political level’. 

The recommendation was approved at a State Security Council meeting held on 3 February 1986. This meeting was attended by 24 people, including most members of the then Cabinet. Attendees included PW Botha, FW de Klerk (then National Education Minister), Louis Le Grange (Law and Order Minister), Magnus Malan, Barend du Plessis (Finance Minister), Adriaan Vlok (then Deputy Police Minister), Gen Jan Geldenhuys (SADF Head), Neil Barnard (NIS Head), Gen Johan Coetzee (SAP Commissioner) and David Steward of the Bureau of Information. The minutes disclose no expressions of concern or objection by anyone to Inkatha being provided with a paramilitary capacity.  

Military documents confirm that by 10 February 1986 the proposed support to Inkatha was authorised at the amorphous ‘highest political level’.  No document reveals who constituted the ‘highest political level’, but it would have included State President P W Botha and his security ministers. The referral to unknown persons at “the highest political level” allowed those in the SSC to claim that final approval was obtained elsewhere.  However, those in the SSC who approved the covert support to the IFP, without the slightest objection, even with the caveat of the paramilitary support being finally approved elsewhere, remain morally and legally culpable for the carnage that followed.

The military executed the directive of the SSC through an Operation codenamed ‘Marion,’ adopted from the word ‘marionette,’ a puppet controlled by wires or strings. Two hundred Inkatha recruits were secretly trained by the SADF’s Special Forces at Hippo Camp in the Caprivi Strip during 1986. Colonel Jan Breytenbach was commander of Hippo Base at the time, while Major Jakes Jacobs was in charge of the training. Former MI Lt Col Jan Anton Nieuwoudt who was granted amnesty for his part in the training stated that the operation was aimed at enabling the IFP “to attack the ANC and UDF effectively inside KwaZulu-Natal” in order to “neutralise” the liberation movements. The training included intelligence gathering, interrogation, target development, infiltration and mock attacks on houses. Nieuwoudt added that the recruits were trained to use “foreign weaponry” and to “eliminate ANC targets without leaving clues”.  He expected the training “to lead to loss of life”.  

Unleashing carnage

On completion the recruits were placed at the disposal of Inkatha under the direct control of Inkatha general secretary, M Z Khumalo and the paramilitary unit was led by Daluxolo Luthuli. 

The military through its Directorate of Special Tasks (DST) supplied on the ground support to the paramilitary groups, including the offensive group. 

The offensive unit carried out attacks against the political opponents of Inkatha, of which the massacre in KwaMakhutha carried out in January 1987 was one of the first. In this incident the home of a KwaMakhutha UDF leader, Victor Ntuli, was attacked on 20 January 1987 in which 13 persons, mostly women and children, were shot dead. DST helped with target identification, supply of Russian made weapons and ammunition, transport to and from operations and the cover-up of the crimes, including the smelting of murder weapons at ISCOR, the state iron and steel company.  

Captain JP Opperman was one of the DST officers who provided operational oversight to the hits of the paramilitary group. He liaised with the IFP secretary general, MZ Khumalo (codenamed REEVA) as well as Col Louis Botha of the Security Branch to ensure operations and cover-ups ran smoothly. Opperman’s duty sheet dated 31 October 1988 described offensive actions as follows: “OFFENSIVE ACTIONS: Must only be carried out by trained cells under strict control. Authority must be granted by DST-2 beforehand. Targets must be approved by REEVA, SAP(S) and SADF. Criminal prosecution of participants must always be taken into account ….”

“OPS MARION: You must advise REEVA in connection with personal administration for the Para-Military Force. Administration for operational cells must exclusively be handled by yourself and REEVA.”

The fear of criminal prosecution was high on the agenda of the military officers involved in the operation.  Following a meeting between Buthelezi and Chief of Staff Intelligence (CSI), Admiral Putter on 14 September 1988 a memorandum was sent to Malan (drawn up by DST officer Col Mike van den Berg) which explored further support to the IFP.  One paragraph expressed concern about officers being charged with crimes carrying the death penalty: “Indemnity against Criminal Proceedings. Offensive action is part of Marion’s tasks. An attempt is being made to build in cut-off points to protect those involved and to train groups so that eventually they can act on their own without SADF assistance. It is not out of the question that CSI and the officers involved in OP MARION, on account of being implicated in the planning, may be charged with capital offence crimes. The assurance is therefore sought for such officers to enjoy the protection of section 103 of the Defence Act if they are charged in respect of their activities in carrying out Op MARION.”

