Between June and December 2006, Mogadishu and most of south-central Somalia enjoyed relative peace after the notorious warlords who devastated the country were routed by the Islamic Courts. The courts swiftly stabilised the capital and won people’s hearts by providing much-needed security. Regrettably, the law and order restored by the courts was destroyed when Ethiopian forces invaded the country in December with the support of the United States.
For Ethiopia, the emergence of an Islamic movement in Somalia presented an opportunity to regain the status it lost after the 2005 elections and to release the Western aid suspended because of its human rights abuses.
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi campaigned against the courts and convinced the US he could root out what the West perceived as a future threat to its interests. Ethiopia and the US conspired to destroy the courts, though moderate voices in the European Union favoured a negotiated settlement between the courts and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).
Since Ethiopian troops entered Mogadishu, gun prices have sky-rocketed, warlords have re-established themselves in their enclaves and armed gangs, killings, looting and clan violence have resurfaced. Security in Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia is worse than it was in the pre-courts era.
The newly arrived African Union peacekeeping forces face the daunting task of trying to stabilise this situation — one in which they are not welcome. The first AU contingent of 400 Ugandan troops that arrived this week was shelled during a welcoming ceremony at the airport. This incident could send shock waves through other African capitals planning to deploy troops to Mogadishu.
In reality, the proposed 8 000 African troops will not be enough to stabilise Mogadishu, let alone Somalia. So far, only half that number is pledged and no one is sure whether they will all be deployed. The Ugandans and Ethiopians could find themselves on their own, fighting a long and bloody war against the insurgency.
Any success by the peacekeepers will be dependent on three factors: the clarity of their mandate, the speedy withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops and the TFG’s attitude towards the national reconciliation process.
At this stage, it is not clear whether the AU operation is a peacekeeping or peace-enforcement mission. The AU troops are guided by UN security resolutions 1725 (2006) and 1744 (2007).
Although resolution 1725 states clearly that the duties of the troops are to act as peacekeepers, provide security for government buildings and train Somali security personnel, resolution 1744 is unclear. It states, for example, that the AU troops can ”provide, as appropriate, protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions to help them carry out their functions of government …”, and that AU troops can ”assist, within its capabilities and in coordination with other parties, with implementation of the National Security and Stabilisation Plan”.
Somalia and Ethiopia have gone to war on a number of occasions. Given this historical enmity, it is impossible for the Somalis to accept what is seen as their continued occupation. If the Ethiopians insist on staying, the AU peacekeepers are likely to be perceived as enforcing the Ethiopian forces. The Ethiopian occupation will not only jeopardise the safety of the AU troops, it will also make the insurgencies more popular and enhance their status as legitimate freedom fighters. The speedy withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces is crucial to the success of the AU mission.
Neither the Ethiopians nor the AU troops will be able to stabilise Somalia without the cooperation of the Somali people. The TFG, which is supported by these foreign forces and is perceived as an Ethiopian puppet government, lacks legitimacy. One can neither rebuild a failed state without the support of its people nor can one force the people to accept the imposition of a foreign system.
The interim president of the TFG, Abdullahi Yusuf, recently announced that he wants to hold a reconciliation conference. Yet, this is unlikely to produce results as it is really a ploy engineered to ease the international community’s pressure. As long as Yusuf has Ethiopia on his side, he will be unwilling to accommodate anyone. The only way a reconciliation conference can be fruitful is if the international community intervenes and all stakeholders such as the courts, civil society and the diaspora and clan elders are invited. It is important to get this one right and invite all stakeholders in order to achieve a negotiated peace agreement that includes all Somali groups.
If the indifference of the past continues — and Yusuf is allowed to derail the conference — the international community should not subsequently blame Yusuf for failing to deliver real national reconciliation. Act now or your decision will haunt you at a later date.
Mohamud Gure is the director of the United Kingdom-based Somali Peace Institute, a non-profit organisation committed to the principles of peace and reconciliation