Coaching at international level used to be relatively straightforward. You cut your teeth in club rugby, moved up to provincial level, developed your style and, when the big phone call arrived, used that style with the national side.
In South Africa there used to be a codicil: you couldn’t coach the Springboks unless you had been one yourself. Ian McIntosh broke the mould in 1993 and since then Kitch Christie, Harry Viljoen and now Jake White, non-Springboks all, have been allowed to do the job.
With all the vitriol aimed at White in the past month it has been interesting to note that no one has blamed his teams’ defeats on the fact that he did not play for the Springboks. Maybe, just maybe, we are growing up as a rugby nation. But if that is the case, then White needs to grow at a commensurate rate.
It is grossly unfair to simplify when we talk about coaching styles, but there was an uncomfortable amount of truth in the statement by New Zealand assistant coach Wayne Smith this week. He said that the Springboks play a game based on harrying the opposition into errors and scoring from turnover ball.
It is a method based ultimately on the so-called ”rush defence” and it is a method that won the Tri-Nations in 2004 and three games out of four in the 2005 tournament. In the context of South Africa’s record in the Tri-Nations, success on such a scale means that the method cannot be lightly cast aside. But the time has now arrived to do just that.
It has become clear during three successive defeats to France, Australia and New Zealand that opposition coaches have deciphered the rush defence. They wait for a Springbok to rush out of the line and put the ball into the space thus generated. Or they kick deep and force the defensive line to dither while it waits for play to catch up.
The downside of the system is exposed as soon as someone misses a tackle. Attackers pour through the gap into the unmanned regions in the soft white underbelly. When Fourie du Preez failed to find touch with his relieving kick in the 39th minute last week, Dan Carter only had to sidestep one man to carve the defence to shreds.
Former Wallaby great David Campese has been saying for years that the best way to break down modern defences is to ”step” through them. By which he suggests that multi-phase play is a con.
That system, brought to its finest lustre by the Brumbies, is designed to suck in defenders ruck by ruck, until space appears out wide. But just as coaches have worked out the rush defence, they have also learnt how to neutralise the multi-phase game.
So what does work? Well, several teams, the Sharks included, have gone back to a method used a quarter of a century ago. Back then it was known as the rolling maul and the lawmakers hated it so much that they legislated against it. Now it is called the driving maul and it, too, is due to be legislated out of the game, but until then it is mightily effective.
The basic idea is to shield the ball carrier, placing him at the back of a wedge of players who are bound together. Opponents cannot tackle the ball carrier because to get to him they would have to go offside.
They can’t tackle the players in the wedge, because they are not in possession. Pulling down the maul is a penalty so the only defence is to pile up players in a barricade and hope that the maul makes a mistake.
The driving maul is not a solution to current Springbok woes, but it is an example of the way that White has to approach his next few games in charge.
His methods have been worked out through overexposure, so he has to cast off his conservative mindset and try something new. That something need not involve a wholesale change of playing personnel, but it needs to address the fact that the status quo cannot continue.
While his team keeps its powder dry for next week’s Test in Sydney, White was due to meet with his bosses this week. What bosses they would be if, rather than giving White a loaded pistol and a bottle of whisky, they were to bring some innovative coaching ideas to the table.