The document also dealt with the need to conceal trainees who were fugitives from justice and how to address the increasing security issues arising from the risk of such hit men spilling the beans if they were charged with murder and other serious crimes.  This fear ultimately saw the disbanding of the paramilitary unit towards the end of 1989 and their incorporation into the KwaZulu Police, where they continued their reign of terror in police uniform.  

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) found that persons associated with the IFP to be responsible for the greatest number of violations, which accounted for over one-third of the total number of gross human violations reported for the 34-year period of the Commission’s mandate. According to the TRC approximately 9 000 gross human rights violations were perpetrated by Inkatha aligned persons in KwaZulu and Natal between 1990 and May 1994, which accounted for almost 50% violations reported to the Commission’s Durban office for this period.  

The monitoring group Human Rights Committee (HRC) estimated that between 1990 and 1994 nearly 14 000 persons perished in political violence in South Africa, mostly in KZN and the townships around Johannesburg. According to the HRC more than 90 percent of the 13 933 deaths recorded were attributable to vigilante-related attacks on township communities, retaliatory attacks, deaths in crossfire and indiscriminate attacks on commuters, beer-hall patrons and mourners.  It is not known how many of these deaths can be attributed to the IFP paramilitary units, but it is likely to run into the hundreds.  

Buthelezi’s role in overseeing hit squads

Buthelezi has strenuously denied any unlawfulness on his part and repeatedly claimed that the support he was provided was purely defensive or protected in nature to defend the IFP and its leaders from ANC violence.  However, the evidence firmly points to the support enabling the IFP to set up an organised network of hit squads aimed at eliminating opponents. Not only did Buthelezi specifically ask for this capacity, but he was actively involved in its oversight and pressed the military for even more hit squads, and even suggested that they work in small cells.  

A top secret signal dated 31 August 1988 discloses that Buthelezi instructed M Z Khumalo to meet with Malan on 30 August 1988 and directed him to complain about the fact that the military had failed to establish a secret base with facilities for the offensive unit and that he did “not want Marion to go backwards or be dissolved,” but he had the impression that certain SADF liaison officers did “not have their heart and soul in the matter.”  Base camps were established at Etshaneni (at Mkhuze near Ghost Mountain) and Port Durnford, codenamed “CAIRO”.  

Khumalo explained that Buthelezi was particularly concerned that the SADF had not “temporarily disappeared” a senior offensive unit member who was on the run from the police detective branch, since if he was arrested this would cause him “political embarrassment” in the upcoming local government elections in October 1988. This member was none other than the paramilitary unit leader, Daluxolo Luthuli, was first hidden at a Military Intelligence base on a farm near Cathkin Peak in the Drakensberg before being taken to the Mkhuze Camp.

This risk also alarmed the MI who were concerned that the arrest of offensive unit members could lead to the exposure of the SADF’s involvement.  This led Vice Admiral Putter meeting with Gen Johan van der Merwe (SAP Commissioner) and Gen Basie Smit (National Head of Criminal Investigations) in Pretoria on 8 November 1988, who advised that not much could be done apart from securing bail for such accused persons who can then “be taken away,” to prevent them from standing trial.

The signal disclosed an instruction from Malan to make “MARION to be self-sufficient and independent and to build in cut off points in the interests of security…” and that this should be discussed with Buthelezi before the end of September 1988. This was put to Buthelezi at a meeting held on 14 September 1988 where the possibility of the offensive unit working in small cells was discussed. Two full time DST operational officers were placed in Empangeni to build capacity and direct offensive actions, and 64 members received covert offensive “retraining”. However, by the end of 1988 the military realised that they had lost direct control of the offensive squad and that the risks could no longer be managed.  

A decision was taken to phase out offensive support to the IFP and to confine the covert support to political mobilisation.  The demobilisation of the offensive unit took place during 1989 and most paramilitary members were transferred into the KwaZulu Police. The military payment of IFP paramilitary members stopped in January 1990. Mobilisation action was thereafter carried out through a front company under the codename ‘VICTORIA’.  The same liaison channels were maintained and earmarks for secret financial support for the IFP continued in the 1990/91 financial year. However, the decision of the SADF to cease its support for hit squad activity was bitterly opposed by Buthelezi. 

Buthelezi fights to retain military support for hit squads

On 31 October 1989, DST Staff Officers Van Niekerk and Van den Berg met with Buthelezi. Van den Berg’s report of this meeting, addressed to Putter titled “OP MARION: LIAISON WITH THE CHIEF MINISTER” dated 6 November 1989, noted that: “The Chief Minister expressed his concern over the situation in Mpumalanga and the fact that he was losing the “armed struggle”. He referred to the “cell” – idea for offensive action that did not get off the ground.”

