The principal aim of the United States air strikes in southern Somalia appears to have been the elimination of three al-Qaeda suspects held responsible for the 1998 bombing of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The limited US operation was not part of the larger, Ethiopian-led military effort to topple the country’s Islamist movement and rescue Somalia’s pro-Western government — and runs the risk of undermining it.
Despite its repeated warnings that Somalia is a failed state that could turn into a breeding ground for global terror and a new Taliban, the Bush administration has no intention of getting involved on the ground there.
Washington will certainly not mourn the “large number” of Islamist fighters reportedly killed. But further “precision” strikes will only be ordered if the primary al-Qaeda targets are still alive or other wanted men are identified. To a large degree, Somalia remains forbidden territory for American presidents and generals who remember the “Black Hawk Down” catastrophe of 1993 when 18 troops died in horrific circumstances.
The strikes may give President George W Bush a needed fillip as he struggles to regain the initiative, and the American public’s confidence, in his Iraq policy. But as in Afghanistan, the predominant US focus on its “war on terror” objectives could prove counter-productive for international efforts to reverse decades of Somali violence, famine and despair. The European Commission was quick to voice such doubts this week. “Any incident of this kind is not helpful in the long term,” a spokesman said.
And despite the interim government’s support for the US action, Somali public opinion is unlikely to welcome this latest, crude infringement of the country’s battered sovereignty any more than it has welcomed the Ethiopian invaders.
This latest chapter of US military and intelligence agency involvement in Somalia dates back to November 2002 when US Central Command created and deployed a new Combined Joint Taskforce-Horn of Africa at the former French Foreign Legion base at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. The taskforce was charged with “detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist groups operating in the region by denying safe havens, external support and material assistance for terrorist activity”.
While declining to send US troops into the country, it set up a sort of “cordon sanitaire”, assuming control over all of Somalia’s air space, sea-lanes and offshore waters, and running anti-piracy and anti-insurgent naval patrols.
Despite recent naval reinforcements, US options remain severely limited in terms of resolving Somalia’s internal political and economic problems, as opposed to supposed al-Qaeda infiltration. The Union of Islamic Courts movement, which has hardline and moderate wings, has been vanquished for now. But there are persuasive reasons to believe it will attempt a comeback once the Ethiopians withdraw. Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, told al-Jazeera television last week that the pull-out would commence within two weeks.
The sense that the window of opportunity for putting Somalia on the road to recovery may quickly close has been reinforced by difficulties in assembling an African Union-sponsored protection and training force for Somalia, as envisaged by UN Security Council resolution 1725. Only Uganda has pledged troops so far.
Speaking on Monday, Javier Solana, the EU’s foreign policy chief, suggested the UN might have to provide a follow-up force. But that looks even more problematic, given the unprecedented global demands on existing UN peacekeeping capacity.
The race is also on to create an inclusive political process involving the transitional government, non-violent Islamists, reformed warlords and clan leaders. A communiqué issued by the International Contact Group for Somalia last Friday, which includes the US and Britain, stressed the importance of launching a process of political reconciliation. In a sign of the difficulties ahead, Somalia’s interim President, Adullahi Yusuf, said on Tuesday that the Islamists “would not be forgiven” and rejected the idea of talks.
The US also wants a big international push to provide immediate financial aid. Jendayi Frazer, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, has pledged $40-million in political and humanitarian assistance and is urging other countries to follow suit. But donors are not exactly tripping over each other.
All this unusually urgent diplomacy is prompted by a lurking fear: that unless Western countries swiftly come to the aid of “progressive” Somali leaders and their East African allies, the whole situation will again quickly unravel — and be exploited by extremists. But the West’s record on reconstructing damaged Muslim societies, from Iraq to Afghanistan, is a poor one. As Bush’s AC-130 gunship showed again this week, bombing is much easier. — Â