Cyril Ramaphosa had a vision of being 'sent' to clean the mess of malfeasance and corruption left by his predecessor, Jacob Zuma. Photo: Supplied
President Cyril Ramaphosa was elected by a whisker to lead the ANC at the conclusion of its 54th national conference on 18 December 2017.
Soon after the narrow and less than inspiring national elective victory, Ramaphosa took to the country’s streets to announce that despite his inconclusive victory, he had a vision of being “sent” to clean-up a heap of mess of malfeasance and corruption left by his predecessor, Jacob Zuma, whom he would succeed as the country’s president.
Ramaphosa’s allusion to the “Thuma mina” call is drawn from ancient scriptures, “Whom shall I send? Who will go for us?” “Here I am,” I said; “send me!” (Isaiah 6:8)
So, Ramaphosa promised to “go for us”, and to turn the fortunes of the country for the best — to become a figure ordained by God to fulfil a divine purpose.
Ramaphosa, at the beginning of his tenure as the ANC president, saw himself as the one called for the messiahship role — a mission and authority by divinity to save the country from implosion of corruption and misgovernance.
Ramaphosa’s opponent, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma — an old hand at the movement’s politics — proved a formidable opponent, and fell short by a miniscule 180 votes to oust Ramaphosa, earning 2 261 votes to Ramaphosa’s 2 440, a factor that has caused Ramaphosa’s presidency and leadership to be easily challenged by those in the party who may have been hurt or unsettled by the demise of Zuma.
With that in mind, could it be that the divine intervention of the thuma mina (send me) strategy was designed to prop up Ramaphosa’s popularity beyond the fickle narrow national executive committee base he enjoys to a wider community-based support base outside the ANC precinct?
As it had been the case at the Polokwane 52nd conference of December 2007, the 54th conference in 2017, the atmosphere continued to be difficult, rocked by factions.
Divisions deepened. Enmity crept in. The Zuma spectre continued to haunt and bedevil the ANC.
Many wished for the Dlamini-Zuma presidency, possibly because Zuma still held a sway in the party, even as a former leader.
A poor leader he was, but many in the ANC disregarded this reality, and continued to swear by his name.
He was charismatic. With a passion he hated Ramaphosa.
Could it be that the ANC faithful, perhaps by association, also loved Dlamini-Zuma, a dynamic leader in her own right whom many thought, especially women, deserved to lead the ANC as president?
This is what Ramaphosa faced at the beginning of his presidency.
His leadership was muddied by factionalism, an outcome that suggested he did not enjoy the total support of the NEC.
Was Ramaphosa a political lame duck? If he was, it should not be forgotten, though, that there were many in the ANC who associated Zuma with corruption, and were no longer prepared to have him lead the organisation.
But it is also true that 10 years earlier, in December 2007, Zuma dethroned Thabo Mbeki.
The general understanding of the defeat was that Mbeki had been thought of as “aloof” and not “accessible” to the “struggling masses”.
His economic policies, so his detractors thought, were driven by neoliberal sentiments that were at variance with “the developmental and redistributive objectives”.
Yet, we cannot discount the reality that Mbeki presided over the country’s highest economic growth rate, with nearly 5% GDP.
At Polokwane, Zuma enjoyed the support of many. Labour union federation Cosatu, the South African Communist Party and the ANC Youth League unashamedly rooted for him, an action that “increasingly alienated Mbeki from the left of the ANC”.
Contrast this with Ramaphosa’s win in 2017, Zuma’s victory at Polokwane was massive. With 3 983 registered delegates at the conference, he scored a landslide victory of 2 329 votes (61%) to Mbeki’s 1 505 (39.25%).
Ten years later, Ramaphosa’s narrow victory speaks volumes about the mind of the conference as it related to his leadership.
It is under Ramaphosa’s stewardship that the ANC lost its majority during last year’s national and provincial elections. At the national level, the ANC dropped to an all-time low of 40%, an outcome that drastically weakened its leadership in parliament, losing the majority and capacity to influence policy, and forcing it to form a government of national unity (GNU).
The ANC also performed badly in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, losing the majority it had enjoyed for a long time.
Ramaphosa’s tenure as the ANC president ends in 2027. There is no doubt the party under his leadership is sailing in tortuous waters, teeming with human icebergs.
The ANC ship’s hull is wearing thin, failing to give durability and buoyancy to ward off storms to sail safely through stormy seas.
The ANC’s veneer of invincibility and greatness under Ramaphosa’s leadership is challenged. Corruption continues under his leadership; the economy continues to shed jobs; he continues to harbour leaders in his party fingered for wrong-doing by the Zondo commission on state capture; many young people, including graduates, fail to get jobs; and the violence continues to spike.
That land of honey and milk and of bullet trains he promised at the beginning of his tenure has become illusory. The long-term and aspirational world of the future of social, economic and human development, is not going to be realised.
Ramaphosa will soon be gone from the political scene to enjoy a life of opulence, yet we have to wonder what legacy he would have left for South Africans to mull over.
The deceit of him being sent by the divinity we will forget. But what we should not forget is the Phala Phala debacle — an act of great sorrow that does not inspire ethical leadership.
Jo-Mangaliso Mdhlela is an independent journalist, a social justice activist, a former trade unionist, and an Anglican priest.