In the same document Van den Berg recorded that REEVA (MZ Khumalo) called for support for the Chief Minister’s wish for “cells that could take out undesirable members.”  

Offensive capability (cells) for Inkatha.  In Oct 89, CM Buthelezi asked that Int Div reconsider the training of offensive cells for Inkatha seeing that an urgent requirement for these exists. 

According to another military document (with reference UITERS GEHEIME ST-2/310/4/MARION/5/2 2 May 1990) Buthelezi in the same meeting cut to the chase and was reported stating that he still needed “hit squads”:  “The Chief Minister was worried because he was losing the armed struggle and hinted that “offensive action is still a need”; meaning the use of “hit squads”.

When Van den Berg appeared in a TRC section 29 hearing on 3 October 1997 he explained what ‘cells’ meant: “In my view the notion “cells’ and hit squads” these were all used in the same context.”

When asked to explain Buthelezi’s expressed desire for “continued offensive steps meaning hit squads” Van den Berg explained in the same TRC hearing: “That is correct. Or rather let me put it this way, including the use of hit squads. I wouldn’t want to limit the use of hit squads…. All that I am trying to say is that we’re speaking of offensive action. Now I am saying at this point that things developed to the point where I understood the Chief Minister to say by offensive action – hit squads. All that I am trying to say is the terminology could imply other kinds of offensive action. It should not be delimited only to hit squads, but it certainly includes hit squads.”

A secret memorandum, dated 2 May 1990 was drawn up by Van den Berg in respect of the October 1989 meeting with Buthelezi. The purpose of the memo was to prepare the new Chief of Staff Intelligence for a meeting with Buthelezi on 9 May 1990.  It included the following passage:

“Offensive capability (cells) for Inkatha: In Oct 89 CM Buthelezi asked that Int Div reconsider the training of offensive cells for Inkatha seeing that an urgent requirement for these exists. Suggested Point of View. After thorough investigation, and in consultation with the SAP, no choice was left but to abide by the decision that Op MARION be confined to liaison and training for mobilisation. For this reason, it was arranged that Gen Smit of the SAP also takes part in the visit to explain the situation more fully.”

As predicted by DST officials, Buthelezi at the 9 May 1990 meeting requested support “for further offensive steps”.  The meeting was summed up in a top secret memo titled “NOTES: VISIT OF CDIO TO CHIEF MINISTER BUTHELEZI” dated 22 May 1990 (with reference DST/310/4/MARION/2/3 22 Mei 1990) which included the following passage which explained why Malan could no longer support “the violent option”: ‘Support of the Minister. CDIO referred to recent talks with Gen Malan. The Minister supports us and actions taken in support of the Chief Minister. Explained that the violent option is a difficult matter’:

The same document referred to further advice provided to Buthelezi by the Chief Director of Intelligence Operations (CDIO) in respect of exposés in the Vrye Weekblad, as well as a request by Buthelezi to meet SPYKER (spike or nail) in secret: Harms Commission. The report in the Vrye Weekblad in which Van Deventer makes allegations about SADF / Inkatha involvement was discussed. CDIO advised the Chief Minister not to admit or deny that he knows anything. We will monitor and if necessary deliberate with him. In the meantime, lie low.

Communication. The Chief Minister mentioned that the alternative media, and even the mainstream press undermine his case with the youth. He does not have an English language medium (publication or radio) to send out his message. In short, communication with his own people is a big problem. At the international level, however, he gets good opportunities. 

Abroad. CM referred to Pres H Boigny and his problems. CDIO gave him a short briefing. CM mentioned that he was with Pres Kaunda in April 1990. Kaunda received him positively and was surprised to hear that actually all top ANC leaders were Xhosas. CM’s nephew who went over to the ANC / UDF provides great propaganda value to the enemy. Chief Minister said he would like to meet SPYKER in secret.

Aftermath: Exposés in the press and the Malan Trial

Cor van Niekerk compiled a secret memo dated 8 October 1990 for Chief of Staff Intelligence dealing with press reports of “SADF Involvement”.  He noted that “claims are being made in the media (Weekly Mail and others) that the SADF was involved in Inkatha training and Inkatha/RENAMO co-operation.” Van Niekerk expressed “concern for Buthelezi’s image if the reports gained greater prominence,” and he identified 2 potential sensitive points, namely:

“a. If SADF training of Inkatha can be connected to the CCB or so called “hit squads”.

 b. If more credible speculation is made in regard to Inkatha/RENAMO cooperation.”

