Understanding coup dynamics in West Africa

In recent academic history, frequent military coups in African countries were largely considered a thing of the past. For roughly two decades since the turn of the century, democracy was gaining ascendancy, displacing the coup-laden past with new promise. Since August 2020, this equilibrium has been rudely disrupted. 

This is not a uniquely African phenomenon. Globally, democracy is in trouble. The latest Global Democracy Index by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) reports that only 21 countries, accounting for a mere 6.4% of the world’s total population, are now categorised as “full democracies”. Some 39.3% of people live in “flawed democracies”, and 37.1% live under an “authoritarian regime”. The latter are particularly subject to coups. 

One does not have to be ideologically committed to democracy to recognise that the data is in its favour. Democracies, on average, have higher levels of economic growth, higher life expectancy for their residents, and more peace and stability. They also tend not to fight with each other. Of course, autocrats in one country (Russia) can still invade democracies (like Ukraine). Russia’s direct violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty, and the untold misery that it has caused, is a stark reminder of why democracy is worth fighting for. But Russia’s behaviour on its own borders, and Putin’s attempts to remake the USSR in his own image, is not the only problem in this respect. 

Further afield, Russia has been projecting its power across African states, trying to re-establish its pre-1989 Cold War presence more overtly. This has disastrous consequences in places like Mali, where the recent withdrawal of French troops has created a vacuum for the likes of private Russian paramilitary mercenary companies (like Wagner) to infiltrate. 

No direct evidence yet seems to exist that this has fomented any coups per se, but the advance of the Kremlin’s strategy in this context seems likely to have destabilising contagion effects. Most African countries that abstained from the UN general assembly vote against Russia happen to either be significant importers of Russian arms or have extensive Cold War ties to the country. 

The EIU report pays specific attention to the coup problem, noting Mali, Sudan, Guinea and Niger just prior to going to print. The list is unfortunately now longer: Mali, Niger, Chad, Guinea, Sudan, Burkina Faso and Guinea-Bissau (in that order) have all been afflicted by coups or coup attempts in the past 18 months. Mali was struck twice, with the military overthrowing President Ben Ndaw only nine months after he was inaugurated following the August 2020 coup.

So, why are coups on the rise again?

Naturally, coups are multi-causal, complex events and simplistic explanations cannot suffice. Attempted explanations for the recent spate of coups across West Africa and the Sahel, therefore, appeal to complex international factors, local grievances and weak governance structures that all combine to incentivise would-be power-grabbers to launch coups. 

One under-examined puzzle of autocratic rule and coup frequency, though, is that most coups are insider jobs. Substantial political economy attention is directed towards understanding the interplay between international dynamics and collective action by local players external to the ruling coalition. But too little attention is generally paid to the internal incentive structure that faces would-be coup plotters, particularly in “hybrid” and “authoritarian regime” contexts. This is especially true in light of the recent coups listed above.

A useful model in the academic literature may help to shed more light on the importance of internal dynamics. Milan Svolik, among the most cited authors applying game theory to political science, notes that most dictators are ultimately removed by government insiders, “such as other government members or members of the military or security forces”.  

In Svolik’s model, the ruler and his coalition, at any given moment, can agree either to share power, or the ruler can attempt to grab more power at the expense of the other members of his coalition. If the ruler attempts the latter, like Alpha Condé did in Guinea (openly signalling that he was going to terminate constitutional term limits), other members of the coalition can attempt to deter the ruler through threatening a coup (as happened against Condé). But credibly launching a coup is generally subject to imperfect information about what the ruler intends to do. If it fails, it is potentially very costly to participants (both politically and physically). 

If an aspirant autocrat manages to grab power repeatedly at the expense of his coalition, he consolidates his autocracy, whereas frequent coups create contested autocracies. Both are bad news for governance. 

Application of the model

My 2021 book Coups, Military Rule and Autocratic Consolidation in Angola and Nigeria used the Svolik model to try to understand coup-frequency differences between oil-wealthy Angola and Nigeria. Both countries were largely characterised by a form of military rule post-independence until 2002 and 1999, respectively. But only one failed coup attempt — in 1977 — was launched in Angola. The aftermath was ruthless and paved the way for José Eduardo dos Santos to cement his grip over the governing MPLA. By contrast, Nigeria suffered a series of both “successful” and failed coup attempts between 1966 and 1993. The latter brought the infamous dictator Sani Abacha to power, who died in office in 1998. 

The glaring question was why Nigeria appeared susceptible to high coup frequency whereas Angola did not. 

In Angola, dos Santos executed Svolik’s game theory model almost to perfection. He eliminated all threats to his personal ambitions within the first six years of his rule (which began in 1979) and by 1985 had largely consolidated his rule. He also used the cover of civil war (which started shortly after independence from Portuguese rule in 1975) to consolidate his power base. After eventually winning the war in 2002, he subverted ostensibly democratic institutions to deepen his wealth and power, greatly aided by a rising oil price, which peaked in 2014. 

His subsequent decline is at least partly attributable to the post-2014 oil price crash, which limited his rent-distribution hand to maintain power within the governing coalition. He also made the “mistake” — from a dictator’s perspective — of placing family members in key positions of power ahead of long-standing party loyalists. 

In Nigeria, no ruler other than Abacha pre-empted and eliminated internal threats. Post-independence (1960), successive Nigerian rulers underestimated the threat of internal military uprisings. The research is also clear that coups beget coups, which the Mali case has shown quite plainly. 

Unexpectedly, however, Nigeria became increasingly open after Abacha’s death. And when Olusegun Obasanjo tried to violate the two-term limit in 2006, the senate (supported from within his own governing party) put an abrupt end to his ambitions by appealing to the constitution. This inadvertently strengthened the constitution. The primary objective had been to ensure a continued rotation of power-sharing with the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), not to actually respect the constitution per se. 

How does this analysis help West Africa and the Sahel?

Accurately trying to forecast the respective political calculus of the ruler and his coalition, particularly in fragile contexts, is a valuable analytic exercise. If, for instance, a ruler tries to eliminate threat nodes to increase the probability of a successful power grab, it should trigger an early warning system both regionally and continentally.

For practitioners pursuing greater stability across West Africa and the Sahel, we should examine the internal dynamics of governing coalitions more deeply to try to prevent both power-grabs and coup plotting. When a president violates, or even suggests an intention to violate a constitutional provision like term limits, regional bodies should be on high alert.