Predictably, there have been howls of outrage and confusion across the land over reports that South Africa may extend Zimbabwe a line of credit. Should we be joining them?
President Thabo Mbeki’s record on Zimbabwe suggests we should. He has repeatedly assured us that he has persuaded Robert Mugabe to move towards a political accommodation with the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and that he has persuaded the Zimbabwean autocrat to repeal offensive laws — and we have repeatedly seen Mugabe renege on the deal.
A huge loan from South Africa without stringent conditions would be a handsome reward for Mugabe’s errant behaviour, and would no doubt strengthen his grip on power. However, there are reasons for thinking things may be different this time. For one, Zimbabwe’s foreign exchange crisis and, therefore, its ability to feed, transport and supply energy to its people, has reached unprecedented levels. In addition, its government is anxious to stave off the country’s looming expulsion from the International Monetary Fund over unpaid debts.
The signs are that South African finance will come with conditions, not least the resumption of meaningful dialogue with the opposition. But just how those conditions would be enforced is less clear — South Africa has not in the past used its control of fuel and electricity supplies to extract concessions, and it is hard to see it doing so now.
But it may be possible to design a phased programme that rewards incremental improvements with incremental access to hard currency. Properly designed, and backed by the African Union and the international community, such a package could be a powerful lever to move Zanu-PF in the right direction. It might also focus the mind of the creditor.
There are a number of flaws in current approach, however. Any loan would go through Cabinet and Parliament, so there will be scrutiny. But, as with all matters pertaining to Zimbabwe, the South African government’s reluctance publicly to state its position has opened the door to controversy. Clarity is needed on the government’s thinking.
Our other reservation is that the South Africans may be misreading Zimbabwe’s balance of forces by calling for bilateral talks between Zanu and the MDC. The recent election highlighted the fact that many Zimbabweans, disillusioned with both parliamentary parties, have either opted out of the political process or identify with the extra-parliamentary civil society movement personified by Lovemore Madhuku. This has to be accommodated, and the best course would be to reinstate a wider constitution-making process involving all parties.
That said, we would cautiously welcome the government’s apparent stiffening of resolve. For too long Mbeki appears to have misread Mugabe as a maligned African struggle hero, trusted to poor intelligence and played to the lapsed democrats in the AU gallery. But international pressure, recently applied by the G8, perhaps fuelled by Mbeki’s fears of being sidelined and the impending United Nations special envoy report on Zimbabwe, seem finally have forced a rethink.
It may all be moot, of course. Mugabe’s spokesperson, George Charamba, reminded the Mail & Guardian this week that other lenders, including China, might be less squeamish about stumping up the cash.
Even so, the flurry of recent diplomacy seems to represent a rare convergence of approaches between the AU, Mbeki, and the international community. And that gives grounds for tentative hope.
Nuclear double-dealing
United States President George W Bush has scaled new heights of hypocrisy with his de facto recognition of India as a nuclear weapons state. India has a vibrant democracy, and for that it deserves support. But Bush’s royal reception of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Washington this week had more to do with courting a counterbalance to China than reward for democratic practice.
And the gift Bush offered Singh is indefensible. Since India conducted nuclear weapons tests in 1998, its atomic industry — peaceful and military — has been under sanctions, and rightly so. Civilian technology can be used to enhance military programmes, and India has refused to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), which would mean it opening its facilities to international inspection.
Bush has promised to lobby Congress and the group of nations known as the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group for an amendment of laws and agreements that bar the supply of civilian nuclear technology to nuclear weapons states, to allow such exports to India. In return, India has promised to allow inspections, but only of its civilian nuclear sites, and there is still no word that it will sign the NPT.
Bush’s gift sets a dangerous precedent. The fundamental principle that nuclear technology can be shared only where there are guarantees that it will not fuel nuclear arms production has been cast to the wind. And the NPT has been undermined: India has found a way around it, and other states may try to follow suit.
But most breathtaking, perhaps, is Bush’s duplicity. He pursued a war against Iraq based on lies about nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. He has been hounding Iran, an NPT signatory (although not in very good standing, it must be admitted), based on unproven allegations that it is pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. Yet India, which has not signed the treaty, and which has an acknowledged weapons programme, has rules amended in its favour so that it can carry on regardless!
The US has again shown that it applies a different set of rules to nations who submit to its hegemony.