South Africa is confronting a problem that goes far beyond immigration. At its heart lies a more profound question: Who governs?
For several years, anti-immigration formations, such as Operation Dudula and, more recently, March and March, have emerged as powerful actors in public life. Neither organisation possesses constitutional authority. Neither is empowered by Parliament. Neither is part of the executive branch, the police, the courts or the immigration services. Yet both have managed, through intimidation, mobilisation, public pressure and, in some cases, alleged vigilantism, to compel and threaten migrants and refugees to leave communities across the country.
The phenomenon should alarm every South African, regardless of their views on immigration. A democratic state cannot survive indefinitely when private groups begin exercising functions reserved exclusively for lawful institutions.
The argument they make
To understand their appeal, one must first acknowledge the grievances that fuel the movements. Groups such as Operation Dudula and March and March argue that South Africa faces uncontrolled migration, porous borders, overstretched public services, high unemployment, organised crime and weak enforcement of immigration laws.
They contend that undocumented migrants compete with citizens for jobs, housing, healthcare, education and economic opportunities. March and March explicitly frames itself as a citizen-led movement advocating stronger immigration enforcement and prioritising opportunities for South Africans.
Many South Africans find the arguments persuasive because they are delivered against the backdrop of genuine social distress. Youth unemployment remains among the highest in the world. Economic growth is lacklustre. Public services are deteriorating and corruption scandals continue to undermine public confidence.
Where the state appears absent, movements promising action often gain support.
This is not unique to South Africa. It is a recurring pattern throughout history.
The dangerous crossing of a constitutional line
The problem arises when citizen activism transforms into self-appointed law enforcement. In constitutional democracies, immigration policy is determined by elected governments, implemented by state agencies and reviewed by independent courts.
Citizens may lobby, protest, campaign and litigate. They may not decide who belongs in the country, conduct immigration raids, demand identity documents, evict people or effectively carry out deportations.
Yet reports from various parts of South Africa suggest precisely such a dynamic has emerged. Migrants have fled neighbourhoods, businesses have been attacked, residents have been pressured to leave and many foreign nationals have sought repatriation because they no longer feel safe. Recent violence has resulted in deaths and displacement.
Whether the organisations directly orchestrate every act is almost secondary. The critical issue is that they have created an environment in which citizens increasingly believe they possess the authority to enforce immigration policy themselves.
That belief represents a profound constitutional failure.
A crisis of legitimacy more than immigration
The rise of the movements reveals something deeply troubling about the South African state. Citizens generally resort to vigilantism when they conclude that legitimate institutions no longer function effectively.
When residents believe police cannot control crime, vigilante groups emerge, and when they believe courts cannot deliver justice, mob justice follows.
When they believe immigration authorities cannot enforce border controls, citizens begin enforcing borders themselves.
This is not merely xenophobia. It is also a crisis of state legitimacy.
Political philosopher Max Weber famously defined the state as the entity possessing a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Once non-state actors begin exercising coercive power with public approval, the monopoly begins to erode.
The danger is not only what happens to migrants. The danger is what happens to democracy itself.
The scapegoating trap
None of this means South Africa does not have an immigration problem. It clearly does.
The country faces significant pressures from regional instability, economic migration, asylum backlogs, porous borders, human trafficking networks and weak administrative capacity.
However, immigration has increasingly become a convenient explanation for problems whose origins lie elsewhere.
South Africa's unemployment crisis was not created by migrants.
State capture was not created by migrants.
Electricity failures were not created by migrants.
Municipal collapse was not created by migrants.
Corruption was not created by migrants.
Foreign nationals have become symbols onto which broader frustrations are projected.
The process of "othering" is familiar throughout history. Consider the actions of US Immigration and Customs Enforcement in America. Societies under stress often identify vulnerable outsiders as the source of complex structural failures.
The result is rarely effective policy. More often, it produces cycles of exclusion and violence.
Lessons from elsewhere
The world offers sobering examples. The persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar began with claims that a minority population threatened national identity, economic security and social stability. Over time, legal discrimination gave way to organised violence and mass displacement.
The state's inability or unwillingness to protect vulnerable populations contributed to one of the worst humanitarian crises of the 21st century.
In Sudan, the collapse of state authority has demonstrated how quickly societies can descend into violence when competing groups assume powers normally exercised by legitimate institutions.
The consequences have been catastrophic.
South Africa is not Myanmar. It is not Sudan. Nor is it Rwanda, where almost a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were massacred. The same applies to Bosnia, where Serbs attacked and killed thousands of Bosnians.
But the lesson is universal: when legitimate authority weakens, informal authority expands.
And informal authority is rarely constrained by constitutional principles, due process or human rights protections.
The forgotten debt to Africa
There is another dimension that South Africans should not ignore. During the anti-apartheid struggle, many African countries opened their borders to South African exiles.
The governments and peoples of Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, Botswana and others provided sanctuary, training facilities, diplomatic support and resources to South Africans fleeing oppression.
Thousands of South Africans lived, studied and organised in exile because other African nations welcomed them.
The historical reality does not mean South Africa must abandon immigration controls. Every sovereign state has the right and indeed the obligation to regulate entry and residence.
But it does mean that discussions about migration should be informed by memory, gratitude and continental solidarity rather than hostility and amnesia.
What the state should have done
The current crisis was not inevitable. A more capable state would have addressed legitimate concerns before they were captured by extra-constitutional actors.
Five measures stand out.
Restore border management:
South Africa must dramatically improve border security, anti-corruption measures and immigration administration.
A state that cannot determine who enters, leaves or resides within its territory inevitably loses public confidence.
Effective border management is not xenophobia. It is a basic function of sovereignty.
Reform the asylum and documentation system
The asylum system is plagued by delays, uncertainty and administrative dysfunction.
People should know quickly whether they qualify for protection, legal residence or removal.
Uncertainty fuels exploitation, corruption and public resentment.
Enforce labour laws against employers
Too much attention is directed at migrants and too little at employers who benefit from undocumented labour.
Businesses that exploit vulnerable workers while undercutting labour standards should face severe penalties.
The incentive structure must change.
- Communicate honestly with citizens
For years, government messaging oscillated between denial and rhetoric.
Citizens deserve transparent data about migration, public services, crime and employment.
Policy failures create vacuums that demagogues readily fill.
Draw a firm line against vigilantism
Most importantly, government should have made it unmistakably clear that immigration enforcement belongs exclusively to the state.
Peaceful protest is a constitutional right.
Self-appointed deportation campaigns are not.
The distinction must be enforced consistently and visibly.
The real test
The greatest danger facing South Africa is not migration. It is the growing perception that only non-state actors are capable of solving public problems.
When citizens begin performing functions reserved for government, they are delivering a vote of no confidence in the state's capacity.
Operation Dudula and March and March did not create that crisis. They are symptoms of it.
The challenge for South Africa is therefore larger than immigration reform. It is the restoration of state credibility itself.
If government cannot convincingly enforce the law, protect vulnerable people, manage borders and respond to legitimate public concerns, others will attempt to fill the vacuum.
History teaches us what follows when that happens.
It is rarely order.
It is usually something far more dangerous.
Shabodien Roomanay is a retired teacher and the former headmaster of Islamia College in Cape Town. He is also the founder member of the Salt River Heritage Society and a committee member of the Academia Library and Resource Centre.