Van Niekerk offered guidelines as to how to respond publicly, which included:“Training of Inkatha must be put into the right perspective, namely training according to the task force concept of relieving a hostage situation should this arise around the Chief Minister. Further it was aimed at the protection of the Chief Minister and definitely not guerrilla training.”

In the Malan trial all the accused resorted to putting up the hostage situation as one of the reasons behind the training and claimed that ‘offensive’ really meant ‘protective.’

On 4 December 1990, Van Niekerk and Van den Berg met with Khumalo in Durban and informed him that the SADF was terminating Op MARION. Van den Berg met with Khumalo on 23 January 1991 for the last time, while Gen Van Tonder continued meetings with Buthelezi. Their last meeting was on 16 July 1991.

Notwithstanding a ham-fisted and bungled prosecution by KwaZulu Natal Attorney General Tim McNally in the trial of Magnus Malan and 19 others, all these documents were before the court. The accused did not dispute their authenticity but argued that “offensive” actually meant “protective”, and that references to “hit squads” and “offensive cells” should be regarded as “aberrations.” Judge Jan Hugo, in what was probably the biggest judicial fraud committed against the people of South Africa, agreed. He engaged in legal gymnastics to escape serious consideration of the overwhelming incriminating evidence against the accused. In his judgment he ruled that the SADF merely supplied “the equivalent of guards to Inkatha as it might do for the Natal Agricultural Society.” 

He was helped in this regard by a corrupt Attorney General desperate to protect Buthelezi and the apartheid political establishment. Notwithstanding the weight of the evidence, McNally argued that Buthelezi and the State Security Council were entirely innocent parties, and it was Malan who went behind their backs and subverted the ‘lawful support’ requested and gave it its ‘unlawful colour’.  There was not a shred of evidence to support his theory.  

The 1990s:  Hit Squads in the KwaZulu Police

Throughout the 1980s Buthelezi deployed the KwaZulu Police (KZP) as a tool of vicious repression against political opponents. Caprivi trainees formed the core of localised hit squads under the cover of the KwaZulu Police in the 1990s. With the placing of most paramilitary unit members into the KZP hit squad activities continued, this time with greater ease, since the killers now wore police uniforms. Ironically, many communities facing the brunt of KZP violence called for the return of the notorious SAP.   

In 1991, a supreme court judge, moved by multiple accounts of generalised violence by the KZP against residents of the UDF/ANC supporting KwaMakhutha township, granted an interdict restraining the KZP from attacking anyone in the entire township.  In 1994, in State v Mbambo & Others in which Esikhaweni based KwaZulu Policemen, including a Caprivi Trainee, were convicted on several counts of murder, Judge Nick van der Reyden, accepted that the accused were acting as part of an organised hit squad and noted that: “The present case is confirmation of speculation that hit squads are one of the factors, which contribute to the violence in this country, more specifically KwaZulu Natal”.

The Court called for a “full investigation into the alleged involvement of those persons identified by the accused as masterminds and puppet masters behind the Esikhaweni Hit Squad”.  According to an affidavit provided to the Investigation Task Unit (ITU) by KZP Commissioner Lt Gen Roy During, when he attempted to transfer District Commissioner of Esikhaweni Brigadier C P Mzimela, who had been deeply implicated in hit squad activities in the area, Buthelezi personally intervened to stop the transfer.  

The ITU, in its report to the KZN Attorney General dated 2 June 1996, titled “The case against persons involved in the establishment and perpetration of hit squad activity in Esikhaweni and surrounding areas,” recommended murder charges against several senior members of the IFP, KwaZulu Government and Police. Unsurprisingly Tim McNally declined to prosecute. 

Buthelezi in his capacity as Chief Minister and Minister of Police orchestrated the paramilitary training of over 5000 IFP members between September 1993 and early April 1994 at the Mlaba and Emandleni Matleng camps in Northern Natal.  The trainees were then sent back into their communities with instructions to train members of their communities and form ‘Self-Protection Units’ (SPUs).  By this time Buthelezi and the IFP had joined forces with far-right wing groups, such as the AWB (Afrikaner Resistance Movement), to oppose the democratic transition.  

Some 1 200 of the trainees were called back to the Mlaba camp in early April 1994 where they received so-called Special Constable training, which included unlawful offensive training in the use of AK47s and other Soviet bloc weapons. It was Buthelezi’s intention to use these “Special Constables” to provide a military-type strike capacity within the KwaZulu Police, particularly around the 27 April 1994 elections and thereafter, should he not be granted various concessions. When the training came to the attention of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) Investigation Task Group (investigating hit squads in the KZP) it hastily arranged a helicopter raid of the Mlaba Camp on 26 April 1994, which dispersed the trainees, and the special constables were never integrated into the KZP.  

