Peter Vale argues the Comoros coup shows the time=20 has come for the government to expunge the=20 mercenary impulse from South African national life=20
THE proverbial fly on the foreign affairs wall must=20 have raised a wry smile when news of the Comoros=20 coup came rattling over the wire. “Hello, we’ve=20 been here before,” it might have wondered, “let’s=20 see how they handle things this time round.”=20
But for those in charge of Africa (and Asia) in the=20 Department of Foreign Affairs, the coup was an=20 altogether new situation. A first test of old-style=20 African politics — the coup and counter-coup which=20 marked the continent’s politics in the late-1960s=20 and early-1970s. True, the Lesotho constitutional=20 crisis of a year ago had similar ingredients but,=20 given that country’s geographical setting, it was=20 far easier to handle than the Comoros.=20
As they work their way through the crisis, some old=20 and some new options must have crossed the minds of=20 South African policy makers. Take the mercenary=20 factor. Embedded deep within the psyche of the=20 South African state is a belief that, when the=20 chips are down, mercenaries are an acceptable way=20 to achieve political ends.=20
Paid soldiers have played a role in every one of=20 Southern Africa’s foundation wars. Their privileged=20 position in the fight against black rule in the=20 1960s — especially in the Congo — was essential=20 to white folklore. And it has been constantly=20 averred that South African diplomats actively=20 supported Mike Hoare’s “dogs of war” at the same=20 time as Pretoria paid lip service to incumbent=20 African governments. In the 1970s the legend=20 deepened: South Africans were openly recruited to=20 defend Ian Smith’s Rhodesia. And who can forget=20 South Africa’s support for the disastrous coup=20 attempt in the Seychelles in the early 1980s.=20
Given this record and Pretoria’s regional=20 destabilisation in the 1980s, is it any wonder that=20 former South African soldiers — under the guise of=20 free enterprise — are fighting in Angola and in=20 Sierra Leone? Is it any wonder that Colonel Bob=20 Denard chose (or should that read, was encouraged)=20 to hole-up in South Africa after the 1989 Comoros=20 coup? Is it any wonder that South Africans are=20 thought to be involved in last week’s coup?=20
There is no way of dealing with this old-style=20 African politics until Pretoria takes decisive=20 action against mercenaries. This must go beyond the=20 ritual concerns expressed by senior foreign affairs=20 officials. To expunge the mercenary impulse from=20 South Africa’s national life will require a=20 stronger arm than the promise of a slap on the=20
Then there is the role of France. The persistent=20 ambiguity — to put it in diplomatic-speak — of=20 her status as an African power is confounding. The=20 sheer obscurity of the situation is compounded by=20 the fact that the Indian Ocean island of Reunion is=20 nominally part of metropolitan France. These=20 reasons account for her direct involvement in the=20 Comoros early on Wednesday morning.=20
France’s increasingly obdurate international stance=20 — witness her determination to defy world opinion=20 in the Pacific — is not helpful in Southern=20 Africa. Her involvement in Rwanda two years ago –=20 according to an increasing number of experts — was=20 driven more by bureaucratic politics in Paris than=20 the needs of Africa.=20
It is very unfortunate, to say the least, that the=20 Government of National Unity has not been tougher=20 with French African ambitions.=20
Given France’s present international isolation, it=20 was wise — just as it was when President=20 Mitterrand two years ago tried to persuade Pretoria=20 to support his plans in Rwanda — for South Africa=20 to resist joining any Paris-initiated action in the=20
Policy makers have to face the hard and simple=20 truth that Africans have to deal with these affairs=20 free from outside intervention. But the most=20 important challenge for policy makers is to=20 appreciate the broad sweep of their regional=20 responsibilities. Here the policy point is simple.=20
Until, and unless, recognition is given to the link=20 between political instability and poverty, the=20 offshore islands are programmed for social decay.=20 Wretched conditions account for last week’s=20 paradox; poverty-stricken people dancing in the=20 street in the face of a military coup.=20
These individual cases reveal much, but only the=20 regional perspective can generate a lasting=20 response. The catastrophic under-development in the=20 Comoros is magnified a thousand-fold in=20 neighbouring Madagascar and a hundred-fold on the=20 Seychelles. Plane-loads of tourists and all the=20 coconuts and palm trees in the world are not going=20 to feed burgeoning populations in a world=20 determined to marginalise the weak.=20
Until the accession of Mauritius to SADC, the=20 offshore islands were essentially outside the scope=20 of regional concerns. However, the deepening=20 interest in the idea of an Indian Ocean Rim, and=20 the wealth of Mauritius, it appears, has changed=20 this. But the manner of its doing has created a=20 regional paradox which, if it is encouraged, will=20 encourage instability.=20
The price for entering the regional “club” cannot=20 only be the size of a bank balance — the criterion=20 so unashamedly applied to Mauritius. If this is to=20 be the case, the offshore islands will remain=20 unruly, restless, prey to all manner of=20
This is why the present crisis should provide the=20 opportunity for a long, hard think on the security=20 and development of the poorest, most marginal=20 states in Southern Africa. Stabilising the entire=20 neighbourhood — as opposed to bits of it — will=20 require far, far more than the solutions which have=20 been tabled to date. Lasting security, for weak=20 states like the Comoros and Lesotho, can only=20 follow the securing of each of their individual=20 citizens in a mutually beneficial regional=20
This will require bending the rules associated with=20 the market; it will require re-thinking the role of=20 regional navies; it will require educating Southern=20 Africans to understand that the ocean is a rich and=20 important asset; and it will require strategists to=20 re-think security and politicians to re-think the=20
In times of crisis, policy-makers are always prone=20 to show some movement — often simply for its own=20 sake. Impulse is almost constantly translated into=20 motion; as one senior government official likes to=20 put it: “We make foreign policy all the time.”=20
Perhaps our proverbial fly may have offered some=20 different advice this time. Looking back, it might=20 recommend to those who are making foreign policy to=20 take a leaf from Winnie the Pooh’s book: “First,=20 you have to think a lot and then work very hard.”=20
Peter Vale, Professor of Southern African Studies=20 at the University of the Western Cape, writes on=20 South Africa’s international relations for the Mail=20 & Guardian=20