The visit of Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams to South=20 Africa highlighted both the similarities and=20 differences between the South African and Irish peace=20 processes, writes David Beresford
The departure of Gerry Adams from South Africa last=20 week is likely to have been met with a sense of relief=20 in Stormont and Whitehall. The memory of the uproar=20 Nelson Mandela precipitated after his release from=20 prison, when he had the temerity to suggest it was time=20 the British government and the IRA start talking, has=20 hung over the Sinn Fein president’s week-long tour; the=20 potential for similarly provocative comment on the=20 current impasse in the Irish talks has been only too=20
But, in the years since that visit to Dublin, President=20 Mandela, while losing little of his taste for=20 directness, has honed his diplomatic skills. Both were=20 evident at his joint press conference with Adams when=20 the parallel was put to him between London’s=20 precondition for the IRA’s surrender of arms and the=20 National Party’s similar demand to the ANC at an early=20 stage of the South African peace process. While=20 conceding the parallel — and the ANC’s outright=20 rejection of the pre-condition — the South African=20 president hastened to stress the need for Sinn Fein and=20 London “to resolve their own problems”.
British sensitivity at the drawing of parallels between=20 the Irish question and South Africa was reflected in=20 the carefully-timed placing of an article by Northern=20 Ireland’s secretary of state, Sir Patrick Mayhew, in=20 The Star on the eve of the Adams-Mandela meeting.=20 Comparisons were “superficial”, Sir Patrick stressed,=20 pointing out that Northern Ireland was part of a=20 democracy and the old South Africa was not, with Sinn=20 Fein enjoying only 10 percent support in the Ulster=20
But if the distinctions between the two situations are=20 obvious and substantial in the historical sense, the=20 parallels in terms of process where peace negotiations=20 are concerned are potentially significant. That, at=20 least, was a point made by MP Pravin Gordhan, the ANC’s=20 co-chairman at the multi-party peace talks, who played=20 a key role in keeping the negotiations afloat.
Gordhan argues that, while the respective historical=20 contexts must have a differing impact on the=20 negotiations, the parallels between the peace processes=20 in the two countries are already manifest. In both, the=20 original refusal to negotiate was even articulated in=20 the same language — “we don’t talk to terrorists”. But=20 eventual recognition by the parties to the conflict=20 that they faced a “no-win situation” in military terms=20 led to secret contacts. A bold initiative was then=20 taken — in South Africa, FW de Klerk’s unbanning of=20 the ANC, in Ulster the IRA’s ceasefire — to pave the=20 way for formal talks. In South Africa, as now in=20 Northern Ireland, the process ran into the predictable=20 hurdles of amnesty for prisoners, the surrender of=20 weapons and what Gordhan refers to as the “lifting of=20 the repressive veil” in the way of emergency powers.
The issues are contentious and vital, says Gordhan.=20 Prisoners also “represent oppression” to the IRA’s=20 constituency, while the retention of weapons plays an=20 important, symbolic role as a guarantee to them that=20 the government of the day will not renege. In South=20 Africa, he points out, emergency rule was lifted at an=20 early stage. The release of prisoners and weapons were=20 dealt with by early agreements in principle, but there=20 were lengthy delays in their practical implementation – – the weapons issue finally being sorted out only after=20 the constitutional settlement was reached. But the=20 delays were not crucial, he argues. As the process=20 hardens, moving from talk-about-talks to the point=20 where “there is no place but to sit across the table=20 and really look at each other in the eye”, these issues=20 “begin to go lower down on the agenda”.
It is a comparison which Adams broadly shares.=20 Interviewed by The Guardian during his tour, he argued=20 there were also parallels in apparent divisions within=20 the British establishment and the South African=20 government. The Downing Street declaration and the=20 Framework Document — despite Sinn Fein’s reservations=20 — did show a genuine wish by the Tory government to=20 resolve the Irish question.=20
But, “I think there are perhaps different tendencies=20 within the establishment; some which would be prepared=20 to go for a very, very radical reappraisal of the=20 relationship between Ireland and Britain — even to the=20 point of ending the union; others who would not do that=20 and who would see the union maintained. In between=20 those two extremes, especially in the military=20 intelligence constituency, there is an element which=20 wants to defeat republicanism, which is still locked=20 into the psychology of war.
“One can see from the South African experience that the=20 same thing happened here in the early days of the peace=20 process. At some point the process here clicked. At=20 some point the government realised there had to be=20 change and then the process here became irreversible=20 and took on a momentum of its own, took on its own=20 dynamic. It went out of control, almost — it had to=20 move on to a democratic solution. That is what we have=20 to try to achieve in Ireland. So far the peace process=20 has not clicked, because the British government has not=20 been locked into it. We have to make it click; if that=20 happens we start to loosen up the entire situation.”
But the differing historical dynamics, pointed out by=20 Gordhan, remain significant to the peace process. The=20 ANC’s overwhelming popular support and the strength of=20 international opinion gave it a leverage which was used=20 to break inevitable deadlocks. Where is Sinn Fein’s=20 leverage; does it lie in an IRA capacity to return to=20 armed struggle? Adams ducked the latter issue, but said=20 of the leverage question: “You have pinpointed in many=20 ways the big difference.”
But leverage did exist, he argued, in an Irish=20 consensus “which remains constant. John Hume is as=20 committed to this peace process now as he was when he=20 and I initiated the entire initiative. The Dublin=20 government understands its responsibility to move the=20 situation forward.” The international dimension had=20 also been “sharpened up” by things such as developments=20 on the Irish-American fronts. The thrust by opponents=20 to undermine a settlement was directed at fragmenting=20 that consensus. “But I think it is a very narrow agenda=20 and I think it is not going to succeed.”
“There are obviously many differences” between South=20 Africa and Ireland, said Adams. But the central=20 importance of South Africa to Ireland was that the=20 conflict in both countries had been described as=20 intractable. “The lesson of South Africa is that no=20 problem, no conflict is intractable. If there is a=20 political will there can be a resolution. If there is=20 psychology, or a will for war there will be war. If=20 there is a psychology, or a will for peace there can be=20