According to a 1996 report prepared by the ITU titled “SPU Training Project” Caprivi trainees played a key role in the training and deployment of the SPUs.  The SPUs gained access to large quantities of sophisticated weaponry supplied through individuals such as Eugene de Kock, who confessed to supplying the IFP with six truckloads of weapons and ammunition, AK-47s, RPGs, light machine guns and explosives.  The ITU report described the SPUs as presenting the single biggest threat to the long-term stability of the KwaZulu-Natal region.

Challenge to the findings of the TRC 

Faced with a mountain of evidence implicating Buthelezi and apartheid’s security forces in substantial criminality, the TRC had no qualms about making strong findings against them.  These included extensive findings of responsibility for gross human rights violations made against Buthelezi, the IFP, the KZP and the KwaZulu Government.  

The most stinging finding related to the Commission’s finding that Buthelezi conspired with P W Botha, Magnus Malan and other senior members of the military establishment to create an unlawful and offensive paramilitary force which committed an unquantifiable number of crimes, including murders, against UDF and ANC supporters in townships such as KwaMakhutha, Clermont, Mpumalanga, Sinating and Esikhawini (Vol 3, 220 – 221).  The main finding read as follows: THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT IN 1986, THE SADF CONSPIRED WITH INKATHA TO PROVIDE THE LATTER WITH A COVERT, OFFENSIVE PARAMILITARY UNIT (OR “HIT SQUAD”) TO BE DEPLOYED ILLEGALLY AGAINST PERSONS AND ORGANISATIONS PERCEIVED TO BE OPPOSED TO BOTH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND INKATHA. (Vol 5, p 234)

Other findings that remain unaltered include: MZ KHUMALO OF INKATHA WAS THE LINK BETWEEN THE HIT SQUAD, THE SADF AND CHIEF BUTHELEZI. BRIGADIER MATHE OF THE KZP WAS THE PERSON WHO ISSUED FALSE POLICE APPOINTMENT CERTIFICATES TO CAPRIVI TRAINEES. KHUMALO AND MATHE WERE CHIEF BUTHELEZI’S CO-CONSPIRATORS. (Vol 3, p 221)

Buthelezi approached the courts claiming he had been defamed and sought to set aside the findings made against him and the IFP.  He initially asked for an order recalling the TRC Report and redacting the findings against him. After he abandoned that relief, he sought an order compelling the TRC to publish a statement of errata.  Buthelezi and the IFP relied largely on the discredited judgment of Judge Hugo in the Malan trial and claimed that the Commission was bound by the findings made in that case.

It was apparent that Buthelezi and the IFP were primarily concerned with the ‘hit squad’ findings made against them.  However, the Commission contended that the findings were based on overwhelming evidence and were beyond question. It refused to adjust these findings and presented detailed answering papers setting out the evidence.  Faced with the humiliation of having such coherent evidence tested in open court, Buthelezi was advised to seek a settlement.  

The Commission was amenable to adjusting errors in lesser findings, involving the roles of certain gangs, and the reformulation of the description of certain statistical findings, which also applied to the ANC and other parties. The case was settled on this basis. Buthelezi and the IFP then quickly and falsely claimed victory. When former TRC Commissioner Yasmin Sooka corrected these false claims by pointing out in the media that the central findings against Buthelezi remained intact and unaltered, Buthelezi sued her for defamation. He again abandoned that claim rather than risk close public scrutiny in court.  

When City Press editor Mondli Makhanya penned opinion pieces countering false narratives of “non-violence” made around Buthelezi’s 90^th birthday he was also sued for defamation. Makhanya reminded readers that Buthelezi had “blood on his hands.” Predictably, Buthelezi also walked away from the case after Makhanya filed his plea and discovery affidavit.  

History will judge Buthelezi for what he was: an unscrupulous apartheid apparatchik and a profoundly violent man, who would stop at nothing to achieve his political agenda. He threw enormous energy into creating an image of non-violence and moderation, but few South Africans were fooled.  As much as he tried to shake off his past, it clung to him like a dark cloud which followed him to his death. 

Richard Lyster and Howard Varney practised as human rights lawyers in Durban in the 1980s and 1990s with the Legal Resources Centre. Lyster went on to be a commissioner on the Truth and Reconciliation Commissioner in 1995.