/ 19 July 2002

Who will guard the guardians?

Perhaps a moral regeneration summit is appropriate in a country where prison warders allegedly sanction the abuse of young children for a pittance and prisons become places where drug and alcohol peddling are the order of the day.

The recent allegations of corruption and abuse at Grootvlei prison serve not only to highlight unacceptably high levels of violent crime in our society, and the attendant problem of over-crowding of prisons, but also raise broader questions about mechanisms of accountability in South Africa’s democracy.

Who, if anyone, holds the key to good and accountable governance: whistle-blowers, politicians, lobbyists, ministers, MPs or ordinary citizens? Probably a mixture of all these actors.

But Parliament’s role is potentially the most interesting in sorry sagas such as what happened at Grootvlei prison and this role therefore deserves scrutiny. In terms of the Constitution, Parliament is charged with exercising oversight over the executive. When allegations about the arms deal broke, civil society organisations called for the executive to be held accountable.

Parliament therefore has a key role to play in ensuring that the government is not only held accountable for its policy options but also that the policy is implemented effectively.

Such a broad definition of oversight is most useful when interrogating the role of Parliament in a democracy. Oversight needs to be about more than members of Parliament enacting legislation. Any more skeletal definition of oversight must surely be deficient and diminishes the extraordinary role that Parliament can play in helping citizens realise their democratic rights.

But back to Grootvlei. As far back as September 1 2000 the correctional services portfolio committee, in a press release, stated that it was investigating allegations that Grootvlei prison was “highly overcrowded and that it was also holding more than 70 minors”.

A member of the portfolio committee, together with senior officials of the Correctional Services Department and provincial government representatives visited the prison in August 2000 to assess the situation. It was found that in addition to overcrowding, the prison was also holding 77 minors, thus “creating a serious problem”.

The member of the portfolio committee who was part of the delegation suggested that these minors be relocated to “safer and secure accommodation elsewhere”.

A proposal was made that perhaps some prisoners could be moved to an old unused prison near Grootvlei. It was also suggested that a report on “the exact state of the prison” should be submitted to the committee to enable it to make recommendations, presumably to the minister of correctional services.

The committee’s role in initiating the study trip to Grootvlei was commendable and was the beginning of it exercising its oversight role over the implementation of policy about prison conditions. But vigorous oversight requires that committees go further than gathering evidence on study trips.

Constitutionally, the committee has the right to push the envelope even further by calling the minister to account for action or inaction in his portfolio.

The Grootvlei incident might have been avoided if there had been closer interaction between the ministry or the department and the committee. This interaction may sometimes be antagonistic, but a continual dialogue between the executive and the legislature can only help to enhance delivery and assure the effective implementation of policy.

The right to call ministers to account is seldom used and where it has been used it has not always been effective.

What is evident is that Parliament is still in the difficult process of shaping its oversight role. This has resulted in a certain degree of awkwardness this year, particularly with the Conventional Arms Control Bill.

A proactive defence committee included a progressive clause on oversight over the sale of conventional arms. The committee’s work has been stymied for a while because the executive returned the Bill to the committee after deleting the prospective oversight clause.

In what could be construed as a parting shot ahead of her imminent resignation, Barbara Hogan, chairperson of the finance committee, has in the past weeks also expressed her frustration at the often crude exercise of oversight by committees in the National Assembly. Perhaps the crux of her speech was that oversight was important as a tool not only to give expression to the ideals of the Constitution but also to ensure delivery of socio-economic rights.

Finding a balanced way in which to exercise oversight effectively is not as simple as it seems, given that there will inevitably be a balancing of various and often conflicting political interests.

South Africa is not the first country to grapple with such complex issues. Established democracies such as the United Kingdom find themselves grappling with similar issues and with similar degrees of difficulty.

The debate over the best model of oversight for South Africa needs to take place robustly and seriously. This requires not only political will from the legislature and the executive, but also the vigilance of civil society. If we don’t muster the political will, our democracy will be the weaker for it.

Judith February is a researcher at the Institute for Democracy in South Africa