/ 7 November 2002

Keeping the show on the road

Small things please little minds they say. Well my favourite moment this political year (so far) was when Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aziz Pahad came to the end of his briefing to the media at the outset of the parliamentary session in August. I think most of us were drained just listening to the set of responsibilities that South African foreign policy has allowed to settle upon its disproportionately broad shoulders — disproportionate, that is, in the sense that this country, as Pahad’s briefing illustrated, is one that continues to punch far

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above its weight in international affairs.

Pahad himself looked somewhat drained. And he completed a list comprising, inter alia, leading the way on the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad) and selling it to the G8 summit in Canada in June, hosting the July African Union launch summit and playing a major role in managing the development of the many sub-institutions and processes attached to the creation of the African Union that South Africa now chairs, facilitating peace talks in the Great Lakes region, Angola, Burundi and the Inter-Congolese dialogue — all with significant measures of success — and the final phase of South Africa’s chairing of the non-aligned movement, which drew South Africa into many other international complexities, such as the quest for a just peace for Palestine.

Then, with a twinkle in his eyes and a wry smile, Pahad added: “and now we have the World Summit in Joburg, as if we really needed it”. The laughter this aside invoked was well meaning. Whatever the heat of media comment on Zimbabwe, there is genuine admiration for the government’s foreign policy efforts. Macroeconomic policy — whether you like the actual policy and its ideological implications or not — is one of this government’s two most effectively implemented policy areas. The other is foreign affairs, though much less is said about it. Media coverage is sparse and generally superficial. By its nature, diplomatic success can not be marketed in quite the same way as other policy gains. And there are few independent voices of civil society analysis to help us all sort the wood from the trees.

It is an arena in which President Thabo Mbeki excels. He is, no doubt about it, a brilliant diplomat. Arguably, it brings out the best in him — his curriculum vitae, his experience of the North from his days in exile, his knowledge of what makes Washington, London and Berlin tick, his inherent ideological pragmatism, his instinct for bureaucratic solutions, are all political characteristics that lend themselves very neatly to the task of foreign policy-making.

But have I come here merely to praise Caesar, or to bury him? Well, after last week, both. I am referring, of course, to the controversy surrounding the good governance component of the African Peer Review Mechanism, a device of potentially far-reaching proportion that was, or so many had led themselves to believe, the umbilical cord of Nepad.

It began when Pahad, speaking without a script at a media briefing on Monday October 28, said that the good governance component, unlike the economic and corporate governance indicators, would not be part of the Nepad African Peer Review Mechanism and that it had never been intended that it should be.

This was, to use the words of a representative of one of the G8 countries, a “bombshell”. The fact is this: the way the G8 sees it, and has always seen it since Mbeki touted Nepad to it, it is a deal. We will put serious money into Africa, by way of mechanisms such as trade facilitation and tariff reform as well as cash aid, in return for governance reform. And at its heart is the idea that the governance reform would be imposed not by the North but as an African conceptualised and implemented review of democracy and good governance, overseen by Africans on behalf of fellow Africans. Hence the “African” element of the review mechanism. Hence the “peer” element of the review mechanism.

The second selling point was that this mechanism would be “independent” and the actual reviews would be conducted by a small group of eminent persons. The clarification much later in the week by Mbeki and contained in a media release last Friday that yes, there was still to be a political review but that it would not be attached to Nepad, only served to pour oil on troubled waters.

From the G8 perspective, the “independence” derives from the notion that Nepad, and its secretariat, whom they do trust, is distinct and separate politically and institutionally from the African Union, which they do not yet trust because it is too soon to say whether it will be any different from its predecessor Organisation of African Unity.

This may be an illusion. As Mbeki has explained on a number of occasions, Nepad is now a programme — the principal socio-economic programme — of the African Union. One of his most powerful lieutenants elucidated the government’s position to me this week in the following terms: because it is mainly dealing with economic matters, it follows that the main focus of the review mechanism and the attention of the eminent persons will be on matters economic; political governance, where it impacts on economic matters, will be considered, but not in totality; political governance indicators will more properly be applied by other institutions of the African Union, such as the new African parliament or the African Commission on Human Rights.

This is perfectly logical, but is it reasonable, given the background and the core deal with the G8? The words coming out of G8 missions last week were of the “disastrous” and “betrayal” variety, though that was not, I should add, universal. The British, for example, as Nepad’s principal cheerleaders, were adopting a more sanguine and calm attitude. Indeed, it is true that the Durban declaration of the African Union launch meeting did leave open the precise institutional home for the political review mechanism. So if, for example, you read the speeches or speaking notes of Pahad or Mbeki on the subject since then, they constantly re-emphasise the linkage between Nepad and political as well as economic governance but are far less specific about its institutional setting.

At the very least, however, this has been yet another public relations disaster. Not only did the president and deputy president fail to speak with one voice last week and not only did it take five days for a definitive statement to be prepared, but the government failed to contact, from my own direct information, at least three and probably, therefore, all eight of the G8 representatives. Given that it was entirely predictable how at least some of the G8 countries would respond, the most obvious exercise would have been to contact them ahead of Pahad’s announcement and at the very least warn and explain.

Other senior advisers in government and MPs were honest in admitting that they did not know “the line”. For the very simple reason that there was no line. Cack-handed is the kindest thing I can think of saying about this episode.

The problem is that while some people recognise that Nepad is an ambitious, long-term programme, there are many who are impatient for results and quick to seize upon hiccups, of which there will be many along the way, as evidence of failure. The brutal reality is that while the French may be adopting a surprisingly supportive line ahead of their own chairing of the G8 next year, not all their colleagues will; in the words of one G8 representative here “this is Africa’s last, best chance, and it will soon pass”.

As he tried to explain to Parliament three weeks ago during presidential question time, Mbeki is trying to put together a massive jigsaw puzzle. Given that his language, as ever, matched the ornate nature of his diplomatic strategy, I suspect that the core theme of his foreign policy flew far over the heads of most MPs: the key is to balance South African leadership with African unity; the diplomatic sleight of hand for Mbeki is to lead without appearing to do so. He does not want to be seen to be going out on a limb — to do so, such as over Zimbabwe, would threaten the greater goal.

Every iota of Mbeki’s diplomatic skill and wisdom will be necessary to keep this show on the road. The message matters. Avoiding avoidable communications disasters would help his task no end.

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